




# INDONESIA AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR ISSUE





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
**Sudjadhan Parnohadiningrat**  
**H.E. Dr. Shaban Shahidi Moaddab**  
**H.E. Mikhail M. Bely**  
**Karyono HS**  
**Ratu Silvy Gayatri**  
**Kusnanto Anggoro**



*edited by*

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**LIPI Press**  
**Jakarta 2005**



LIPI Press, Jakarta, Indonesia

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ISBN: 979-3673-38-9

#### Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Indonesia and Iran's nuclear issue / [edited by] Indriana Kartini

xiv + 68 pp.; 14,8 x 21 cm

Includes index.

ISBN 979-3673-38-9

1. Nuclear Issues. 2. Nuclear Energy

341.755

Production editing by Sarwintyas Prahastuti, Augusto W.M. and Ari Irawan.

Layout by Prapti Sasiwi. Cover design by Arubi Nakhdiat.

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#### *Published by*



LIPI

LIPI Press, member of IKAPI

Jl. Gondangdia Lama 39, Menteng, Jakarta 10350

Telp. (021) 314 0228, 314 6942. Fax. (021) 314 4591

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# P R E F A C E

## Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue

**Indriana Kartini<sup>1</sup>**

When a country begun developing nuclear power on their own area, a global institution like the UN should take a special inspection on the country. This is necessary to assure that the country must have a high commitment of notifying the safetiness and prerequisite of developing a nuclear power. As a very high risk of nuclear radiation can be a fatal impact for the human lives, the development of nuclear power must be taken under legal institution control.

When we concern nuclear issue on Iran, our mind actually realizes that the issue remains to be a high controversial problem. The judgement of Iran's nuclear power for a civilian purpose has to be maintained under international agreement. Beyond that purposes, a country could develop a nuclear power for non-civilian purposes. For the later purposes, the international community must take a serious consideration on it. Actually, Iran has signed the international agreement on development of nuclear reactor.

Meanwhile the United States has believed that Iran has been developing the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). That is a judgement for the US to take military action towards Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> Chairman of the Organizing Committee of Workshop "Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue" and researcher at Centre for Political Studies-Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI).

The international community has been apprehensive about this issue and raised question, will Iran be the next target of the US pre-emptive strike doctrine?

In February 2, 2005, in the State of the Union address, President George W. Bush stated that the US has committed to halt regimes which developed the weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism, especially the Iranian (and Suriah) government. The US has been convinced that Iranian government has been developing a nuclear programme for military purpose. On the contrary, the Iranian government denied the accusation and stated that the Iranian nuclear programme is developed for civilian purpose. As such, for the Bush administration, the possibility of US military action against Iran is a rational choice.

“Psy-war” between Teheran and Washington in the context of Iranian nuclear issue has created the political escalation in the Middle East. The international community concerns about the US intention to attack Iran. Although, the pre-emptive strike doctrine is not a brand new doctrine in the US foreign policy, it is implied by Bush administration intensively. In fact, the implementation of the doctrine does not bring about a world peace. Otherwise, it is a threat to international security.

In order to minimize dispute between Iran and US, a European trio of Britain, France and Germany guided by a policy of “constructive engagement” want to be a mediator for these two opposite country. A breakthrough came soon after when Iran - possibly sensing its last chance for a deal - made an agreement with the EU nations. The Iran’s decision to suspend uranium enrichment is a sign of good faith while more rigorous inspection methods were implemented.

Meanwhile, the Islamic World also responses to this political escalation, particularly in the context of the Iran’s nuclear

issue. In Pakistan, for example, chairman of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Abdullah Badawi (also Malaysia Prime Minister), has called the Islamic countries, to stand together against the US intention to take military action to Iran, including Indonesia of which one of the member of OIC.

As a country with majority Muslim population, Indonesia has an important role in regional and international stage. Correspond with its foreign policy principle, Indonesia always stands against any form of colonialism in the world, including US invasion to Iraq. In the era of Megawati Soekarnoputri administration, Indonesia has performed its consistency by denying the military invasion towards Iraq. The Indonesian government perceived that the US unilateral action to Iraq is a another form of colonialism toward an independent and sovereign country. Therefore, Indonesian government has asked the United Nations to pursue US responsibility for the tragedy in Iraq.

In the case of Iran, Indonesia certainly has to answer the OIC and international call for standing together against US intention to attack Iran. Although, there is a transition of government in Indonesia, this development should not change the Indonesian commitment to stand against any form of colonialism. Therefore, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, today, must united with the Islamic world in particular, and rest of the world in general in order to establish a world peace by standing together against US military intention toward Iran.



## **Opening Speech**

### **International Workshop “Indonesia and Iran’s Nuclear Issue” Centre for Political Studies-Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI) Jakarta, April 28, 2005**

**Dr. Umar Anggara Jenie  
(Head of Indonesian Institute of Sciences –LIPI)**

Excellency, the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran,  
Excellency, the Ambassador of Russian Federation,  
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of LIPI, let me first give the highest appreciation for your presence and welcome to LIPI.

LIPI is a national research institute. It was founded in 1967 and consists of 22 research centers, covering various discipline of sciences, including Political, Social and Humanity Sciences.

The Center for Political Sciences carries out research activities on political matters, whether nationally or internationally. These activities include assessing on contemporary politics, such as local, national and international politics. Besides, LIPI also conducts cooperation with

other research institutions, both local and foreign. LIPI also provides any recommendation concerning political matters to the government.

As we already known, the issue of Iran's nuclear remains to be an important one. Although Iran is an oil producer country, it realizes that sooner or later its oil well is running out. Therefore, it is quite understandable, that the Iranian Government is now looking for other energy resources. One of the most efficient is nuclear energy. It is the right of every sovereign country to choose any alternative policies in developing their energy policy. IRAN is not exceptional. But, we know now that Iran, as part of developing country is now under strong pressure from the West, to abandon its nuclear project. This is now become an important issues, and of course need to be solved justly and proportionally.

As a research institute, LIPI has responsibility to contribute scientific analysis concerning that problem and hopefully it could give a "small" but meaningful contribution to make the world safer.

# 1

## **Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue**

Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat

(Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs)

This subject has been in the spotlight since President Bush of the United States in his annual State of the Union address bluntly named Iran as constituting an alliance of menace – axis of evil, threatening world peace by its development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To begin our discussion on this particular subject matter, let me first of all furnish the audience with Indonesia's policy on disarmament which is basically stipulated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Paragraph IV of the Preamble clearly stated that Indonesia is to "... participate in creating a world order based on lasting peace...". Indonesia is of the view that the threat posed by the development, possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to international peace and security is imminent. Subsequently, disarmament of weapon of mass destruction is imperative.

Throughout the years, Indonesia has taken an active part to address the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction in various bilateral, regional and global forums. It is the Indonesian Government's policy that the disarmament issues, both concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction and conventional weapons, are to be addressed collectively taking every country's legitimate security interests into consideration.

Indonesia promotes the ideals of controlling armaments to the lowest possible level while holding the principles of

undiminished security for any member of the international community. In this regard, the term “disarmament” is defined to include control, restriction, regulation, reduction as well as abolition of certain types of classes of weaponry.

The full implementation of multilaterally agreed norms and legally binding international instruments for the reduction, control or abolition or certain, of certain type of class of weaponry in our view serves to strengthen the pursuit of international peace and security. Awareness of the horrendous consequences of the use of Weapons of Mass Destructions has also become one of the grounds for Indonesia to pursue the objective of a world free of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and as a country that does not possess nor has the intention to develop, acquire, nuclear or other Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is only logical that Indonesia also renounces these types of weaponry.

Indonesia’s articulation of its commitment to disarmament can be traced back to its role as one of the founding fathers of the Non Align Movement (NAM), which since its inception in 1961 expressed continuously the views, which were critical of the super-powers. And as a member of the Movement which perceived the rivalry and entangling Cold War at that time, alliances as a threat to international peace and security, at the subsequent years, Indonesian representatives took a leading role in various forums dealing with the question of disarmament together with call member of the Non Align Movement.

Indonesia continuously call for the abolition of doctrines, concepts and strategies that have potentially to drag, that have potential to drag states to an armed conflict or open war, including those that employs Weapons of Mass Destruction with its attendant consequences, the quest for the world free of Weapons of Mass Destruction is therefore become a core Indonesian foreign policy



in term of international peace and security. Throughout the years, together with Non Align Movement members, Indonesia had persistently advocated the importance of multilateral approach, in dealing with disarmament issues.

Being a member of the United Nations, Indonesia is bound by the Charter of this organization. Together with other peace-loving countries, Indonesia subscribes to the ideal that the less armaments possessed by the major power, the lesser the potential threat to international peace and security. It is for this ideal that Indonesian delegation in any disarmament forum, strives to seize every opportunity to advance its course, formulate proposals and get Indonesia's viewpoints included in the forum's final outcome.

In 1979, Indonesia became an original member of the 31 nation Committee on Disarmament (CD), lately converted to become Conference on Disarmament, established by SSOD I. Indonesian CD membership coupled with the functioning of a newly established national inter-agencies mechanism at the national level, soon transformed Indonesia's disarmament policy outlook. Nuclear disarmament and the objective of total elimination of the nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction became one of Indonesia's priority concerns.

As excerpted from the report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the document GOV/2003/75 of November 2003, that is derestricted 26 November 2003, Iran has acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, uranium centrifuge enrichment program, and for 12 years, a laser enrichment program. This is in so far as the report by the Directorate General of the IAEA produce. In that context it was reported the Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes. This country also admitted that it failed to report a large number of

conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear materials, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

Iran was also said to have failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear materials and its processing in use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.

The disclosure of Iran's programs was seen by many that in the past, this country has concealed different aspects of its nuclear activities. It was also seen by number of states member of the IAEA as a breach of this country's obligation under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. While most of the said, I have to say while most of the said breaches because this is the controversial issue and need to be look further from which perspective and which angle. While most of the said breaches identified to date, have only involve limited quantities of nuclear materials, they involve sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. The nuclear materials in question would definitely require require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes. However, the failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement, has given rise to serious concern of a number of IAEA member states.

In response to this concern – and given the stalemate between the US, Iran and IAEA and the context of finding resolution in the issue of this particular sensitiveness of an fuel cycle and reprocessing plan, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany made approaches to the government of Iran. The result was that Iran as reported had undertaken to comply with the three elements of the Agencies Board's resolution :

- 1) to engage in full co-operation with the Agency to address and resolve, through full transparency, all requirement and outstanding issue of the Agency, and clarify and correct any possible failure and deficiencies within the IAEA;
- 2) to sign the IAEA additional protocol, and commence ratification procedures, as well as to co-operate with the Agency, in accordance with the protocol in advance of its ratification;
- 3) to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, as defined by the IAEA;

To cope with that problem we, Indonesia, consider it critically important that all states must remain committed to their non-proliferation obligations under the existing non-proliferation treaties and strengthen the non-proliferation policies. Indonesia as a part of state party to the NPT as an initiator of the Southeast Asia nuclear weapons free zone and as a country that has no possess that doesn't has intention to produce or to research on nuclear weaponry has strong views that all the issue involving breaches or elaborates, has to be address in the context of the implementation of the existing regime that govern the activities of any countries in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The objectives of nuclear disarmament including the universalization of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) therefore become imperative necessity. In the world where stability and security continue to be challenged by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the full implementation of the treaty is the only way and it's vital to avoid any irregularities that may lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We believe, therefore in this respect that the pressing challenges that need to be responded by the international community, collectively include :

- 1) development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors;
- 2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies;
- 3) non compliance;
- 4) an increasing assertion of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines; and
- 5) a trend toward the qualitative enhancement of nuclear weapons by some nuclear weapons states.

With regard to the issue of Iran's nuclear program, Indonesia welcomes the Islamic Republic of Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Guarantees Agreements and its continued cooperation with the Agency. This is the only way for the international community together with Iran to address the doubt that may have been created. Indonesia stresses the importance of the IAEA's Safeguards, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model Additional Protocol, which are among the essential elements of the system and the importance of achieving the universal application of the IAEA's safeguard system. In this regard, we, Indonesia, urge all state member of IAEA and state parties to the NPT, particularly, which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguard agreements, to do so as soon as possible.

Indonesia holds the inalienable rights of member states of the IAEA and state parties to the NPT, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the NPT and, or, the Statute of the IAEA. As a state party to the NPT and as member state to the IAEA, Indonesia fully supports the right of each state party and member state of the agency, to engage in research, production and use of nuclear for peaceful purposes. Free and

unimpeded and non discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all states parties should be fully ensured to help promote state parties economic development.

Indonesia is of the view that the issue of Iran's nuclear program have to be settled in a peaceful manner in the context of multilateral approach. The issue and coercive or unilateral approach, did not prove to be right solution to the question. Therefore, it is crucial for the countries in the region, together with the international community, to continuously engaged in dialogue toward creating a Weapons of Mass Destruction-free Middle East Zone.



## **Indonesia and Iranian Nuclear Issue**

H.E. Dr. Shaban Shahidi Moaddab

(Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Republic of Indonesia)

This issue is a condemned property inherited to us from the Imperial regime which was toppled in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution. Iranian nuclear activity is four and a half decades old. In 1960 the bilateral Iran America agreement according to which Iran could have its own nuclear program began. In 1967 Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRS) was built and the Americans equipped it with a 5 Megawatt nuclear research reactor. This reactor could provide necessary neutron flux for preliminary research purposes. The fuel elements used in this reactor were highly enriched U<sup>235</sup>. In 1968 Iran joined the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

After the soaring oil price in 1972, Iranian regime decided to have access to nuclear power plants. Contacts were made with the Americans and Washington agreed that the Shah of Iran should have 23 Nuclear power plants by the year 2000. In 1975 Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State signed the national security decision memorandum 292 titled: "Iran's Nuclear Cooperation" through which US would benefit \$6 billions of Iranian Petrodollars. In those days Iran was pumping 6 million barrels of oil per day.

In 1976 President Gerald Ford signed a directive offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S. built reprocessing facility for extracting Plutonium from nuclear reactor spent fuel

elements. The deal was for a complete “Nuclear Cycle”. Nuclear contracts were signed by different western countries and several hundred Iranian students were sent to MIT in the US and French Commissaria a l’energie atomique and England to be trained as engineers and technicians to run the to be installed nuclear power plants.

The first western company to ring Iran’s nuclear bell was German Siemens, which started the construction of two 1300 Mwatt electric nuclear plants in Southern Iranian port Bushehr in 1974. It will be very interesting to know that when Bushehr project started, no such huge nuclear power plant existed elsewhere in the world, since up to then, Europeans and Americans only had 900 Mwatt power producing reactor units. Siemens-Krafterke Union put its full force to finish Bushehr reactor in 1979. A colossal amount of engineering work was done.

In addition to that huge project, the German industrial giant was to desalinate thousands of cubic meters sea water in a day in order to provide fresh water not only for two Units daily consumption but also to provide irrigation water for Bushehr province.

When the Islamic Revolution took place in 1979, 90% of the work was done in Bushehr and 60% of equipments were already installed. Since then Germans decided to lag the construction and to procrastinate the delivery of necessary elements or components and the completion of the project came to standstill.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1981, Bushehr project was in complete halt and after the Iraqi Air Force targeted Bushehr Installation and missiles penetrated the reactor dome and exploded inside, the project was halted and German engineers left Bushehr.



When Iran accepted the 598 Resolution of the Security Council and Iraqi invasion came to an end, the government of President Rafsanjani started its reconstruction plan.

As a consequence of the war many Iranian existing power plants had been severely damaged or totally destroyed and the country was facing daily long hours black outs.

The new government started to repair the damaged power plants and in its long term reconstruction strategy decided to go back to nuclear energy. Contacts were made with the Germans to complete the unfinished Bushehr project. They refused. Other western countries also gave in to U.S. pressure. Therefore, the government of President Rafsanjani decided to ask the Russia to come to the rescue of Bushehr and invited the Chinese to construct two new units of 300 Mwatts power plants.

To finish first unit of Bushehr project, and after lengthy negotiations, finally Tehran and Moscow signed an \$800 millions deal in January 1995, and in August 1995 another \$300 millions deal of fuel delivery. Knowing the technical and engineering differences in German and Russian technology the 1300 Mwatts PWR could not be completed according to the initial project. Russian VVER-1 1000 Mwatts would in fact replace the existing power plants after redesigning the turbine room and replacing the vertical German generator space with the horizontal Russian type. Russians were supposed to finish the project in four years.

We are in April 2005. Bushehr project is still not completed. Fuel has not been delivered to Iran yet. Russia is under immense pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv. Negotiations with Chinese for the construction of two 300 Mwatts power plants have ended with no concrete result.

At the same time, power demand in Iran witnesses a 7 – 8% annual increase. 3000 MW new capacity is only needed for

the year 2005. While the electricity production on 2003 was 31000 Mwatts it should stand at 36000 Mwatts by the end of this year. Just 7% of the generated electricity comes from hydroelectric plants and the rest rely on fossil fuel and natural gas.

The price of oil is rising and to burn this “noble fuel” just to produce electricity does not seem logical in long term. Knowing that, no matter how rich our oil resources, wells would be depleted sooner or later. The value-added which derives from petrochemicals and oil’s bi-products by itself is a solid proof that explains why we should develop our petrochemical industry rather than burning oil to produce electricity.

Technologically speaking, Iran, like any other country in the world should have access to nuclear scientific know-how. Just to mention that one gram of a radioactive element, dearly needed in radio-therapy costs more than 100 barrel of crude oil.

Furthermore, Iran is a country experiences severe weather fluctuations every year. For at least three month 2/3 of its territory has a temperature of over 30 degrees. And in the southern provinces heat rises over 40 Celsius in summer. Radioactive conservation techniques would effectively preserve food stuff in such weather. On the other hand, during the winter in 2/3 of the country temperature falls below zero for three months and huge energy is needed for heating. With such naked facts we have no other option but to diversify our energy resources by taking advantage of nuclear energy and technology to meet our ever-increasing daily and long term needs.

When the West decided to sell nuclear technology to Iran to provide it with 23 nuclear reactors, Iran had only a population of 34 millions and roughly only 5000 thousands out of 50.000 Iranian villages had access to electricity. Today we are 69 millions people with more than 95% of villages benefiting from electricity.

Iran is paving its way towards industrial development very quickly. We produce 13 million tons of cement and over 10 million tons of steel annually. In 1979 Iran was a big importer of wheat. Today with 13 million tons of wheat production, Iran is self-sufficient. This simply means that our agriculture is mechanized. Such argument, therefore, should convince those who say “a country floating over a sea of oil and gas does not need nuclear electricity”. Iran, which is in extreme need of energy to meet its industrial needs, therefore, has developed its own uranium resources and has trained as well the required scientists and technicians.

I am not going to discuss Iran’s international undertakings with regards to its nuclear program. But I would like to emphasize that although Tehran became a signatory of NPT in 1968, it signed the revised NPT after the Revolution without any reservation. Even before the Islamic Revolution, Iran initiated the idea of nuclear-free Middle East and nuclear-free Indian Ocean. The already troubled region of Middle East would be safer and more prosperous if no country in that region pursued nuclear weapon program and if all nuclear activities were put under international regimes of surveillance and inspection.

During the last three decades the IAEA experts have done frequent professional inspections in Iran. Iranian nuclear programs and relevant research or production sites have gone through all sorts of safety verifications. Even though Iran’s ability in manifesting its potentials is proven, it has respected its obligations. Iran has signed the Additional Protocol for surprised inspections of its nuclear installations and started its voluntary implementation even before ratification of the Protocol by Iranian Parliament. Furthermore, and to build further confidence, Iran has temporarily suspended all its enrichment activities.

The logic behind NPT and all other international instruments is the balance of rights and obligations. No country in the world would impose upon itself obligations of international agreements if it does not see commensurate compensatory rights in them. Iran has complied fully with its obligations according to NPT and not even a single trace of diversion towards restricted areas has been reported so far by IAEA. The question now is what have we been granted in compensation of what we have given? What Iran is asking for is non-discriminatory implementation of NPT as a whole package and that's all.

We are living in a global village. Conventional barriers in trade are falling one after another. Free flow of information has become a universal slogan. In such a world what should not be allowed is practicing of double standard measures. According to Article 4 of NPT<sup>1</sup>, Iran has the inalienable right to have its own nuclear program with peaceful purposes.

Nuclear industry is a sophisticated chain of different technologies. To produce nuclear energy uranium mines should

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<sup>1</sup> ARTICLE 4 of NPT:

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

be explored and exploited. Discovered ores should be extracted, purified, and after complicated chemical processes and fabrication delicacies, fuel rods must be fabricated. To have a successful fuel fabrication we need to have well equipped laboratories.

Thanks God, the Islamic Republic of Iran has developed its indigenous nuclear technology and in a world in which the chief of the global village is deciding for others, Iran has no other choice but to rely upon itself. In conclusion, if nuclear technology is good for the United State and others, then it should be good for Iran as well. What is good for goose is certainly good for the gander.

## **Annex:**

Table 1.

<b>Iran's Economic Overview</b>	
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	(2004E) : \$155.4 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate	(2003E): 6.7% (2004E): 5.8% (2005E): 5.4%
Major Export Partners (2003)	Japan, China, Italy, Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea
Major Import Partners (2003)	Germany, France, China, Italy, UAE, South Korea, Russia, Japan
Merchandise Exports (2004E)	\$40.1 billion
Merchandise Imports (2004E)	\$33.2 billion
Merchandise Trade Surplus (2004E)	\$6.8 billion
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (2004E)	80%-90%
Foreign Reserves (2004E)	\$24.4 billion
External Debt (2004E)	\$11.9 billion (around 8% of GDP)

Table 2.

<b>Iran's Energy Overview</b>	
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/05E)	125.8 billion barrels
Crude Oil Production Capacity	3.9 MMBD
Oil Production (2004E)	4.1 MMBD (of which, 3.9 MMBD was crude oil)
Oil Consumption (2004E)	1.5 MMBD
Net Oil Exports (2004E)	2.6 MMBD
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/05E)	940 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
Natural Gas Consumption (2002E)	2.80 Tcf
Electric Generation Capacity (2005E)	36.0 gigawatts (2002 = 28 gigawatts) (around 90% conventional thermal - oil, gas, and coal)

### 3

## **Iran's Nuclear Issue in Russian Perspective**

H.E. Mikhail M. Bely

(Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Indonesia)

This workshop "Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue" provides with good opportunity to systemize the views on the much debated issue and gives the chance of finding a balanced. Then in the final session of this paper will arrive at win-win approach that not only reflects the interests of the Iranian people but will help to remove certain concerns of the international community about character of the Iran's Nuclear Program.

This paper is to dwell upon three aspects of the issue of non-proliferation and Iran's nuclear program in Russian perspective:

- Russia's stance on the issue of non-proliferation;
- The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its future prospects;
- Russia's position on peaceful usage of atomic energy and our approach to Iran's nuclear program.

#### **1. Russia's Stance on the Issue of Non-proliferation and Our Work in This Sphere**

Annually the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which is a universal international forum on disarmament and security, considers more than 50 agenda items on the maintenance of a strategic balance in the world and the search for collective responses to the new challenges and threats

of today, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.

In June 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation (the Russian Federation was one of its co-sponsors) aimed at helping our countries in the struggle against “black markets” for weapons. This resolution is very important in view of the increasing danger of terrorists gaining access to WMD.

During the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly the First Committee unanimously adopted the joint Russian-US draft resolution entitled “Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the New Strategic Framework”. It reaffirms the fundamental importance of the Russian-US partner relationship for the safeguarding of international security and strategic stability, and welcomes the practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons.

On April 1, 2005 the Ad-hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly finished the work on the proposed by Russia Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This is the first universal treaty, aimed at preventing terrorist acts with the use of nuclear material and other radioactive substances. Speaking of the contents of the Convention, it aims in the first place:

- To provide a legal basis for effective counteraction against acts of nuclear terrorism, including their suppression and the elimination of consequences;
- To ensure the antiterrorist protection of both the peaceful and military atomic devices, and to suppress terrorist acts involving the use of self-made nuclear devices;
- To ensure the inevitability of persons guilty of acts of nuclear terrorism being brought to justice, on the basis of the “either extradite or try” principle.



The Convention will be open for signature during Summit 2005, the meeting of leaders of the UN member states in New York.

## **2. Concerning Thirty-Fifth Anniversary of Entry into Force of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its future prospects**

The Russian Federation strongly believes that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the most extensive international document in the sphere of non-proliferation. NPT is a time-tested instrument, which has become a pillar of the system of international security. The thirty five years have convincingly demonstrated the effectiveness of the well-balanced structure of the obligations therein contained with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

Today the NPT and the non-proliferation regime based on it are going through not easy times, having been confronted with new challenges and threats, of which the main one is the potential danger of use of nuclear materials for terrorist purposes. At the same time, despite all the changes in the world, the Treaty was and remains a major mechanism for checking the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

As a state party to the NPT and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation has undeviatingly been abiding by its obligations under the Treaty and exerting efforts to impart to it a universal character.

The Seventh NPT Review Conference will be held in New York in May 2005 to survey the Treaty's operation and outline specific steps for the future, aimed at strengthening the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation.

### **3. Russia's Position on Peaceful Usage of Atomic Energy and on Iran's Nuclear Program**

A firm Russian position towards the issue of non-proliferation does not mean that the states should not cooperate in the sphere of peaceful atomic power. The adherence to principles of non-proliferation, UN and IAEA resolutions, rules and procedures, in our view, is prerequisite for such cooperation, the umbrella for interaction in this direction.

The Russian Federation cooperates with many European and Asian states in the sphere of peaceful atomic energy. For example, we are working closely with France's fuel processing from their nuclear plants, some CIS states where we have joint energy projects, India where we are building nuclear plants together. With Indonesia we initiated the Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Usage of Atomic Energy, which has been recently completed and is ready for signing.

And one of our partners is Iran. Russia and Iran work exclusively in the sphere of peaceful atomic power. We are helping Iran in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, constructing its own very much needed plants. Our cooperation completely fits into the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions, it is proceeding under full IAEA control. In this regard we are of the view that we do not have to convince anyone about peaceful character of cooperation with Iran.

To be certain that our partners are not using our cooperation for military goals, we have secured appropriate amendments to be made in our bilateral agreements. According to these amendments, Russia has received the right to have back Iran's nuclear fuel that has been processed at the nuclear power station in Bushehr. We are certain that Iran's nuclear program is not

directed towards creating nuclear weapons, nuclear cycle technologies and uranium enrichment.

As a parallel step that shows openness of our bilateral cooperation with Iran, we have established close ties with the EU Troika – France, Britain and Germany – so as to be certain that the Iranian program contains a peaceful character and that the resolution on Iran, adopted last November by the IAEA Board of Governors, is fully complied with.

Moreover we have repeatedly welcomed the statements of Washington, including the statements of President George Bush, that the US would want a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Iranian problem. I think that the EU Troika's involvement in the direct talks with Iran, the involvement of Russia in its own cooperation with Iran, which is being coordinated with the EU Troika's efforts, the exchange of views, and the elaboration of steps which will help everybody move in this direction, coupled with the productive participation of the US, will be useful.

The good thing is that the key participants in the talks on settling the Iran nuclear problem favor a political solution to it, and there are real opportunities for this. Three European states have reached agreement with Iran on freezing the uranium enrichment program and on continued close cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.

As Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, recently said "Iran should not feel that it is being infringed upon in its use of the modern achievements of science and technology". Iran is our neighbor, it is a big country, and to infringe upon on a country like Iran is counterproductive. We do believe that a country like Iran and the Iranian people must not be humiliated. Iran has assured the world that it is giving up the production of nuclear cycle technology.

We believe that major progress has been attained on closing the Iranian nuclear dossier. We also hope that the Iranian side itself will be forthcoming and most cooperative with IAEA experts to dispel any lingering suspicion in some quarters about its aims in the nuclear field.

To sum up this presentation, there are its main points.

- 1) The fact that the nuclear Iranian program has been in the focus of the world community does not nullify our responsibilities in respect of construction of nuclear plant in Iran. Russia proceeds from the assumption that only IAEA has the right to give assessment to the observance by Iran its responsibilities under NPT.

Our further policy towards cooperation with Iran in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy we intend to pursue on the basis of existing bilateral agreements taking into account position of IAEA, UN, other international organizations but not on individual assessments of the third parties.

- 2) At this moment we have no additional contracts with Iranian side in the area of atomic energy except Bushehr. But we are discussing other possibilities to expand our cooperation. It goes without saying that all our cooperation has been completely transparent and based on the observance by international obligations by both sides. That is why Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot cause any questions not to mention claims from the point of view of nuclear proliferation. As I have already mentioned any Russian participation in construction of nuclear power station in Iran is possible on the terms of obligations that Iran returns the processed nuclear fuel back to Russia.
- 3) We have high degree of understanding with our European partners on so called Iranian nuclear issue. We all proceed

from one very important and indisputable principle - the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

All our actions on Iranian nuclear dossier are guided by this principle, we adhere to it and seek such approaches to solve the problem that will not infringe the Iranian interests in realization of its plans in peaceful use of nuclear energy.



## 4

# **Information and Issues on Multilateral Cooperation and Regulation of Nuclear Science and Technology**

Karyono HS

(Deputy Chairman for Development of Nuclear Material Cycle  
Technology and Engineering – BATAN)

### **I. IAEA**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world's centre of nuclear cooperation. Created in 1957 as the intergovernmental “atoms for peace” organization within the UN system, the IAEA contributes to global peace, development, and security in essential ways – helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and fostering safe, secure and peaceful uses of beneficial nuclear technologies for human development.

Article 2 of the Statute: The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The IAEA mission covers three main pillars of work, with authority rooted in its Statute:

- 1) Safeguard and Verification, including safeguards inspections under legal agreements with States to verify

the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear material and activities.

- 2) Safety & Security, including the establishment of safety standards, codes, and guides and assistance to help States apply them.
- 3) Science & Technology, including technical and research support for nuclear applications in health, agriculture, energy, environment and other fields.

The work is multi-faceted and engaged multiple governmental and other partners at national, regional and international levels in and outside the UN system.

IAEA programmes and budgets are set through decisions of its own policymaking bodies – the 35 – member Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States. Reports on IAEA activities are submitted periodically or as cases warrant to the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly.

Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (NST) among IAEA Member States:

- 1) RCA : 17 countries in Asia and the Pacific region
- 2) AFRA : African region
- 3) ARCAL : Latin America region

Some Topical Agenda in the 48th General Conference, 20-24 September 2004 :

- 1) Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. This item is pursuant to resolution GC(46)/RES/9 and GC(47)/RES/7.
- 2) Nuclear security – measures to protect against nuclear terrorism, pursuant to resolution GC(47)/RES/8



- 3) Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities. This item is pursuant to resolution GC(47)/RES/9, operative paragraph 15.
- 4) Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications, pursuant to resolution GC(47)/RES/10
- 5) Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, pursuant to resolution GC(47)/RES/11, operative paragraph 17
- 6) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pursuant to operative paragraph 10 of resolution GC(47)/RES/12.
- 7) Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, pursuant to operative paragraph 9 of resolution GC(47)/RES/13.
- 8) Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. This item is pursuant to the statement by the President of General Conference, endorsed by the Conference, contained in GC(47)/DEC/13.

Outline of the Statement of Director General IAEA in the 48<sup>th</sup> GC, 20-24 September 2004: Scope areas

1) Nuclear Power Technology

- Nuclear Power : Current Status and Outlook
- Advances in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- Nuclear Production of Hydrogen
- Nuclear Desalination
- Plant Life Management and Decommissioning
- Addressing Waste and Fuel Cycle Concerns
- Nuclear Knowledge Management

- Nuclear Power: Looking Ahead
- 2) Nuclear Applications :
    - Food and Agriculture
    - Human Health
    - Water Resources Management
    - Environmental Applications
    - Future Challenges in Nuclear Applications
  - 3) Nuclear Safety and Security
    - Nuclear Installation Safety
    - Status of International Conventions
    - Safety Standards
    - Safety Missions
    - International Nuclear Safety Group
    - International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX)
    - Radiological Criteria for Radionuclides in Commodities
    - Regulatory Infrastructures for Radiation Safety and the Control of Radioactive Sources
    - Nuclear Security and Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism
    - Future Challenges in Nuclear Safety and Security
  - 4) Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    - Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
    - The Safeguards Implementation Report on Safeguards Statement for 2003
    - Integrated Safeguards
    - Verification Activities in Iraq
    - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
  - Implementation of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
  - Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East
  - Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation
  - Future Challenges in Nuclear Verification
- 5) Technical Cooperation Programme
- TC Programme Management
  - Status of Technical Cooperation Funding
  - Future Challenges in Technical Cooperation

Outline of the Statement of Director General IAEA in the 48<sup>th</sup> GC, 20-24 September 2004: Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran) :

- 1) The Board has continue to devote considerable attention to the implementation of Iran's NPT safeguard agreement
- 2) Agency's verification of Iran's compliance with its legal obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement, and
- 3) Agency's monitoring of Iran's voluntary undertakings to suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as confidence building measures requested by the Board.
- 4) Two issues remain central to understanding the extend and nature of Iran's nuclear programme:
  - The origin of uranium contamination found at various location in Iran
  - The extent of Iran's effort to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design.
- 5) Agency has made some progress in understanding both issues, but additional investigation is needed

- 6) Iran needs therefore, as Board made it explicitly clear last week, to continue to accelerate its cooperation, pursuing a policy of maximum transparency and confidence building, so that Agency can bring the remaining outstanding issues to resolution within the next few months and provide assurance to the international community.

## II. NPT

### Non-Proliferation Strategies :

- 1) The NPT remain the most notable accomplishment of multilateral nuclear arms control.
- 2) With 187 States party to the treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to the international agreement after the UN Charter, but with the notable absence of three nuclear weapons capable States : India, Pakistan and Israel.
- 3) Four nuclear weapon free zones have successfully been established – in Latin America and the Caribbean, The South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa And in Central Asia, that is currently being negotiated.

### Outline of the Statement of the DG on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

- 1) Since 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent.
- 2) The achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of “security”.
- 3) The first WMD was not nuclear weapons, but biological and chemical weapons which the ban on their use and

also their acquisition is adopted through respectively 1975 BWC and 1997 CWC.

- 4) The approach to containing the proliferation of - and eventually eliminating – nuclear weapons has been rather different. Instead of an outright ban on their use or acquisition, a gradual approach was adopted under the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT).
- 5) Different commitments were undertaken by two distinct groups of States :
  - for the five nuclear weapon States – that is, States that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967 – a commitment to divest themselves of those weapons through “good faith” negotiations; and
  - for all other States, a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to accept IAEA verification of all their peaceful nuclear activities, in return for assured access to peaceful nuclear technology through the technology holders.

### **III. Actual questionnaires on the NST aspects in Multilateral and Non-Multilateral regimes**

#### 1) What are the challenges for nonproliferation regime?

The main challenges for nonproliferation regime are how to implement fully and universality by all parties to the treaty, to solve fairly the specific matters of substance problems such as disarmament, middle-east resolution, and arm control including illicit trafficking of nuclear materials as well as proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by state and/or non-states actors.

- 2) What is the reaction of Indonesian people (or official) to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540? How do they see Resolution?

The definition for the purpose of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 deals with the means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned system capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that are specially designed for such use. Indonesia does neither intend to have nor to develop any WMD.

This is the basic principle of Indonesian politics that correspond to the Indonesian Constitution Preamble : Indonesia promote actively world peaceful purposes, the human right, anti colonialism and national independency and people welfare. As a member of the UNO Indonesia obligatory must follow such resolution and therefore she has sent the report on his efforts to eliminate illicit trafficking and disseminating WMD to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Nevertheless, the implementation of Resolution 1540 should take into consideration the disarmament efforts that have been carried out in the multilateral forum and should respect and be in accordance with the international laws.

- 3) Indonesia is a member of the NPT, CWC, and BWC, but not a member of other nonproliferation regimes like MTCR and PSI, Why is it?

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 as an instrument for preventing the proliferation of delivery system of WMD. It is non-multilateral regime.

The basic principle of Indonesian politics sides with all peaceful purposes and against any human /mankind destruction.

It is shown enough through her membership in IAEA, NPT, CWC, BWC, and ratification of Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, Indonesia supports the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Principally Indonesia supports any international efforts for non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD, based on core principle of multilateralism and lawful manner in the international laws.

- 4) Many countries insist on strengthening export control on material relating to WMD including products mainly for civil uses in fear of being used for weapons purposes. Does Indonesia needs stronger export control?

Strengthening such export control for nuclear materials is needed through the IAEA guidelines. Beyond radio isotopes and radio pharmaceuticals for health care purposes, Indonesia has no other nuclear materials or nuclear products relating to WMD to be exported.

In case if in the future our fuel element products for reactors is exportable, Indonesia will certainly follow and strict with the IAEA guidelines.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was initiated on May 31, 2003 as an instrument for preventing the WMD proliferation, distribution systems, and all material relating to them in around the world. PSI is also beyond the multilateral instruments and although stated to strengthen the NPT regime however such non-multilateral policy just tends to reduce the credibility of NPT, CWC and BWC regimes. It might give a stimulus to establishment of new mechanism - beyond the multilateral instruments - relating to discriminative and selective export control regimes such as MTCR, HCOC, etc.

Furthermore, based on the lawfulness Indonesia is respectful toward UNCLOS 1982. As a biggest peninsula country Indonesia has been contributing very much to the development of this international maritime law and I think she could not support the interdiction concept of work mechanism and application of PSI that is principally and legally in contradiction with UNCLOS in which Indonesia is a party to.

- 5) Many developing countries say that strong export control will become obstacle to their trade. In addition, they say developed countries which have advanced technologies are trying to keep the technologies by strong export control, and so it is a kind of discriminatory policy by advanced countries. How does Indonesia see these assertions?

Indonesia, I think the same to any other people or nation, supports very much the peaceful purposes for human being without any kind of discriminatory policy by other countries.



## 5

# Iran's Nuclear Issue in Indonesia's Perspective\*<sup>1</sup>

Ratu Silvy Gayatri

(Directorate of International Security and Disarmament  
Department of Foreign Affairs)

### **I. Introduction**

I was asked to speak specifically on “Iran’s Nuclear Issue in Indonesia’s Perspective”. My presentation will consist of three parts. After this introduction, I would like to share with you Indonesia’s view on weapons of mass destruction; and as expected by the organizing committee, later on, I will touch upon the Iran’s nuclear issue in Indonesia’s perspective, followed by a conclusion.

### **II. Indonesia’s View on weapons of mass destruction:**

Now, let me start with Indonesia’s view on weapons of mass destruction. Indonesia is of the view that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — nuclear, biological and chemical weapons pose imminent threat to international peace and security. So, any actions that lead to the development, possession and proliferation of those weapons have to be banned as these actions are obviously jeopardizing peace and security. Subsequently, disarmament of

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\*<sup>1</sup> This presentation is the personal view of the author and does not necessarily reflect the Government’s view.

WMDs in all its aspect – horizontally and vertically – is imperative. Our position on this matter is basically in accordance with the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution – “... to participate in creating a world order based on lasting peace... “— To show its commitment to the disarmament of WMDs, Indonesia has become state party to the multilaterally treaty based export control regimes such as the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1979), Biological Weapons Convention (1992) and Chemical Weapons Convention (1998).

However, due to the nature of the dual-use of nuclear, biological and chemical materials/agents, they are not merely used as weapons. They can also be useful for human being and the environment. Hence, our adherence to these regimes is also based on socio-economic considerations, especially to assist our economic development.

### Indonesia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Since this forum is devoted merely to nuclear issue, I think it is unavoidable for me to speak a little bit about Indonesia and the nuclear non-proliferation regimes such as the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

#### 1) Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon.

Indonesia became a state party to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) in 1979, we have shown our commitment both to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. As a declared non-nuclear-weapon-state, Indonesia has always been in the forefront of the international community, striving for nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and for a nuclear weapons free world.

It is widely known that the NPT rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to non-proliferation, we have noticed that – with a few exceptions — the majority of the state parties have fulfilled their obligations. Some technologically advanced countries have refrained from exercising their nuclear option. This has demonstrated that acquiring nuclear weapons or not is a political, security and status question and not necessarily one of technical expertise.

Concerning nuclear disarmament aspect of the Treaty, Indonesia considers it of utmost importance to speed up the reduction pace toward the abolitions of these weapons since tens of thousands of nuclear warhead – the exact number is unknown – remain in arsenals of the nuclear weapons states around the world. We are of the view that the link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament was the rational for the coming into force of the NPT in 1970. So, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing.

As regards to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the central question is to ensure that a widening utilization does not pose risks of weaponization, and hence, to peace and security as technology involved for civilian and military purposes are similar in many respects. Indonesia views such utilization is far more important for many developing countries whose power resources are limited. For the non-nuclear-weapons-states, the acquisition of technology, materials and training for their peaceful programs, represented in a direct way the most tangible benefits offered by the NPT. Therefore, if there is one single issue that is critical for these countries, it remains civilian uses of nuclear energy.

To control the states parties compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, a Safeguards System was developed following the

entry into force of the NPT. This was primarily focused on verifying declared nuclear materials and activities. To strengthen the safeguards system, the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997 agreed on the introduction of a legal instrument complementary to safeguards agreements called as the Additional Protocol, which establishes the Agency's rights to specified information and access.

An important development on verification system is the introduction of "integrated safeguards" – this is not a different form of safeguards, but a rationalization of safeguards activities under a combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Integrated safeguards require in the first instance the satisfactory implementation of the additional protocol. Currently integrated safeguards apply to four states parties, including Indonesia. Indonesia's compliance with the provisions of the Treaty as well as its correctness on safeguards reports and additional protocol declarations have led Indonesia to this achievement.

## 2) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Another multilaterally based treaty dedicated to efforts of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons — adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 — was the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The international community considers the CTBT as a cornerstone of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty's total ban of any nuclear weapons test explosion in any environment will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of these weapons. Indonesia was amongst the first countries to sign the Treaty in 1996. So far, 173 countries have signed and

119 countries have ratified the CTBT. Among the 44 states whose ratification are necessary for its entry into force, 33 countries have ratified it. Indonesia is one of the remaining 11 countries whose ratification is expected.

That Indonesia is yet to ratify the Treaty in no way indicates our lack of commitment to the principles and objectives of the Treaty and to the universalization of this Treaty. Indonesia's commitment remains unchanged. Despite not having ratified the Treaty, we have actively participated in any multilateral efforts on the non-proliferation and disarmament of these horrendous weapons. As a signatory state, Indonesia has nonetheless acted consistently with all provisions of the Treaty. We have also been actively participating in regional as well as multilateral conferences on non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, including on the issue of nuclear testing.

That was the background of Indonesia's policy on nuclear weapons.

### **III. Iran's nuclear issue in Indonesia's perspective**

May I now move on to our main topic for today, Iran's nuclear issue in Indonesia's perspective.

Iran's nuclear program has been intensely discussed following allegation of Iran's acquisition of WMDs. The US President, in his annual State of the Union address, accused that "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and export terror". On another occasion, President Bush said that "...The mighty United States will do whatever it takes to defend our security". I think this is a strong signal from the White House of things to come.

Based on all information currently available to the IAEA, it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards

Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear materials, its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.

Iran acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment program, and for 12 years, as laser enrichment program. In that context Iran has admitted that it produced small amount of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear materials, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium. (IAEA: excerpt of key finding)

The Iran's nuclear Issue happens to occur on the eve of the "2005 NPT Review Conference". In several preparatory conferences prior to the Review Conference, The US delegation has expressed its dissatisfaction with the recent settlement outcome. The US is expected to continue pushing for Iran to be declared in violation of the NPT. In this regard, it is likely that in order to reach consensus out of legitimate interests — the Review Conference needs to allocate specific time to discuss this very issue. I believe, it is the hope of many that the forthcoming Review Conference will succeed in its endeavors to ensure the efficacy, utility, credibility and thereby longevity of the NPT.

As a state party to the NPT, Indonesia wishes all states parties realize that the NPT establishes specific obligations undertaken respectively by the nuclear-states-weapons and non-nuclear-states-weapons to ensure non-proliferation and move towards a nuclear-weapons-free-world. The failure to comply with the NPT is a potentially serious blow to the long-term survival of the Treaty. In this respect, the NPT obligations of the nuclear-states-weapons and non-nuclear-states-weapons are equally crucial.

Under Article VI, nuclear-weapons-states agree “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Under Article II, non-nuclear-weapons-states are obliged not to transfer from any transferors whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In other words, being state party to the NPT, Indonesia would like very much to see all states parties respect and implement all the provisions of the NPT. The success or failure of the Treaty will depend upon state parties’ commitment to the common objective of strengthening the non-proliferation regime in all its aspects.

Indonesia wishes that the Iran’s nuclear issue be settled in a peaceful manner. As a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries and of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia is against resolving disputes through violence and will not in any circumstance be for war against any sovereign country. Together with other members of the Organization and Movement, Indonesia welcomes Iran’s signing of the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Guarantees Agreements and its continuous cooperation with the Agency. Indonesia recognizes the inalienable right of all states parties to the Treaty, including Iran to develop its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the IAEA.

Whereas a coercive (and unilateral) approach to Iran's nuclear issue is not an appropriate solution. The Iraq case is one of the excruciating lessons that we all have to learn from. We have seen more than once for ourselves that force-based actions have led only to an aggravation of the situation, both in the particular region and in broader terms. In my opinion, Iran's nuclear program reflects this country's concern over the threat posed by the Israeli nuclear program. The fact that Israel is not state party to the NPT and the Arab-Israeli conflict, have made no assurance to security in the region. In this regard, as state party to the NPT, Indonesia support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in Middle East in accordance with the Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus.

With regard to the recent development in Iran's nuclear issue, I believe the European Foreign Ministers' visit to Tehran was a good start to the process of resolving international concerns over Iran's nuclear program. However, Iran must clearly understand that the real test will be full and early implementation of its commitments.


To conclude and answer the question regarding Iran's nuclear issue in Indonesia's perspective, I suppose it is already clear that:

- 1) the 1945 constitution (UUD 1945), the basic guideline of Indonesia's foreign policy, commands us to participate in creating a world order based on lasting peace. Therefore, the Iran's nuclear issue is to be settled in a peaceful manner since coercive approach is harmful to international peace and security.
- 2) We have witnessed — with deep concern — the case of Iraq. In this vein, Indonesia is of the view that unilateral plus



coercive approach not only has undermined the role of the multilaterally agreed institution, it also demonstrated to be unsuccessful in the maintenance of peace and security in the country itself as well as in a wider region.

- 3) Indonesia does not want to see a widening conflict in the region. Indonesia wants to see a situation where we are able to solve our differences through diplomatic means while at the same time encourage Iran to comply with obligations of the NPT.
- 4) In addition, despite progress in obtaining greater transparency on Iran's nuclear program, the Middle East region remains a fertile ground for nuclear proliferation – with Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, if we were to avoid the escalation of conflict in the region, the current situation where the WMD programs of several countries are being widely discussed – albeit complex – represents a window of opportunity. The time is ripe for countries of the region to begin a serious dialogue towards creating a Middle East as a nuclear free zone.



## 6

# **Iran's Nuclear Capability and Stability in the Middle East**

Kusnanto Anggoro

(Centre for Strategic and International Studies)

Over the coming months, few Middle Eastern issues are likely to become more pressing than Iran's nuclear program. Political issues and regional dynamics could well be in the fore front of strategic calculation, both in Tehran and in Washington. Appear on the surface however is somewhat purely the issue of nuclear technology. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to deny that Washington have consideration and agenda more than the future of Iran's nuclear capability.

### **Regional Politics and Missile Technology**

Doctrine of strategic stability assumes that nuclear weapon would only be used if conventional deterrence fails. Conventional military balance thus becomes the most importance factor. In practice, however, since the early history of nuclear weapon, power politics at global and/or regional levels has been in the centre of gravity of any calculus of deterrence.

Tehran's desire to develop and acquire nuclear weapons is based upon its deteriorating national security situation. Before October of 2001, when the United States began military action against Afghanistan, Iran had less to fear regarding its territorial

integrity or the survival of its government. Afghanistan to the east was plagued by inner turmoil and did not pose much of a threat to Iran's eastern border. Iraq, to the west, was more of a concern, yet the U.N. enforced sanctions did much to keep Iraq in a state of perpetual weakness. The United Nations and the United States were intent on keeping the status quo in the Middle East.

In this context, the post Cold War era appears to have increased the US leverage in the region. Maintaining close relations with Israel and managing a working cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Washington managed to establish military bases in former Soviet states and therefore increase its influence with the governments in those states. After establishing military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Bush administration had engineered the successful projection of U.S. power and influence into Central Asia that could then be used to achieve U.S. interests in the region. As alarming as this sudden influx of U.S. troops and influence was for Tehran, it was eclipsed by the ability of the Bush administration to gain political support for not only overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but in establishing a military occupation of the country.

Second issue relates to conventional balance in the Middle East, especially between Iran and its arch rival, Israel following the end of Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, estimates differ as to just how much of Iran's military capabilities were lost during the final year of the Iran/Iraq war. U.S. Intelligence officials put the figure at something like 60 percent of its major combat equipment in its land order of battle. By that time most of its modern aircraft had very limited operational capability and many were not able to operate their avionics. The large attack helicopter force that it had under the Shah had basically ceased to operate effectively

within about a year of the beginning of the Iran/Iraq war which was in 1980. Its navy still was active, but it too had not had resupply in some eight years.

In the years that have followed, Iran has not been able to acquire significant numbers of modern aircraft. It failed to reconfigure and rebuild its major surface ships. Some of imported surface-to-air missiles are more than a quarter of a century old in terms of design and technology. Very likely that they (SA-2 and SA-5) have a limited utility. Still, Iran has not been able to develop the kind of sensors, command and control systems needed to link them together effectively relative to the capabilities of modern powers like the United States. As table 1 suggest, until 2005, Iran has not been able to close the gap.

**Table 1.** The Military Balance in the Middle East (2005)

Country	Regular Troops	Reserve Troops	Total	Tanks	Aircraft
Israel	186,500	445,000	631,500	3,930	798
Egypt	450,000	254,000	704,000	~3,000	518
Jordan	100,700	60,000	160,700	970	106
Lebanon	61,400		61,400	350	
Palestinian Authority	~ 45,000		~45,000		
Iran	518,000	350,000	868,000	~1,700	335
Syria	289,000	132,500	421,500	3,700	510
Saudi Arabia	171,500	20,000	191,500	750	~345

*Sources:* Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, Eds., *The Middle East Military Balance*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Anthony Cordesman, "Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, (April 15, 2003)

This change of both the geopolitical map on both Iran's western and eastern borders and conventional military balance has led to the conclusion in Tehran that Iran must make itself militarily powerful in order to continue to secure its interests and, most importantly, its territorial and governmental integrity. In the initial period, however, Iran only maintains and has increased its SCUD forces. These include Scud C, a North Korean design that probably on the order of something like 300 to 450 missiles. Its launch strength is significant. Indeed, these missiles could have a longer range, depending on the weight of the warhead.

Iran is forced to pursue such daring and dangerous steps because it feels it lives in the most dangerous environment in the world. This explains why in recent days Iran has continued to focus attention on its Shahab-3 missile, which was fully and successfully tested on 15 July 2000. These missiles, according to the *Federation of American Scientists*, have the ability to strike targets within a 1,350 to 1,500 kilometer range, putting them well within striking capability of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also within striking distance of Israel.

Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. It has purchased North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and Nodong ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rockets and is producing the Scud-B and the Scud-C—called the Shehab-1 and Shehab-2, respectively. On October 20, 2004, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani confirmed the latest successful test of Iran's Shehab-3 with a 2,000-kilometer range in front of observers.

Yet on the other end of spectrum, the Israeli defence forces have also enhance its missile capability. There are some

unconfirmed reports that suggest the existence of a 4,800 km-range Jericho-3 missile that may stem from Israel's space launch vehicle, the Shavit. With US financial assistance, Israel has also developed the Arrow theater defense missile, which has become one of the only functioning missile defense systems in the world. In addition to these systems, Israel has become a leading exporter of UAVs.

For the time being, the Israeli appear to have a clear advantage, if not superiority, over Iran's missile capability. Considering that neither Israel nor Iran is member of MTCR (*Missile Technology Control Regime*), thus very likely that missile arms race would spark in the Middle East (see Table 2). It is at this point discussion on nuclear capability gain more significance. Worries over nuclear development, particularly that of Iran, is for some extent inseparable from the NPT Review Conference 2005, taking place in New York next week, and would likely to heat discussion on amendment of the Treaty, perhaps to avoid withdrawal as was the case of North Korean did in 2003.

### **Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons**

As fears about the spread of weapons of mass destruction grow among western governments, suspicion has mounted that Tehran intends to build a bomb. These fears have been exacerbated by Iran's failure to fully reveal its program to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear watchdog, make it basically political questions rather than simply military capability. In the case of Iran, there is evidence of efforts at procurements of technology and materials that are troubling in proliferation terms, but at the same time there is little evidence that Iran is making a full-court press to acquire nuclear weapons.

Whether Iran have a real potential to develop nuclear weapons and, if it has, how long it will take remain difficult question to answer. The nuclear material used in a civilian nuclear reactor is simply a less enriched version of that needed for a warhead. Therefore, a civilian nuclear program (permitted under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty) could act as cover for a weapons program if, as Iran's does, it includes fuel enrichment technologies.

In fact, two processing technologies are the key to getting bomb material. One is enriching uranium, a process normally used to concentrate uranium ore sufficiently to make nuclear reactor fuel. If one keeps the process going, one can enrich the uranium enough to make a bomb. That's what many in the West fear will happen in Iran, which says it merely wants an enrichment program so it can produce its own low-enriched reactor fuel for electric power plants.

The other route is reprocessing - taking spent fuel rods from conventional reactors and, in an elaborate and expensive process, extracting the 1 percent of plutonium that is a byproduct of the fission process. Collect enough plutonium for a lump the size of a baseball, and there would be the core of a Nagasaki-sized weapon. By extracting plutonium through reprocessing, a nation with only a single, moderate-sized reactor could make 3 or 4 dozen bombs a year.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that Iran has huge reserves of raw uranium and has announced plans to extract more than 40 tons a year. That amount, if converted to uranium hexafluoride and repeatedly spun in centrifuges, could theoretically yield more than 200 pounds of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, enough for about five crude nuclear weapons. Iranian officials say the Isfahan plant can convert more than 300



tons of uranium ore a year. If 40 tons of raw uranium yields 5 crude nuclear weapons, then the Isfahan plant operating at full capacity (300 tons/year) could produce 37 or 38 crude nuclear weapons per year.

There have been two other major developments that complicate the issues. *First*, the original plan was for Russia to supply nuclear fuel to Iran and take it away when it was spent. That changed when Iran announced that it had begun mining uranium ore and intended to take control of the fuel cycle, meaning the amount of nuclear fuel it was enriching - and the levels to which it was enriching it - would be outside international scrutiny. *Second*, the revelation of Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistani nuclear scientist that he had ordered reconditioned nuclear equipment to be sent to Iran (as well as Libya and North Korea).

More importantly, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, an Iranian opposition group, report in May 2003 that Iran had two uranium-enrichment facilities west of Tehran, which operate as "satellite plants" to the larger facility centered at Natanz. The Iranians reportedly had already installed several centrifuges at one of the sites. The purpose of the sites, besides to assist in the nuclear program, is to take over the work of the Natanz site should it be bombed. IAEA's ElBaradei report revealed a secret centrifuge program for enriching uranium, and evidence of weapons-grade fuel. Iran insists the traces of high-enriched material IAEA inspectors found on the machinery were the result of buying already contaminated units on the black market. (*New York Times*, May 26, 2003.)

In the medium term, however, the primary concern is that the situation sparks arms races in the Middle East. Israel is, at present, the only country in the region to have nuclear weapons (although it neither confirms nor denies it has them, part of a

policy of nuclear ambiguity), but an Iranian bomb could prompt it, or other countries, to arm themselves even further. In the near term, worries are around the clock. In the tradition of Israeli military adventurism — the honour roll includes the destruction of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and the raid on Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976 — Jerusalem is preparing for another daring strike.

An article in the September 27 issue of *Newsweek* also reported that “last week US and Israeli officials were talking of possible military action—even though some believe it's already too late to keep Iran from going nuclear (if it chooses)... *Newsweek* has learned that the CIA and DIA have war-gamed the likely consequences of a US preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Israel's finest soldiers, most of them from Shaldaq battalion and dressed in the uniform of the Iranian Pasdaran, had been flying for several hours before the assault helicopters reached their target — the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, in southern Iran.

### **The centrality of politics**

“If one day, the world of Islam comes to possess the weapons currently in Israel's possession—on that day this method of global arrogance would come to an end. This is because the use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only damage the world of Islam.” —Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on December 14, 2001.

The centrality of the threats posed by Iran is clear, and relates not only with nuclear weapons capability but also, perhaps more importantly, to political issue. From US point of view, Iran under Khamanei continues to be the world's foremost state supporter of terrorism, offering financial and logistical support to

both Shi'a and Sunni terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Elements of al-Qaida and Ansar al-Islam transit through Iran and find safe haven there.

Washington believed that through these groups Khamenei destabilizes the region, prevents the emergence of an independent and democratic Lebanon and tries to stymie any movement toward peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is to suggest that Bush's war on terror calculation could have been in the mind of the US against Iranian nuclear program. As table 2 may suggest, the Iranian less committed than the Israeli as far as international convention on combating terrorism are concern.

Experts have few doubts that some non-nuclear nations could quickly arm themselves if they felt threatened. Japan has tons of plutonium from its spent reactor fuel and can already reprocess on a small scale. It is building a much larger reprocessing capability to create more reactor fuel, but politicians there have discussed whether it's time to start a nuclear weapons program. Other countries are assumed to be years away but would be likely to accelerate their programs if their neighbors got the bomb. Seen from this context, the danger the Iran's nuclear program might have in the Middle East is uncontrollable arms race.

### **Final notes**

The NPT Review Conference will soon take place in New York. The 187 state-parties will this time be confronted with the trickiest challenges the NPT have ever faced. There is a lot of bad news. While in Pakistan to help break ground for a nuclear reactor, China's premier talks about enhancing bilateral nuclear cooperation by selling the country two more nuclear power plants. The United States, as part of a stepped-up energy dialogue with

India, suggests it could eventually sell India nuclear reactors - in part to keep it from going into the natural gas pipeline business with Iran. Meanwhile, North Korea shuts down its nuclear reactor, which could mean it is planning to ramp up nuclear arms production - or just using routine maintenance to scare others about its nuclear ambitions.

The Treaty was designed to link the concerns of those who acquired nuclear weapons but did not desire further proliferation with those who had not acquired nuclear weapons but wanted the potential to make use of nuclear energy. To this purpose, the non-nuclear weapon states promised the nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, and France, the Russian Federation, and the United States) that they would not acquire nuclear weapons. In return, the nuclear-weapon states promised their non-nuclear counterparts “the fullest exchange” of nuclear technology (given compliance with safeguards obligations) and “good faith negotiations” to engage in nuclear disarmament. Such bargain seems to have been necessary to codify the emerging norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s experiences during the early 1990s in Iraq and North Korea, however, proved that those safeguards were insufficient. These experiences led to the adoption of a new voluntary standard, the 1997 Model Additional Protocol, which substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Neither Iran nor Israel are signatory to this Protocol.

**Annex:**

**Table 2. Commitment to International Treaties and Norms**

<b>INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</b>	Iran	North Korea	Israel
<b>United Nations (UN)</b>	Member	Member	Member
<b>Conference on Disarmament (CD)</b>	Member	Member, violated safeguard agreement	member
<b>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</b>			
<b>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)[2]</b>	Member	-----	-----
<b>TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS</b>			
<b>Nuclear</b>			
<b>Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)</b>	State Party	Withdrew, violated article 2	-----
<b>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</b>	Signatory	-----	signatory
<b>Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)</b>	State Party	State party	State party
<b>IAEA Safeguards Agreement</b>	Yes (INFCIRC 214)	Yes (INFCIRC 403)	Yes (INFCIRS 249/Add 1)
<b>IAEA Additional Protocol</b>	-----	-----	-----
<b>Nuclear Safety Convention</b>	-----	-----	signatory
<b>Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention</b>	-----	-----	-----
<b>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</b>	-----	-----	State party
<b>Chemical and Biological</b>			
<b>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)</b>	State Party	---	Signatory
<b>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)</b>	State Party	---	---
<b>BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)[4]</b>	Submitted		
<b>Geneva Protocol</b>	State Party		State party
<b>WMD Delivery Systems</b>			
<b>International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile</b>	-----	-----	---

*Table 2 continue*

NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES			
<u>Zangger Committee</u>	-----	-----	-----
<u>Nuclear Suppliers Group</u>	-----	-----	-----
<u>Australia Group</u>	-----	-----	-----
<u>Missile Technology Control Regime</u>	-----	-----	-----
<u>Wassenaar Arrangement</u>	-----	-----	-----
TERRORISM CONVENTIONS			
<u>Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism</u>	-----	-----	State party
<u>Suppression of Terrorist Bombings</u>	-----	-----	State party
<u>Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection</u>	-----	-----	signatory
<u>Against the Taking of Hostages</u>	-----	State party	signatory
<u>Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft</u>	State Party	State party	State party
<u>Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft</u>	State Party	State party	State party
<u>Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation</u>	State Party	State party	State party
<u>Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation</u>	State Party	State party	State party
<u>Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation</u>	-----	-----	signatory
<u>Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf</u>	-----	-----	Signatory
<u>Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents</u>	State Party	State party	State party

## Appendix

The Jakarta Post

**Unilateral approach may not solve Iran nuke issue: RI**

Friday, April 29, 2005



**NUCLEAR TALKS:** Iran's Ambassador to Indonesia, Shaban Shahidi Moaddab, (*center*) speaks before an audience at a workshop on Iran's nuclear industry, as Russian Federation Ambassador Mikhail M. Bely (*left*) and political researcher Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (*right*) look on. Featuring a series of experts, the seminar on Thursday, organized by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), focused on Indonesia and Iran's nuclear issues.

**Adianto P. Simamora**, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

As debates on Iran's nuclear program are heating up, Indonesia — a peace-loving nation and home to the largest Muslim population in the world — urged all countries in the Middle East as well as the international community to settle the issue through dialog.

Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that any unilateral approach on the Iran's nuclear issue would be harmful to international peace and security.

“A coercive and unilateral approach, has not proven to be the right solution to the question. Therefore, it is crucial for the countries in the region, together with the international community, to continuously engage in dialog toward creating a WMD (weapons of mass destruction)-free Middle East zone,” he told participants of a seminar on Indonesia and Iran's Nuclear Issue. in Jakarta on Thursday.

The one-day seminar, which was sponsored by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), also featured Iranian Ambassador to Indonesia Shaban Shahidi Moaddab and Russian Ambassador Mikhail M. Bely as its speakers.

Indonesia, a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty signatory and member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), welcomed Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Guarantees Agreements. But at the same time it supports every country's, including Iran's, right to develop nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes.

“Indonesia fully supports the right of each state party and member state, to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” said Sudjadnan, who will



be the head of the Nuclear Disarmament's Main Committee I during next month's NPT Review Conference in New York. The seminar comes at a time when the United States has been accusing Iran of harboring ambitions to build nuclear weapons, while Tehran, which has strong backing from Russia, claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

Iran has consistently refused to permanently suspend uranium enrichment but has suspended it during the talks. Iran together with other 187 countries, including five nuclear powers — the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, is a state party to the NPT.

Iranian Ambassador Shaban said that as a state party to the NPT, Iran had complied fully with obligations and not even a single trace of diversion toward restricted areas had been reported so far by the IAEA.

"Iranian nuclear programs and relevant research or production sites have gone through all sorts of safety verifications. Even though Iran's ability in manifesting its potential is proven, it has respected its obligations," he said.

"If nuclear technology is good for the United States and others, then it should be good for Iran as well. What is good for the goose is certainly good for the gander," he said.

Meanwhile, *Reuters* reported on Thursday from Jerusalem that Russian President Vladimir Putin said Iran needed to do more to assure the world it was not trying to build atomic weapons.

Putin said Tehran's agreement to return spent nuclear fuel to Russia — which agreed to supply the material to Iran's Bushehr plant — "does not seem to be enough".

He said that in addition, the Iranians should "abandon all technology to create a full nuclear cycle and also not obstruct their nuclear sites from international control".

Bely said that his country helped Iran in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

“Our cooperation fits completely into the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions; it is proceeding under full IAEA control,” he said.

He said that Iran’s nuclear program was not directed toward creating nuclear weapons, nuclear cycle technologies and uranium enrichment.

“Russia proceeds from the assumption that only the IAEA has the right to give an assessment on the observance by Iran of its responsibilities under the NPT,” he said.



**Kompas, Jum'at, 29 April 2005**

### **Dalam Soal Nuklir Iran, RI Ikuti Ketentuan NPT dan Penyelesaian Damai**

Jakarta, Kompas - Indonesia menyambut baik ditandatanganinya protokol tambahan atas safe guard system IAEA oleh Iran, dan kesediaan negara itu untuk terus bekerja sama dengan IAEA (Badan Energi Atom Internasional). Hal itu sesuai dengan pandangan Indonesia yang menyikapi persoalan nuklir dari kacamata Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/Perjanjian Tidak Mengembangkan Nuklir).

Sekretaris Jenderal (Sekjen) Departemen Luar Negeri RI Sudjudnan Parnohadiningrat ketika ditemui pada Workshop “Indonesia dan Isu Nuklir Iran” yang diselenggarakan LIPI, Kamis (28/4) di Jakarta, menyatakan bahwa Indonesia mengambil sikap normatif, yaitu mengikuti aturan main NPT.

“Yang memberikan penilaian apakah Iran melakukan proliferasi atau lalai melaporkan adalah IAEA. NPT sendiri tidak memiliki mekanismenya. Di IAEA sudah ada laporannya bahwa ada beberapa kegiatan yang belum sempat dilaporkan. Ini yang menimbulkan keraguan,” jelas Sekjen Deplu yang juga akan menjadi pimpinan Komite Utama I pada Review Conference NPT bulan depan di New York.

Sudjudnan menekankan, Indonesia mengakui hak setiap anggota IAEA dan juga negara dalam NPT, termasuk Republik Islam Iran, untuk mengembangkan kemampuan nuklir bagi tujuan damai, sesuai dengan ketentuan NPT dan statuta IAEA.

“Indonesia dalam masalah program nuklir Iran memandang masalah ini harus diselesaikan secara damai. Pendekatan koersif dan unilateral sudah terbukti bukan merupakan penyelesaian yang benar. Oleh karena itu, sangat krusial bagi negara-negara di kawasan, bersama komunitas internasional, terus melakukan dialog untuk mewujudkan Kawasan Timur Tengah yang bebas senjata pemusnah massal,” ungkapnya.

### **Tujuan damai**

Duta Besar Iran untuk Indonesia Dr Shaban Shahidi Moaddab yang menjadi pembicara pada workshop itu menguraikan, Pemerintah Iran memang melirik kembali pembangunan reaktor nuklir Bushehr untuk pembangkit listrik, karena pembangkit-pembangkit listrik yang ada mengalami kerusakan total akibat perang Iran-Irak.

Proyek reaktor nuklir Bushehr itu sendiri sebenarnya diawali dari tingginya harga minyak bumi pada tahun 1972, yang kemudian membuahkan kontak sekaligus persetujuan dari Washington bahwa Iran harus memiliki 23 pembangkit nuklir sampai tahun 2000. Reaktor itu mulai dibangun tahun 1974 oleh perusahaan Jerman, Siemens, untuk memproduksi pembangkit listrik dua kali 1.300 megawatt. Ketika Irak menginvasi Iran, kompleks pembangkit nuklir itu diserang sehingga proyek terhenti total.

Moaddab menambahkan, Iran telah mengikuti seluruh ketentuan dalam NPT dan IAEA yang juga berulang kali melakukan inspeksi ke fasilitas nuklir Iran. Iran juga menghentikan program pengayaan uranium. Itu semua menunjukkan itikad baik Iran yang memang berhak mengembangkan nuklir untuk tujuan damai.(OKI)

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