




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Multiculturalism, Separatism and Nation State Building in Thailand



Research Center for Regional Resources
The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PDR - LIPI)
Jakarta
2004



PREFACE

Multiculturalism, Separatism, and Nation State Building in Thailand is the following study that had done before in Philippine by Research Center for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Science in 2003. Studying about Multiculturalism in Thailand is a second research from the serial research activities that we do for three years, which the third we will do in Myanmar with the same theme. The study is undertaken by five researchers from different background i.e. anthropology, politics, sociology, and economics.

The case study of Thailand is different from the previous research, because first, the Southern Thailand (Pattani) has a different history background from the southern Philippines. Second, the theoretical framework not only said about multiculturalism but also about the conflict forms and their resolutions. Third, the data collection was not only Bangkok but also in southern Thailand (Pattani). The Thailand characteristics are same as Philippine related to the Moslem minority problem.

The research report maps the problems happening as an impact from Thailand's integration policy to Pattani province since 1902. The effect of integration process are conflict between majority ethnic and minority ethnic, injustice in economic and resource distribution, lack of relationship between government and local community, polarization in social-politic-economic-and culture, and the inequality of ethnic composition formal sector. The report also describes the symbols of Pattani's people resistance to the Thailand's government

The success of this report is also because of our colleagues in Thailand given some assistance to this research. We would like to thank to Dr. Surichai Wankaew from University of Chulalongkorn; Teuku Umarsyah the first leader of communal Mesjid Raya Pattani; Prof. Dr. Peerajot Rahimmulla Prince Songkhla University, Pattani; Dr.Chicanouk Rahimmulla, Prince Songkhla University, Pattani; Husein bin Yusuf executive secretary of Islam in Islamic Center, Pattani; Muhammad bin Yusuf Alumnus from the Islamic high school in Sudan and he is working in Red Crescent Society for Emirates Arab Communities; Ibrahim Hasan bin Haji Maktjen, Prince Songkhla University, Pattani; Dr. Chaiwat Satha Anand, Associated Professor and lecturer in Political Science, Thammasat University; Dr.Khadijah Md. Khalid, Ph.D, University of Malaya, Malaysia; Dr. Patrick Jory, Program Coordinator Visiting

Research Program, Regional study-Institute of Liberal Art, Wailailak University, Nakhon Sri Thammarat; Pravit Rajanaphruk, Journalist from the *Nation* news paper, Thailand; and Alisa Hasamoh, Dr, Surichai's assistant.

This report has been passed many debates through not only discussions but also seminars, held by Research Center for Regional Resources (PSDR-LIPI). It has been revising base on critic and suggestion that given from many colleagues. We want to say thank to the researchers and our administrative staff who gave the assistance and the cooperation to us, as well as the researchers from outside of PSDR LIPI who were involved to this research and the report. We realize that our report have some lack and weakness as well as the limitation. We are really thankful if there are any suggestion and input for our report to make it perfect.

Jakarta, December 2, 2004
Director
Research Center for Regional Resources
Indonesian Institute of Science

Yekti Maunati

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ABSTRACT

MULTICULTURALISM, SEPARATISM, AND NATION STATE BUILDING IN THAILAND

In multicultural model, a society is looked as a culture that happen generally by its characteristic, which like a mosaic. That mosaic covers all of smaller societies culture and it was made form of society, which is bigger than before. This ideology admits and idolizes the differences in equality, not only individually but also culturally. What did happen in a nation, that built a nation state (*nation state formation*) and reconstructed a nationality (*reconstruction of nationality*), created a relationship system among majority-minority ethnic, economic and resources distribution in justice, a democratic relationship between central government and its region, and polarization in social-politic-economic-and culture. The Thailand relationship shows that there was the centralistic of democratic system, which the kingdom of Thai dominates in state management. The separatism (by Pattani Malay Moslem ethnic) occurred to against the state policy because they did not have roles in state management, especially in the development. The *stakeholder* role; non government organizations (NGOs) or the resistance organizations in developing of integration policy and conflict resolution is faced by government and military by resistance.

Key words: *integration, multiculturalism, domination of majority's culture, ethnic-politic conflict, State formation.*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Erni Budiwanti and Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto

I.1. Background

The Siamese had started to conquer Malay Sultanates since 13th century. They were finally subjugated, and were under full control of the Siamese King in 17th century. Although the Sultans still had the autonomy to rule Pattani using the *syari'ah* (Islamic laws), their positions were subordinated to Siamese Ruler. Under the Anglo-Siamese treaty, signed in 1902, the Siamese and Royal British agreed on conceding Kelantan, Kedah, Trengganu, and Perlis under the British colonies, and the incorporation of Malay sultanates areas located in North Malay Peninsular i.e. Naratiwat, Yala, Satun, and Pattani into Siam.

This treaty giving further legitimating for Siam to consolidate its territorial boundaries that included the Southern region, covering the four areas above, previously belonged to the Malay sultanates. The territorial integration brought changes in political bureaucracy. The Muslim sultanate areas mentioned above were ruled and controlled by the Siamese government centralized in Bangkok. In line with the political integration, the Siamese government had also taken further steps to include Southern region as vital sources for economic development. In this respect all the local revenues, tax, and natural resources of Southern provinces were controlled and allocated by the central government. Under central bureaucracy, the local Malay sultanates were deprived from their rights to collect tax and other local revenues, as well as the right to allocate them. They received salary from the central government. There was also huge land exploitation over the Malay Muslim regions in the south to increase national income. The Thai government opened rubber plantation program and tin mine inviting labors from other parts of Thailand. Resettlement programs were built to accommodate local migrants pouring into the four provinces of the South for economic reason.

The territorial integration had influenced the economic lives of the Pattani. Even though many of their lands were converted to rubber plantation and tin mine, the Malay Muslims remained poor and mostly worked in agriculture as subsistent farmer. The exploitation of their land had only benefited outsiders who were mostly the Thai-Buddhists. It also brought demographic changes. Migration of the Thai, sponsored by the government, into the Malay's Southern region was not only aimed at fulfilling labor shortage for the rubber plantation and tin mine, but also to balance the population ratio. The Malay Muslims suspected that through land exploitation and resettlement program, the Thai Buddhist migrants might one day outnumbered the Muslims as the native inhabitants.

The regional disparity between southern and northern regions was one among many other factors, which stirred up spirit of ethno-nationalism movement among the Malay Muslims of Pattani. Besides economic factor, forced assimilation program to unite the Pattani Muslims into the nation-state of Thailand was also important factor leading to that movement. Thai Custom Decree promulgated in 1961 was an assimilation program intended to create a sense of belonging among the Pattani to be part of the Thai nation. It is also meant to integrate and unify them with the Majority of Thai-Buddhists. This project was conducted through education. The Pattani were forced to take secular education program and used Thai language for daily conversation.¹ The Pondok (traditional Islamic school) were also forced to adopt secular program, which taught Thai history, culture, and Buddhism ethics. They were converted to private schools and monitored by the government. They were not allowed to use Malay as the medium of instruction. The Muslim were not allowed to have the Islamic court with the Muslim Judge, and were forced to go to civil court. Sunday was defined as public holiday replacing Friday. The Muslims were also forced to adopt western style in the way they dress up and eat. They were not allowed to wear Muslim hat (peci), sarong, sorban (head

¹ Carl H. Lande, *Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation Building in Southeast Asia, Studies in Comparative International Development*, New Brunswick, Winter, 1999.

cover of Islamic figure), and eat with bear hands. They had to wear trousers, and eat with spoon and fork. Having realized that the repressive policy was increasing further the spirit for resistance among the Pattani, the Thai government then abolished the Thai Custom decree, and allowed the pondok to operate again as an autonomous institution, which was free from the government's intervention. The Muslims were also permitted to use their Islamic names. The government was also providing specific quota for the Muslims to enter university and bureaucracy. It also established Islamic Consultative Board (Chularajmontri). However, the Pattani were not yet satisfied with religious autonomy, they demanded regional autonomy with their own local leader to manage and control their own affairs, without so much being controlled by the central government.

The Pattani Liberation movement for the first time came up with the goal of gaining greater autonomy for Southern region. This movement was led by Haji Sulong who through Islamic Council launched a petition to the royal kingdom demanding Pattani to be led by a native born elected by 80% of the Pattani, 80% of the government officials in each of the four provinces should be Muslims, Malay and Thai should be the official languages, acknowledgement of Islamic law, and its implementation in the autonomous Islamic court, separated from the Civil court, with Qadi as the Muslim judge, all the regional revenues and the natural resources coming from the four provinces should be utilized for the Pattani's interest, the establishment of an Islamic body having full authority to handle problems faced by the Pattani Muslims under the authority of the Pattani leader. After Haji Sulong was arrested and disappear mysteriously in 1959, Tengku Abdul Jalil organized underground movement, Pattani Liberation National Front (BNPP- Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani) that struggled for the Islamic State of Pattani.

The position of Malaysia was ambiguous among varied separatism movements of Pattani. This country had been strongly supported the separatism movements in Thailand, some of which used the border area connecting Malaysia and Thailand as the

headquarter. Some were even joined with the Malay communist struggle. In terms of culture, religion, ethnicity, and affinity, the Malay Muslims of Pattani felt strong adherence to other Malays in Malaysia. They did not see themselves as Thai. However, since Malaysia domestically also faced Malay communist rebellion, supported by the Thai government, that threatened its stability, it did not whole-heartedly support the Pattani separatism. Moreover the two countries were tied in ASEAN agreement; Malaysia's support to Pattani movement would affect its bilateral relationship with the Thai.

Compared to the separatist movements developed in the Philippines, such as the MNLF and MILF, the Pattani were less successful in putting their demands. This was partly because there were no strong separatist groups gained either regional or international recognition. Meanwhile the movements were also split up into different ideological struggles i.e. Islamic fundamentalism and secularism. This made them difficult to gain international support especially from the Muslim countries.

I. 2. Research Problems

Based on the previous description, this research is addressed to reply these questions as follow:

1. What extents do the history of annexation of the Muslim Sultanates domain and forceful integration of Pattani to Thailand influence separatism movement in Pattani?
2. What extents do the forms of forced cultural assimilation toward the Pattani Muslims impact on the multiculturalism in Pattani?
3. How do the characteristics of the Pattani's ethno-nationalism movements develop and impact on the nation state formation?

I.3. Research Propose

This research in general aimed at:

1. Explaining the history of annexation of the Muslim Sultanates domain, and forceful integration of Pattani to Thailand
2. Analyzing the forms of forced cultural assimilation toward the Pattani Muslims and their impact.
3. Describing characteristics of the Pattani's ethno-nationalism movements and their development.

I.4. Variables

This study covered some variables as follow:

1. Multiculturalism, i.e. the power relation between the Malay-Moslem (Pattani people) and Buddhist (Thai people) in the southern border provinces of Thailand (former Pattani sultanate). It also envisages the state policies of Thailand in culture and social to the Malay-Moslem including the ultra-nationalism, Islamic patronage Act, and secularization toward Islamic institutions.
2. Separatism, i.e. the resistance of the Malay-Moslem against the Siam (Thai) administration in southern border provinces since the implementation of political centralization Act (thesaphiban) in 1902. The separatism movement are: Sultan Abdul Kadir rebellion 1902, Namsay rebellion 1922, World War II, Haji Sulong petition 1948, Gampar (Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya), Barisan Nasional Pemberontakan Pattani, Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO).
3. Nation State formation, i.e. covers the impact of state policies toward the Malay-Moslem and the conflict resolution to the southern border provinces on the nationality of Thailand development. It also describe the politics of identity and military approach can eliminate the Thai nationality in the southern border provinces.

I.5. Theoretical Framework

A society can be said that it is multicultural if there is one or more than one of society groups separate from the majority scope; or in clearly, there is awareness about the togetherness in feeling and identity as a whole as well as in peaceful and secure. It means there is pluralism in inter- culture relationship; the minority group by its culture and majority group by its culture live together base on the diversity of culture.

In state development, the dominant group did the policies that addressed to make assimilation in its member of communal group, than he control their collective autonomy and carry off their resources as well as force their employees to work for state. These are done to pressure and to suppress the minority groups like happened in Pattani's Moslem people who had undergone by military power.

Refer to the conflict theory explanation; Ted Robert Gurr (1998) mentions three conditions that bring on the minority ethnic rebel. First, community had undergone the extraordinary of psychic pressure. This pressure will be accumulated to the one step and erupt as rebellion. Second, because the sharpness of class differences had made a social jealousy appear. The extraordinary social frustration will make the transformation easier to be the rebellion. Third, there is a suspicion from minority ethnic to the majority ethnic. These are can transform inequality condition to the resistant movement.

The strategy of minority ethnic movement to fight their rights divided into: first, without violence; second, by violence; third by rebellion. The protest is done for pressure the government so it can change its policy. The rebellion by weapon is done for realizing the fundamental and the governance relation changes among groups in its society. The protest actions usually do to sue the reformation aims and rebellion is used for mobilizing the power to force a government so it will accept the change.

Approach that use for conflict resolution has two types, repression and accommodation approach. Ted Robert Gurr (1998) explained some of ways that used in accommodation approach, especially in politic-ethnic conflict is by giving the autonomy in their areas, assimilation, pluralism, and division of power.

Every approach has a problem that can be obstacle in conflict resolution. The regional autonomy has rejection risk from government, which had failed to apply that policy. Besides, the rejection came from radical fractions that choose more to fight than accept in half. Assimilation self has two problems, some groups in minority ethnics do not like to join and others groups in majority ethnics against to accept people who they do not like.

Gurr says about two keys of ethno-politic conflict management that constructive to look for the social and politic policies, which creative and able to link the gap between ethnic minority interest and state. All of the conflict managements should enfold the groups that interested such as civil society, resistance groups, state, and International organizations or multilateral as the observer.

I.6. Research Method

(1). Approach:

This research has been undertaken by using a Qualitative approach through descriptive and comparative analyses. The descriptive model is addressed to figure out some typology and paradigm such as; ethno-political conflict between the Malay-Moslem against Thailand administration and Buddhist people in southern border provinces, politics of identity toward the Malay-Moslem, the state policies: Thesaphiban 1902, Anglo-Sam treaty 1909, Education Act 1921, Thai rathaniyom 1939, Patronage Islam Act 1946, Haji Sulong petition 1948, Secularizations 1957, separatism 1970, Peace policy 1979, military policy 2004, and separatism movement development. Meanwhile the comparative annalists is used to compare one state policy to other state policies toward the Malay-Moslem in southern border provinces, to compare between the peace approach with the military approach in coping with he separatism, to compare among the separatist organizations characteristics, and to compare the using of terminology: Thai nationalism between before and after 1945.

(2). *Stages:*

The research on multiculturalism, separatism, and nation state formation consist from three study cases i.e. 2003 (Philippines), 2004 (Thailand), 2005 (Myanmar). Study on the southern Philippines separatism has concluded that the resistance of the Bangsamoro people against the administration of the Philippines is resulted from colonialization history since Spain, marginalization toward bangsamoro people in politics, economic, and culture, and also identity values. The separatism appeared based on structure factors (marginalization),

(3). *Data Collection:*

Literature studies in Jakarta, Bangkok, Pattani, and Nakhon Si hammarat. In-depth-interview to informants in Thailand: Prof. Surichai Wungkaew, Prof. Chaiwat St Anand (bangkok), Prof Perajot Rahimmula, Dr. Chicanouk rahimmula (Pattani),

I.7. Composition of Report

This paper consists of seven chapters that entirety illustrate the multiculturalism and separatist movement in nation state formation in Thailand. The first chapter describes the problem, propose and the significance of the research. It also mentions important and conceptual frameworks used as the main tool of analyzing the fact and problem of Pattani Malay Moslem.

Chapter two explain in general about the demography and geography of the Thailand's nation state. It briefly identifies the social culture of Thailand's, the economy and the plurality of its people. Also explain the main administrative system and local politics in general. Thailand is the place with plural society consists of ethnic diversity. In different area except Bangkok province, there have seen economic and social politics imbalance toward others ethnic out of Thai.

Chapter three explain about the conquest history of Pattani by Siam Kingdom. The history covers the fact that integration Pattani kingdom to Siam colonization brings conversion of the occupied Pattani Moslem people into amalgamates of the region. This event take place when the signing of Anglo-Siam Treatment in 1902 between Siam Kingdom and the British Representative in Asia. The history also gives basic element that shape and builds the identities of the Moslem Pattani. Depicts the Pattani's people struggle against the Bangkok colonization as well as forced administrative, which in later give inspires their struggle against external expansion for independent movement.

In chapter four describes about state policies, focus on the state policies towards southern border provinces. The political integration policies of the Thai administration of the southern border provinces were dominated by the politics of violence, forced cultural assimilation, and economic development that proved failures to get the sympathy of the Malay Moslem people. The local government officials in the southern border provinces were predominantly non-Moslem and their policies never adapted to the Malay Moslem traditions.

Chapter five describes Pattani Malay politics of identity when Thai government tries to apply nationalization policy through education secularization, Thai nationalization through language and mores and Thai government effort to accommodation Moslem Pattani resistances to rejected assimilation which gone into effect to Moslem society.

Chapter six mainly discusses the mind seeds or roots as well as the growth and development of separatist movement. The basic characteristics and ideologies underlying those movements and the ways they deal with the government in putting their demands. This chapter also gives description about the recent moment, which come to pass in southern Thailand.

Chapter 7 concludes all the issues upon in Pattani Thailand. The main assumption drawn from the conclusion is that the social, economic and political deprivation is the main factors leading the separatism, apart from religious and cultural

differences. The Indonesian can learn precious lesson from the Thailand government coping with the separatists. Certain government policies upon the conflict resolution in Pattani sometimes could even lead to action that would further endangering the nation building of the Thailand.

CHAPTER II

A DESCRIPTION OF THAILAND'S GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

Erlita Tantri

II.1. Introduction

Thailand one of the developing countries in Southeast Asia, has unique ethnic groups, government, religion, language, and customs. It has a particular nickname: 'the land of smiles' coined for the sake of tourism. Its unique geography has given a certain colour to its community and support for the peoples' activities.

The diversity of people, religions, customs, and their historic backgrounds contribute to the picture of Thailand. The area extends from the northern to the southern parts of the heart of Southeast Asia and needs special attention, especially Pattani, a province in one of the regions in southern Thailand. The diversity does not only give colour to its people, activities, and cultures, but also provides valuable resources for the country itself as well as impacting on problems, which sometimes need a specific solution.

This chapter will give a general description of Thailand's geography and demography by specifically concentrating on Pattani. I will look at the previous and current or contemporary conditions, which are particular to Pattani that will be assessed especially by the geography and the demographic conditions of Thailand and Pattani in particular.

1. Geography

Thailand lies in the heart of Southeast Asia, at the Gulf of Thailand in its south, and the *Golden Triangle* in its north. It borders Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar (Burma). The Myanmar border starts from the west to the south along the Malay Peninsula. In the east, Thailand is next to Laos where it meanders along the Mekong River as far as

Cambodia. The area of Thailand is about 513,115 sq. km. and the length is about 2,500 kilometres from the north to the south. The breadth from the east to the west is 1,250 kilometres. Its coastline is about 1,850 kilometres along the Gulf of Thailand and 865 kilometres along the Indian Ocean.

Thailand lies on 5 to 21 degrees north latitude and 97 to 106 degrees east latitude. It is divided into five regions: 1. The Northern mountain region, a high land which includes all of the high mountains in Thailand including the highest Mount Doi Inthanon (2,594 metres); 2. The Central plain is a triangle depression region that extends from the north to the south with the length of approximately 480 kilometres and the width of approximately 240 kilometres; 3. The Coral Plateau is an undulating plateau with the height of 150 kilometres, where lies the Phu Phan hill that separates the Mekong water course into two Rivers, Chi and Mun; 4. The Southwest hills lie from southeast to northwest with at its top Mount Khao Soi Dao (above 1,000 metres); 5. The Thai Peninsula is hilly, extending from Tenasserim Mountain in the north to Malaysia, with the highest mountain, Khao Luang (1,786 m) in Sri Thammarat Province.

Thailand is divided into four main areas. First, the north mountainous area, where there are some temples and Thai heritage areas, among which is the ancient city of Chiang Mai in Chiang Mai Province where the highest mountain can be found. This region is the area of Thailand's hill tribes, a different ethnic group which has been living in the region for thousands of years, after immigrating from Tibet and central China. Second, the northeast area lies on the semi coral plateau it is the most remote area and the least visited. The Coral culture is interesting enough in this area because of the characteristics of the culture that have been influenced by Thai, Lao, and Khmer cultures. Third, central Thailand consists of a fertile area that surrounds Chao Praya, close to a river that extends to Bangkok and the Gulf of Thailand. Fourth, the southern area which extends for hundreds of miles along the Malay Peninsula and possesses valuable resources in its beaches and some of its interesting islands.

In general, a Thai administrative region is divided into 8 regions: First, Bangkok City. Second, the vicinity of Bangkok, that consists of five provinces. Third, the central region, that consists of six provinces. Fourth, the eastern region, that consists of eight provinces. Fifth, the western region, that consists of six provinces. Sixth, the northeastern region, that consists of nineteen provinces. Seventh, the northern region, that consists of seventeen provinces. And the last, the southern region, that consists of fourteen provinces.

Thailand's climate in general is tropical. The difference between the rainy and dry seasons is quite obvious. The country has three seasons, winter from November to February, summer from March to May, and the rainy season from June to October. Most areas have more than 70% of the rainfall in the rainy season that comes with the southwest wind. But the rainfall differs according to the air in every area and its distance from the ocean. The difference of climate is more obvious in the north where the temperature increases to quite high in the summer and lower in the spring and winter, especially in the mountainous area, which is much cooler than others. Rain can create weather that is cool and fresh in the rainy season.

The southern area is a narrow Peninsula that has its particular climate, land, and resources. Its economy is based on subsistence agriculture and rubber production that enriches industry. Other resources are coconut plantations, tin mining, and tourism. One of the most interesting areas is Phuket Island. The area is hilly and mountainous and there are no big rivers in the southern area. From the north to the south there are barriers of mountains and impenetrable tropical forests, giving rise to the isolation initially and now separated by political developments in this area. The international access through the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand has given the area Theravada Buddhism which is centred in Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Islam which is centered, especially in the former Pattani Sultanate on the Malaysian border.²

² Thailand's Provinces, <http://countrystudies.us/thailand/>

The Pattani area is about 19,404 square kilometers, with the distance of 655.3 miles or 1,055 kilometers from Bangkok city. Pattani Province borders Songkhla Province in the north, Narathiwat in the south, the Gulf of Thailand in the east, and Yala in the west. In general, the geographic Pattani area is well watered, so that it is suitable for cultivation or agriculture. Most of Pattani inhabitants are Moslem. This could be the result of Pattani's geography that extends it into the Nusantara Archipelago and Malaysia. Administratively, Pattani is divided into 12 districts: Amphoe Muang Pattani, Amphoe Kapho, Amphoe Khok Pho, Amphoe Mai Kaen, Amphoe Mayo, Amphoe Nong Chik, Amphoe Panare, Amphoe Sai Buri, Amphoe Thung Yang Dang, Amphoe Mae Lan, Amphoe Yarang, and Amphoe Yairing.

Recently, the southern region, especially the Pattani Province has been indicated as the area that is called the area of separatist movements, which are against the Thai governmental law. This is one of the consequences of Pattani geography with the area far from the centre of Thailand's governance and receiving little attention. Due to this the Pattani people have a sense of alienation. Though the number of Malay Moslems is small and insignificant, their resistance has become more complex, as the result of its geographic condition that is the same as that of the other four provinces in the southern part of Thailand - Pattani, Yala, Songkhla, Narathiwat, and Satun - which border the Malay Moslem state, Malaysia. Though for a very long times Pattani has been integrated into the Thai state by Buddhist values, provinces that are dominated by Moslems can be deemed as still isolated from the state bureaucracy which has a Thai Buddhist orientation which limits the Moslems in fulfilling their obligations (Pitsuwan 1989: 3).

The fact of Pattani's geography (including Yala, Satun, Songkhla, and Narathiwat provinces) which are close to the Malaysian border, cause these provinces to communicate more easily with Malaysia than with other Thai provinces, with their culture, customs, and language like those of Malaysia. Also the transference of workers from Pattani to Malaysia strengthens the Pattani identification with Malaysia (Che Man 1990: 17).

II.2. Demography

Demography will be analyzed briefly through looking at the population, the economy, education, natural resources, and language.

Thailand is a Kingdom ruled by His Majesty Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX. The government is led by the Prime Minister, Thaksin Sinawatra, who has been in power since 2001. The political system is a Constitutional Monarchy and the centre of its government is in Bangkok. Bangkok City is divided into 38 districts which are managed by elected Governors. The country is divided into 76 provinces that are managed by appointed Governors. These provinces are also divided into districts, sub districts, *tambon* (groups of villages), and villages.

The typical Thai village commonly consists of 100 to 150 households or about 500 to 700 residents. A village is led by an elected person who is called *phu-yai-ban* and commonly was a man. Now, a woman can be elected too. To be elected as *phu-yai-ban*, the candidate should not be a member of a party, know about his/her village life, should have lived in the village for at least six months, and should be at least 25 years old. The villages in the same area are grouped into *tambon*, the basic administrative unit of Thailand that depends on topography and density and consists of two to 28 villages. Each *tambon* is administered by a Sub District Council, composed of all the village headmen from whom is elected the chairperson or *kamnan*

The population of Thailand was about 62,799,872 in 2002. Thailand is one of the countries that has a high population increasing gradually because of the low mortality rate. The rate of population growth in Thailand is 1.5%; it is higher than China (1.2%) but lower than Laos (2.9%), the Philippines (2.3%), Malaysia (2.4%), Vietnam (2.3%), Cambodia (2.5%), Myanmar (2.1%), and Indonesia (1.7%). While, the mortality rate is lower than in any of the countries mentioned above except Malaysia. Thailand, compared with the countries above, has the lowest illiteracy rate. The most crowded area is the fertile and productive area of Chao Phraya. In the north and the northeast, the

centre of housing is usually along the river, and in the south, most of the housing is on the east coast. The population in the south numbers 8,415,908 people. The Pattani population was about 627,955 people in 2002 ranking 39th. of the 76 provinces. Pattani is one of the provinces that has a high number of births, about 20.0/1000 residents in 2001/2002 and the average mortality rate was 5.5/1000 residents.

Table 2.1
The Thai Population in the Thousands by the Average in Percentages

Year	Population	Year	Population	Period	Growth Rate
1950	20,042	1995	58,894	1950-1960	3.2
1960	27,513	1996	59,608	1960-1970	3.0
1970	37,091	1997	60,311	1970-1980	2.4
1980	47,026	1998	61,003	1980-1990	1.6
1990	55,250	1999	61,684	190-2000	1.2
2000	62,352	2010	68,058	2000-2010	0.9
2001	63,007	2020	71,894	2010-2020	0.5
2002	63,645	2030	74,297	2020-2030	0.3
2003	64,265	2040	75,012	2030-2040	0.1
2004	64,265	2050	73,951	2040-2050	-0.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *International Data Base*, July 2003.

Table 1 show that the expected population number in 2004 is approximately 64.866.000 people. The expectation in 2002 (63.645.000) was not much different from the actual situation (62.799.872). The expected birth number can be seen in the following Table, in 2000-2005, the number of live births is quite high, about 70.23/1000 people.

Table 2.2
Thai Live births and the National Life Expectancy in 1990-2015

Year	Life Expectancy at Birth		
	Total	Male	Female
1990 - 1995	68.72	66.48	71.04
1995 - 2000	69.51	67.36	71.74
2000 - 2005	70.23	68.15	72.39
2005 - 2010	70.89	68.83	73.00
2010 - 2015	71.50	69.50	73.58

*Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base,
Note: Data updated 7-7-2003*

In population density, Bangkok is the most crowded of all (3,694 people/kilometre), and Pattani Province is the ninth in order of the 76 provinces, with about 324 people/kilometre. About 80% Thailand's people are Thai, 53% Siamese and 27% Lao. Among the minority groups, the Chinese is the biggest (12%) and the second biggest minority Malay (4%). Some other minorities can be differentiated into the 'hill tribe' group (Lisu, Luwa, Shan, Khan, Meo, Karen, and Yao) and the group of Vietnamese refugees. The hill tribe minority groups inhabit Chiang Mai, the Talaung and the Laotian ethnic groups dominate the north, Hmong dominate in the south, and the Haw in the Golden Triangle.

There are four categories that make a Thai society: Central Thai (32%); Thai-Lao (30%); North Thai (17%); and South Thai (5%). In brief, the biggest minority is Chinese (12%), and the second and third is Malay (3-4%) and Khmer (1%). The other minority group is a large number of hill tribes, which, however, is not more than 2% of the population.

The prejudice and discrimination against certain ethnic groups are obvious and the potential for conflict among ethnic groups is huge. The potential conflict that occurs among neighbours in Thailand is against the Chinese ethnic group because they are more

dominant in the economic sector. Another significant ethnic conflict possible in Thailand is the conflict between the Moslems in south Thailand and the Thai government. Most Thai Moslems or Thai Malays live under poor economic conditions and initially, the Pattani Province and four other provinces (Yala, Satun, Narathiwat, Songkhla) were parts of Malaysia where 90% are Moslem. Since becoming a part of Thailand they have become victims of prejudice and discrimination. These four provinces do not have equality in economic development or attention from the government as part of the Thai region and at present are in poor condition (Slagter and Kerbo 2000:77).

Religion is central to society in Thailand. Religion for Thais is the first thing to learn to understand, who they are, what their customs are, and how to set their life goals. About 94% of Thais are Buddhists. Monks brought the Buddhist religion from India in the third century B.C. There are some differences in the Buddhist streams in Asia; and the Thai society is Theravada Buddhist. The rest of the Thais are Moslem (4%) and 1% is Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Tao, and animist.³ Most Moslems relate to Malay society, while Christians can be found in the hilly areas and among the Vietnamese.

Buddhism has been associated with the daily lives of the Thais since the formation of this country hundreds of years ago. Islam is prominent in the south of Thailand, while Christianity or other religions are not. Most villages in Thailand have at least one temple for the Buddhist monks to live and practice their religion in. The function of the temple is to be the religious centre, an education place, a social centre, a place for staying overnight, and the funeral place. One of the indicators that makes the Thai society appreciate their Buddhist religion is the fact that about 80 to 90 per cent of the boys are Buddhist and become monks, at least for several months in their lives staying at a monastery. Usually, they become monks in their teens or in their early twenties.

³ Thailand into The 2000's, Published by National Identity Board Office of The Prime Minister, Kingdom of Thailand, 2000, page 107

Most of the Christians live in Chiang Mai Province with some in Bangkok and other provinces in the north. The Christians include the Roman Catholics and Protestants. There is a Chao Kao tribe, which has about 500,000 to 600,000 followers that generally embrace animism. The Hindu and Sikh community is estimated at about 19,000 believers. They are small groups who emigrated from South Asia during the 20th century. Most Hindus and Sikhs stay in Chonburi, Bangkok, and Phuket Provinces. The Chinese minority (Sino-Thai) mostly embraces the belief, which is known as Taoism. Most of its believers are of the Mien hill tribe. Besides, there is a group who adhere to Mahayana Buddhism made up of a few Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants.

Religious freedom is protected by law and the government respects the right of all to religious activities, although sometimes the government limits the religious activities of some groups. The most powerful religion in Thailand is Theravada Buddhism. When the Constitution was being drafted in 1997, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly rejected a proposal to have Theravada Buddhism named as the official religion, because it would create social division and be 'offensive' to other religious communities in the country.⁴ The freedom of religion has been immortalized in the Kingdom's Constitution since 1932.⁵

Islam is a minority religion in Thailand with the majority of followers and the centre of it in Thailand's southern provinces such as Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun. Islam came to Pattani through Arab and Indian merchants during the 13th century. The trading contacts between Malay and Thai people in the south also helped the penetration of Islam. According to Chaiwat Satna Anand, Moslems in Thailand are a little different from those in other countries, in north Thailand, there are Moslem people of Chinese descent. In central Thailand, the Moslems are Arab, Cambodian, Indonesian

⁴ Religious freedom Report 2000, Resource of U.S State Department, http://atheism.about.com/Library/irf/bl_Religiustlibrary.htm

⁵ Ibid. page 106

and Pakistani, and in the northeast the people are from Pakistan.⁶ In general, most Moslems in Thailand have been assimilated into Thai society. There are Moslem Siamese; Moslem Chams and Moslems from Cambodia; Moslems that came from west Asia, such as Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia; Moslems that came from South Asia made up of Tamils, Punjabis, and Bengalis. Moslems that came from Indonesia, mostly from Java, Bawean, and Minangkabau, and the last from Malaysia who are known as Malay Moslems (Forbes 1989: 5-10).

Someone may be a Moslem for a variety of reasons. First, original Moslems (Siamese) who had inherited the Moslem religion. Second, someone may become a Moslem through marriage. Third, Moslems (*muallaf*) who embrace Islam by choice. The number of original Moslems is not large and they usually marry their coreligionists or non-Moslems who have converted to Islam. The second and the third categories of Moslems are more common and can be found in areas where Islam's influence is strong, such as in southern region of Thailand. Usually a man who becomes a Moslem is not as obedient as the woman who has chosen Islam as her religion. He tends to fulfil his obligations as a Moslem just in the common things, only getting to know Islam well after being assimilated into the Moslem community, especially, if he lives in a Moslem community area or in a strong Moslem culture (Forbes 1989:6).

The Moslem religious leader or Central Islamic Community leader in Thailand is Chularajamontri or the state counsellor for all Islamic affairs. He is helped by 42 people who are experts on Islam and whose main function is to plan and cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior and Religious Affairs Department in cases or affairs related to Islam.⁷ In 1983, the number of Moslems found in four provinces of southern Thailand was :

⁶ Interview with Dr Chaiwat Satha Anand, Associate Professor and Lecturer in Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Tuesday, May 25, 2004

⁷ Op.cit, Thailand into The 2000's, page 112

Table 2.3
The Number of Moslems in the Southern Provinces

Province	Area (km ²)	Population Total	Rural (%)	Muslim (%)
Pattani	2,109	472,363	85	78
Narathiwat	4,227	460,060	79	80
Yala	4,716	287,470	75	60
Satun	2,669	174,076	78	70

Source: National Statistics Office, *Statistical Reports of Changwat, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand, 1983.*⁸

In the south, there are the Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Satun Provinces, where Islam is the majority religion. By race, ethnic grouping, language, and culture, these provinces are almost the same as Malaysia. By geography, these provinces are really closer to Malaysia, so that it is easier for them to communicate with Malaysia than with other provinces in Thailand. Most Moslems are considered Malay, even though they come from different ethnic groups and nationalities (from South Asia, China, Cambodia, and Indonesia). The Thai government itself cannot determine exactly the number of Moslems in Thailand, but according to its estimation, the number of Moslems in Thailand is about 4% of the total of population. This can be seen from the number of mosques that exist in 57 provinces. There are about 3,200 mosques with the highest number in the Pattani Province (552 mosques) and in Bangkok; there are about 164 mosques. Islam has its own law that is called *sharia* as the direction for life that is taught through educational institutions.

Formal education for the children starts at the age of seven. The law that was passed in the mid 1990s, states that all children in Thailand are required to attend school for at least 9 years. In the 21st century, Thailand will require 12 years of schooling for all

⁸ Andrew D.W Forbes, *The Muslims of Thailand, Historical and Cultural Studies*, vol. 1, Centre for South East Asian Studies, India, 1989

children, as in the other developed countries in Asia. Thailand expected that in 2000, 95% of young people would graduate from high school. The Thai government has tried to develop education by building hundreds of schools and dozens of new colleges to face the new challenges in global economic competition (Slagter and Kerbo 2000:100).

In the south and Pattani especially, there are many Islamic educational institutions. There are three kinds of schools that exist in the southern region. First, are the religious schools usually known as *pondok* (or *ponok*), which is the traditional religious school; the second is the private school which adds to the common educational curriculum agreed to by the Ministry of Education and known as *madrasah*, and the third is the common school (or kingdom school) in which the general curriculum is more dominant. Historically, the traditional religious school or *pondok* has played an important role in Islamic Education in Pattani, before it became a Thai region (1909). Besides, the *pondok* is one of the important institutions for Pattani people. In the past, Pattani was known as an intellectual centre; where many students from outside Pattani came to study. The number of *pondok* in Pattani is about 249. 122 *pondoks* have been registered by the Thai government and 127 have not.⁹

The *Pondok* in Pattani is an educational institution, which has given much knowledge about Islamic law and the way of Islamic life for more than two centuries. Especially in Great Pattani, the *Pondok* institution has grown as a symbol of pride for Malay people and their aspirations. The *Pondok* is assumed to be a religious and educational institution, so that it is the 'microcosm' for Islam which is an idealisation of a Malay society which is marginal, not only in relationship to the Thai state, but also in its bearing to the Moslem Malay world generally (Pitsuwan 1989: 138).

Now, secular schools under Thai governance play a bigger role (up to 100%) and all of the teachers of those schools are under the control of the Thai government. The Thai government has tried to replace traditional education by secular education or the

⁹ Berita Harian Pattani (Pattani Daily News), <http://beritadaripattani.mine.nu>

vocational curriculum in Pattani. According to Abdulkalim Naknawa, the Director of one *pondok* which quite popular in Pattani, *Dalah*, in Pattani there are 200 *pondoks* and about 186 *pondoks* in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces have been registered with the Ministry of Education, at its local area office.¹⁰ Though, they don't want to change their curriculum to be dominated by a secular curriculum.¹¹

The number of educated people in Thailand in 2000 was about 11,767,555. Those from elementary and high schools numbered about 11,659,559. For Pre-primary it was about 2,161,284, Elementary 6,012,047, Lower Secondary 2,329,650, and Upper Secondary 1,098,551. For the Masters' Degrees, there were about 107,996 candidates.

The number of students in Pattani in 2000 was 118,673 with the number of schools about 372 and number of teachers 5,268. Religious education has been delivered in common schools from elementary to the second grade (7-12 grades). In Elementary schools, religious education takes up about 80 hours of every academic year and only Buddhism and Islam are taught. Nowadays, most regions with an Islamic minority in their population do not have special schools for Islamic education. Besides, the freedom to show a Moslem identity is limited, such as Moslem women being banned from wearing veils when wearing a government uniform.

Specifically for the Pattani Province, the number of students at elementary and high school levels, includes a number of Master degree candidates which cannot be determined definitely. Most of the Masters' Degrees in Pattani come from overseas, especially from the Middle East, which are obtained through scholarship programs or at the students' own expense. But, these graduates cannot easily get jobs in government services. Generally, the graduates of religious schools are assumed not to have the needed qualifications for work because most of the religious schools' curricula are based on religion rather than skills training in subjects such as mathematics, physics, languages

¹⁰ Supalak Ganjanakhundee, 'Islamic School Leaders Agree to Ministry Guidelines', *The Nation*, 2 June 2004

¹¹ Supalak Ganjanakhundee, 'Teaching 'pure' Islam in the South', *The Nation*, 6 March 2004

etc.. Many graduates finally go abroad to neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia where they become teachers. Many students from the south are from common Thai schools too, but they can neither compete nor get jobs. Many students who studied outside Pattani are banned from returning. They are not acknowledged and their certificates are not considered valid.¹² There is fear that the education (Islamic) from overseas will have a bad effect on Thailand.

Education is one problem in Pattani. Not many schools are available in remote areas and most high schools are only available in the centre of Pattani. If a child can go to a common school, his language becomes a serious problem, because using the Thai language in the learning process becomes one of the difficulties or obstacles for Pattani children who tend to be more fluent in Malay. Besides, most Pattani people lack money to send their children to Thai common schools. As an alternative, they are only able to take their children to study in a *pondok*, which teaches pure Islamic studies. The result is that most Pattani students are assumed to be of lesser quality and cannot compete in the military area, civil government or to be policemen (Stephen I.: 249). However, the Thai government is still trying to build a common school in Pattani, as well as continuing support for the State University, Prince Songkhla, and putting in secular curricula into the *pondok* with the purpose that the graduates from *pondok* can compete with graduates from common schools (especially in global work).

The Number of field jobs available in Thailand in 2002 was about 358,548 but the number of employees was about 908,981. For the Pattani Province, the number of jobs available was about 2,734 (at the fourth rank for the southern area after Songkhla (6,906), Surat Thani (5,676), and Nakhon Si Thammarat (3,296)) but the number of employees was 29,397 or about 21% of the total population of 627,955. Most of the jobs are in agriculture, on plantations, and in fishing with most of the investors from China and of the Thai ethnic group while most of the Pattani people are only workers or

¹² Interview with Prof Peerajot Rahimmula, Dean of Political Science and Lecturer in Political Science, Prince Songkhla University, Pattani , Monday, 24 May 2004

labourers in those fields. The average wage per day (2001) earned by Pattani people was 129.4 baht/day, the second lowest after that of the people of the Narathiwat Province who earned (127.4 baht/day) for the southern area. While, the highest was in Surat Thani Province (164.8 baht/day) and the average wage per day for the southern area was 153.2 baht/day. The highest wages earned by the inhabitants were from agriculture (52.7%).

In household average monthly income in the southern area, Pattani Province was the second lowest (9,702 baht/month) after Narathiwat Province (7,603 baht/month) while the highest was in Phuket Province, about 26,363 baht/month. Phuket Province is a tourist area which is able to provide a higher income for its inhabitants.

Even though the southern areas are popular with their tourism spots of magnificent scenery and beaches, the Pattani people feel that they are in the grip of prevailing social inequity. The government controls a major share of the tourism sector and leaves most of the revenue and job opportunities available in the hands of non Moslems, with Moslems earning wages working in hotels, restaurants or guesthouses.¹³

The income earned by the Pattani Province was about 29,645 million baht (December 2000), in the fifth position (after Songkhla, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phuket, and Surat Thani Provinces) of the 14 provinces in southern Thailand. The income per capita of Pattani people over 7 years (1993-2000) increased at about 4.5%/year. The Province economy increased by about 4.67% in 2000 together with an increasing population that caused per capita income to grow by 3.49% to become 47,737 baht/person/year. Total forestland is 27,161 rai (2.2%). farmland is about 763,998 rai (63.0%) and unclassified land is about 421,563 rai (34.8%). The days of rain in Pattani is 161 days.¹⁴ The farmland in most of the southern area relies on the rainy season.

¹³ Kazi Mahmood, IOL Southeast Asia correspondent, *Poverty Grips Muslims In Southern Thailand*, Kuala Lumpur, 12 February 2004 (IslamOnline.net)

¹⁴ Pocket Thailand in Figures, 7th Edition 2004, Alpha Research Co. Ltd. page 379

As a region the southern area contributed 9.1% to the national income or about 448,794 million baht (2000) of 4,904,731 baht as a whole. Most of Pattani's income was obtained from the agricultural sector (52.7%) with most of the southern area fertile for farming because the amount of rainfall is high enough; followed by trade (14.7%), services (10.6%), manufacturing about 4.4%, transportation and communication (2.9%), construction (2.1%), and other (12%), with the total in baht about 29,645 million and it is in the fifth place of the 14 southern provinces.

At the national level, the southern region was the biggest agricultural producer. It was in the first rank with 34.7%, while the manufacturing sector was at the last rank 7.4% (in 2000). Pattani was considered a rich Province in the south because of its natural resources, such as minerals (gold, tin, and natural gas), agriculture, plantations and fishing. Most of inhabitants' economic activities are in fishing, rubber and copra plantations and tropical fruit. But, its income is lower than of the other areas. It is because the land that is owned by Pattani people (especially the Moslems) is less and lower in productivity and moreover there is discrimination against attracting investment, programs and technology. Besides, most of the economic and business activities in Pattani are dominated by ethnic Chinese with the local people (Moslem Malay and Thai) occupied in the lower paid work such as farming, rubber plantation work and fishing.

Many mining activities are currently unproductive, because of the lack of investment due to rumours of terrorism which has led to a decline in domestic income from the rubber plantations, tin mining, and fisheries. From the fishery sector, the problems come from the competition with the bigger fishing businesses and industries that are more developed, while the fishermen from Pattani lack sophisticated fishing equipment.¹⁵

¹⁵ The administrative Policy of the Thai government towards the Thai Muslims in the Southern Border Provinces (1932-1973), Eleventh IADA Conference, International Association of History of Asia, Colombo 1-5 August 1988, page 9

Surin Pitsuwan (1989) says that one of the most important jobs for Malay people is fishing with only Yala Province not having access to the sea. Three of the other provinces really depend on the fishing industry, but this work is done inefficiently (Fraser 1966:9-10). They just used small boats (*kolek*) and nylon fishing nets. For some decades the huge boats with sophisticated technology have come to their ocean. Most of those boats came from provinces in the north, from as far as Bangkok and the east coast crewed by Thai-Buddhists or Thai-Chinese. So, the Malay Moslems have gone to the wall from their traditional profession and have to look for other jobs in the cities. Besides, the fishermen weren't ready to enter into competition with the developed marketing operations (Schrock1970:1044). Only a few Malay Moslems can work in the mining industry. This sector is exclusively in Chinese and English hands, who collect most of the advantages from this very concentrated ownership (Stifel 1971: 7, Thomas 1975:7).¹⁶

The poverty in the southern area, particularly in the three Provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat needs to be given priority in development. In comparison, the poverty rate of people in Yala is (27%), Pattani (20%), and Narathiwat (34%), two to three times higher than the average national poverty rate, which is about 9. 8%. The solution offered by the government to decrease the poverty rate in the three provinces in the south (and the north regions, where the poverty rate is about 17.7%) are: make the allocation of budget activity more effective to decrease the number of poor in the three provinces in the south and the north regions and extend the social saving system, especially in the formal sector.¹⁷ As it is told in NESDB (National Economic Social Development Board), more than 20% of residents living in Pattani and Yala are below the poverty line and more than 30% of Narathiwat people are below the poverty line.

¹⁶ In Surin Pitsuwan, *Islam di Muangthai, Nasionalisme Melayu Masyarakat Pattani*, 1989, page 16-17.

¹⁷ Press Release, Thailand takes aim at development challenges; New Report calls for action in far South, North, and Northeast, <http://www.undp.or.th/whatsnew/documents/Pressreleases-MDG.doc>

If we compare, the poverty rate in the north is higher than it is in the south, referring to per capita income. The lowest per capita income in the north in 2000 was 25,407 baht (Phrae Province), while in the south it was 28,694 baht (Phattalung Province). The highest per capita income, in the north was 68,859 baht (Lamphun Province), and in the south it was 227,664 baht (Phuket Province). It is the same if we look at the provincial income between the north (440,494 baht) and the south (448,753 baht). But, the poverty in the southern region tends to be in the areas where the Moslems are the majority (Narathiwat, Satun, Yala, and Pattani).

The poverty of Moslems is caused by such factors as that most of the significant economic sectors are dominated by non Moslems (Thai-Buddhist and Chinese), with the Moslem people just having a role at the lower level. The *resettlement* program, had also given a role in the domination of the economy to non Moslem people in those four provinces, where the Thai government moved residents from the north to the south with facilities such as land given to them and also significant exploitation in the economic sectors.

In language, more than 85% of Thai people use the Thai language (part of the Tai family of languages) as the official language in Thailand. Besides the Thai language, English is also spoken as the commercial language. Even if it is rarely used, English is the second language taught in schools. But, English is difficult to apply in daily lives, because there were only 28% of schools at the second grade that applied the study of English. Finally, Chinese is also frequently spoken by Thai people.

In general, the Thai-Lao language is used in north and central Thailand, and has become the official language in schools and governance. The other languages spoken by minority groups in Thailand are Chinese (especially Teochiu), Malay, Karen, and Khmer. Other small groups speaking the Thai language; are the Shan, the Lua, and the Phutai. But sometimes there are a few Chinese people speaking the Thai language.

Most of the Pattani community use the Malay language as the means of communication, especially in their family lives. But in community lives, recently Thai has become spoken because there has been a program of assimilation. Besides, in the formal context, such as in government institutions or in work situations, the ability to speak Thai is needed and very important for communication. Sometimes, language becomes a problem between the Pattani people and the government officials, because misunderstandings could happen among them. It can also increase the gaps among them. According to Chaiwat Satha Anand, language has become the barrier in reaching an agreement in Pattani.¹⁸

In the southern area, especially Pattani, it is known that most people lack the ability to speak Thai. Most Pattani inhabitants are Malay, and they are supposed to learn the Thai language. But, sometimes the Thai language is accompanied by Buddhist values, which differ from Islamic values, so there is a rejection from the Pattani community. Inability in Thai results in their not having a chance to enter trade or the government institutions, besides, most of them graduated from Islamic school, *pondok*.

The Thai government's effort to bring about assimilation in language, culture and religion is related to the acknowledgement of Thai national identity which the Thai Kingdom established and which was enshrined in the 'trinity' (*lak thai*), which consists of the Thai nation, belief in the Buddha, and the power of the King. Those who do not believe in the 'trinity' (or one of those), are assumed to be not significant in authority and determination of policy.

Hence, the Pattani Moslem people who have differences (in religion, language, and culture) from the other regions in Thailand, where the Buddhist values are accepted by most people, have to adopt the culture, values, even religion of their fellow Thais. The purpose of assimilation is to avoid the regionalism that can give rise to the formation of tribalism (Sihbudi 2000:73).

¹⁸ Op.cit. Chaiwat Satha Anand.

But this program is not the kind of thing that is easy to accept by many people, such as those in the southern region (Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun Provinces). Because, this program is sometimes more affected by the values of Buddhism and contrary to the values of the Pattani people or Moslem Malays (Islamic Values).

Generally, the provinces in the south tend to be poor unlike other regions in Thailand, with Pattani and Narathiwat Provinces the poorest provinces in the south. It is because of the lack of investment and fund allocation for economic development, terrible development planning management, less government attention to these provinces, as well as the negative stigma, which is held by Pattani as the area that has a unique history and disruptive movements. The Pattani Province has natural resources but they are not managed so that they are maximized. There is no big industry in Pattani and the infrastructure is bad. Tourism is not developed well, even though Pattani has magnificent scenery that has great potential. Actually, the movements affect the government policies in politics, economics, and many investors withdraw their investment because Pattani conditions are not safe enough for economic activity.

Kazi Mahmood's article¹⁹, says that five million Moslems in Thailand are disappointed because of the government's rejection of their language, culture, Malay ethnicity and their area that is poorer than most of the other areas in Thailand. Besides, Thai Moslems had undergone the grief from government management that was not good in the 1980s and 1990s.

There is a gap between Pattani people and the local government officials which has become the reason for the failure of education and economic development. Government officials tend to be from central Bangkok and they cannot approach the local people. Besides, the government officials don't understand what it is the local people need and what they feel, as they have a different religion, ethnicity and culture. The lack of understanding among them can be caused by the barrier of language,

¹⁹ Op.cit. Kazi Mahmood, Islamonline.net

between Thai and Malay (Madakul 1987:72), so that, generally the administrative officials are not trusted by the local people. According to Pravit Rajanaphruk, a senior journalist from the second most popular newspaper in Thailand, 'The Nation'²⁰, the Pattani people need Thais who can understand them.

Local culture needs people from non Muslim[backgrounds] to learn about them. They (government) tend to ignore, not pay attention to the south in economics and Muslim education

Human resources have become weak in the Pattani Province too. Many educated people who have high education do not have the opportunity to compete in the Thai job market. The human resources can't develop because of the lack of funding resources and limited job opportunities.

The differences in the Pattani Province in comparison to other areas in Thailand cause the Pattani community to feel alienated, not only on the social and cultural sides, but also in Thai politics. This is not only because Pattani has a different religion and culture, but also because it has different customs, language, and ethnicity, which sometimes makes them considered as *outsiders*; second class citizens in Thailand. This is the background to why in the southern areas there is conflict unlike in the other areas in Thailand that have different ethnic groups too. The south region is the area where Malay ethnicity has become the majority but is a minority in Thailand. The concentration of people who have a different religion and culture, geography, resistance and movement history, has made the south area easier to negatively stigmatise and subsequently gives rise to conflict,

²⁰ Interview with Pravit Rajanaphruk, The Nation Journalist, Thursday, 27 May 2004

According to Ajan Peerajot Rahimmulla, a Lecturer and Dean of Political Science, Prince Songkla University, in Pattani²¹: The minority that has become the target (problem focus) is Moslems; Thai Moslems, not Chinese, Hmong, etc., because they are not the problem with their culture, religion and border, and they are not Moslem. So, the differences between the Pattani and other areas in Thailand that have different ethnic groups too but subscribe to Thai Buddhism are not caused by the different culture, language, and customs, but are caused by the different religion, which is Islam.

Malay culture in Pattani is stronger than the Thai culture, which makes the Bangkok governance much more discriminatory against the Pattani Province. Though, the Thai government tries to provide funds to develop the area to improve the economic conditions and acknowledge the existence of culture, language, and religion in Pattani that has the aim to improve the Pattani social and economic conditions, as well as increase the loyalty to Thai state, they are not important and do not affect the Pattani people (Stephen I.L. :246).

II.3. Conclusion

The Pattani Province is located in the south of Thailand. Many things have influenced Pattani to become a unique region; the different culture, customs, language, the way of life, and religion, different from most Thais and it makes Pattani an area that seems to be *indigenous*, native ('Malay'), compared to other areas in Thailand. The historic experiences give colour too to the lives of the people of the Pattani Province. The area history with the struggle of Pattani has been given a negative judgment from the central government. Pattani, the region that was known in the previous time as a rich Islamic Kingdom, a popular Pattani Moslem Dynasty, an important trading centre in

²¹ Interview with Prof Peerajot Rahimmullah and Dr Chichanouk Rahimmulla, Dean of Political Science and Lecturer in Political Science, Prince Songkla University, Pattani, Monday, 24 May 2004

Asia, a big and crowded Malay state in the Peninsular area, but nowadays is known as the area of the Pattani freedom movements which relate to the history and the conditions in previous times.

The Pattani geography extends to the tip of south Thailand, bordering Malaysia, so it is not amazing if the Malay atmosphere (the way of life, culture, language, and religion) is more influential than that of the Thais. The same culture, customs, language, and religion confirm the Pattani peoples' identity as Malay Moslems. Pattani society is proud of this identity and has information and trading contacts with Malaysia. The Pattani area that is far from the central governance indirectly has influenced the Pattani conditions. Left behind in development and discrimination in government attention as well as a lack of awareness of the south's problems, have built the Pattani attitude that is apathetic and demands for independence and the same treatment as other Thais. Now, reactions such as rejection and dissidence movements appear. The majority of Pattani people are Moslem with the culture and customs more reflective of Islamic values. The Malay language is more often spoken by the society here than the Thai language. Assimilation programs (culture, customs, Thai language, etc) which are offered and implemented in Pattani have difficulty in being accepted by the Pattani people, because the values offered by the Thai government are usually coloured by Buddhist values which contrast with Islamic values.

The economic conditions have influenced the points of view of Pattani people too. The Pattani region is one of the provinces that belongs to the poor provinces in the south. The geographic condition that it is far from the central government and the smaller amount of government attention given to the south's problems have played a part too. Most Pattani Moslems are poor (about 5 million people) and most economic activities of the Pattani people are at the lower level of economic activities, such as the blue collar work of farm work, industrial work, and fishing. In demography and natural resources, the south region has great potential, but sometimes the negative sentiments have influenced the government's point of view. The Pattani Province is assumed to be

the centre of the Moslem movement and has influenced government investment in this region. The dominance of Chinese and Thai businessmen in the economic activities in Pattani have influenced the quality of the economy and income of Malay Moslem people too. Generally, Pattani people study in religious schools, *pondok*. Some of the reasons which influence the Pattani peoples' choice for their children to go to the *pondok* are: First, the *pondok* is the first educational institution which has grown in Pattani as the centre of education and socialization of the life values and the Islamic laws (*syaria*) which are based on Islam. Second, the availability of the common schools is very limited, especially in the remote areas. Third, the school fees in common schools are felt to be high. Fourth, the language spoken in the learning process at common schools is the Thai language which is not understood by the Malay students. Fifth, the common schools with its secular curricula are influenced by Buddhist values. Because of these conditions common and secular schools are not accepted. The way of the Thai government approach from a soft way to a repressive way has given rise to the Pattani conditions of today, soft but not up to the people's aspirations, although it is the repressive way that causes the movements. The approach that has been put in place usually was not followed by good communication between the Thai government and the Pattani people. The Thai government's attitude (including the local government's) tends to have limitations which indirectly have given people a negative view of the government which is assumed to be unfriendly. The differences of two opinions and two thoughts that do not meet each other, between the Thai government and the Pattani people, has created disadvantageous conditions and obstructed the development, cooperation, and the understanding between them. For ages the Pattani people have wanted their region to reflect their values, culture, and their religion which are different from those agreed to by the Thai structure. They want to keep their unique language and Islamic traditional schools, without intervention from state officials, and most importantly, they want to keep their legal authority and their religion (Pitsuwan 1989:80).

CHAPTER III

INTEGRATION OF PATTANI MALAYS: A GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE PERSPECTIVE

Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto

III. 1. Introduction

Pattani in its early period covered a wide sultanate region; consisting of the area of *Negeri Pattani Besar* (The Great Pattani State) that covered Narathiwat (Teluban), Yala (Jalor) and some of Senggora (Songkhla, areas of Sebayor and Tibor) and even Kelantan, Kuala Trengganu and Pethalung (Petaling) regions. This Pattani area with a regionally wide coverage has a long history of trade and Islamic ideology so can be called a geographical and ideological Malay Moslem region with a different character.

The Pattani region previously was a semi independent Malay kingdom, which was a part of the Empire of Siam: Sukhothai and Ayutthaya. After the Ayutthaya kingdom collapsed in 1767, Pattani obtained its full independence, but under King Rama I administration it once again became a part of Thailand. In 1909, the Pattani region integrated with the Siamese Kingdom as part of the agreement with England. Yala and Narathiwat were initially part of Pattani but as they failed to integrate they became separate provinces. After that period, the rebellions and anti Siam movements started and on several occasions resulted in conflict.

This paper aims to analyse the historic process of Pattani's regional integration into Thailand from an independent kingdom to a subordinate Thai region. First it will try to elaborate the growth of the Pattani Malay kingdom; describe the process and changes in dynamics which took place before the Pattani regional integration into the Kingdom of Siam; and also look at the efforts made by the Thais to achieve national and territorial unity before the Anglo-Thai agreement period. It is hoped to also give the background to the history and geopolitical changes in southern Thailand along with the dynamics that took place.

III. 2. A Brief History of Pattani

Tracing the historical process, Pattani was an important kingdom in the growth of commerce and spread of Islam in the Malay Peninsula since it was the only port town and commercial centre in the region, it had a profound effect in the emerging South China Sea territories from the 14th to the 16th centuries. According to the notes of Chinese visitors, the Pattani region was well known before the 12th century, through commercial relations with Southeast Asian countries. They knew the country and called it 'Lang-Ya-Hsiu' or Langkasuka²² on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula between Senggora (Songkhla) and Kelantan with a capital city in the Yarang area. In those notes that region was said to be an important commercial port for all Asian seamen especially for the Chinese navy that tried to cross the Gulf of Thailand to Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula since they had previously found this landing place.

Langkasuka is believed to have been an early Pattani kingdom. The Langkasuka story can be seen in an Indian as well as a Javanese text. Rajendra Chola (King of India) mentioned the name of Langkasuka when his kingdom invaded the Asian region, as a kingdom which did 'not tremble in a bitter struggle'. At that time Langkasuka was an Indian naval expedition target, which required subjugation and mastery over their fields of trade. During the epoch of the Majapahit kingdom it was written in 1365 in *Nagarakartagama*, that Langkasuka was part of the Majapahit region in the east coastal area. Langkasuka was also a part of the Sri Vijayan monarchic authority. The Langkasuka region was under the control of two big *nusantara* kingdoms (Majapahit and Sri Vijaya) as has been written by the University academic of Songkhla Pattani

²² According to several notes there are many versions of the name Langkasuka: *Lang-Hsi-Chia*, *Lakawn Suka* even emerging in a farming fable in Kedah, *Alang-Kah-Suka*, a story about Princess Sadong, who overcame some celestial female beings and wild goats of a limestone hill, refusing all suitors. A rational explanation by Paul Wheatly in Nik Anuar Nik Muhamad, *Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Pattani, 1785-1954*, said that Langkasuka formerly was a Kingdom that ruled the commerce of the east west region through Segenting Kra and this power included the peninsular area up to the Bay of Bengal. The Malay kingdom of Langkasuka which is believed to have already existed before the 13th century was changed to become the Malay Kingdom of Pattani.

University, Peerajot Rahimmula; who claims that the genesis of the people of Pattani is from the Javanese Malay tribes. This statement arises from the commercial relation that involved the Sri Vijayan kingdom. Most experts are of the opinion that one of the Malay ancestors in the Malacca area after the conquest of the region in the 8th and 9th centuries developed to become the Malays of now. With the fading of the Sri Vijaya kingdom's monarchic influence in the 11th century, this region got its independence and became a separate region. The Langkasuka area itself became of interest to several neighbouring kingdoms in Southeast Asia in the 13th and 14th centuries; the Angkor Empire in Cambodia, the Burmese Empire in Pagan; the King Chola's in India; the King of Ceylon's Empire, the Majapahit and the Sri Vijaya Empires. Almost all of those empires were able to intervene and tried to make an independent area in their regions.

The Langkasuka kingdom was last heard of in the 14th. and early 15th centuries. In Thai historic notes, the name Langkasuka has no clear explanation, yet at that time, the Pattani region was known as part of a Buddhist regional group under the regional coverage area of Kedah and Pahang with the governance centre in Nakhon Si Thammarat (Ligor). At that time the Pattani region was already formed and now became a new area in the region under the dominance of the Sukhothai and Ayutthaya kingdoms. The existence of the Nakhon Si Thammarat region as a place of governance under the kings of Siam is guessed to have continued from the end of the 15th. century when the Ayutthaya Kingdom assigned a governor to Nakhon Si Thammarat under the control of the central kingdom..

How Langkasuka changed into Pattani cannot be ascertained because there is no clear historic evidence of it. Thai historians, A.Teeuw and Wyatt write that the Pattani region existed in the 14th and 15th centuries. At that time, Pattani began to be recognised as an area of commerce and spread of Islam. The story *Hikayat Pattani* mentions that the Pattani Malay Kingdom originated from the Malay kingdom centred in *Kota Mahligai* ruled by the Phya Tu Kerab Mahayana. The narrative tells how the kingdom was formed. At that time the location of Pattani was far in the hinterland and difficult

to be accessed by any merchants. Phya Tu Antara, a child of Phya Tu Kerab Mahayana, moved the kingdom to a fishing settlement that was found by chance. This region, was called 'Pattani', now believed to have been centred at Kampong Grisek in the present Pattani region (Siti Hawa 1992:9-10).

The Pattani area development in much of the literature is correlated with the Islamization and the commercial processes in this region (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970, Siti Hawa 1992, Nik Anuar 1999). In the 14th and 15th centuries the Pattani region quickly developed into a kingdom of commercial activity and spread of Islam. It covered an extensive and dense area especially in the South China Sea peninsula. Geographically the Pattani area is described as strategic because it is centred in the commercial path of traffic between the Malay Peninsula and the East Asian countries and between the waters of the Strait of Malacca and the Sulu Sea with the South China Sea waters. The path was a very well known trade route as it was becoming an international shipping route connecting Arab lands and India and China. Pattani was an important commercial centre to serve Moslem Arab, Indian, European and Chinese merchants.

Concerning commercial activity, Pattani in fact started commercial activity many years ago. In a note, the Chinese naval officer, Admiral Cheng-Ho, who presided over the expansion to the southern regions, showed that commercial relations intertwined all the merchants in Pattani (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:3). The commercial relations between Moslem and Chinese merchants greatly assisted the growth of trade in Pattani. First because of its location and second because it was very much connected with the spread of the Moslem religion. The role of the southern Chinese merchants who professed the Moslem religion and spread it to the Malay region pushed commercial contacts among them. Commercial relations also continued with Arab and Indian merchants who also conducted exploration into regional commerce.

The Pattani region became a trading *entrepot* where the local people sold land products '*rempah-rempah*' (various spices) which they traded for Chinese textiles and ceramics. Besides that Pattani became a focus for Arab and Indian merchants many of

whom brought their textiles. Pattani merchants resold these trade goods along with their own land products like black pepper, other foodstuffs and gold. The trading action conducted by Pattani merchants extended to the south Malay Peninsula, the Island of Sumatra, the Island of Java up to Sulawesi (Makassar) (Auni 2001:300).

The famous trading centre of Pattani attracted Christian and European colonists who in the 15th. and 16th centuries began colonial expansion into the Asian region. The Portuguese and Dutch partook in trade in this region, especially to get land products like spices, black peppercorns and gold which had become the most important Pattani products. It is noted that the Portuguese had already arrived in Pattani in 1517 to conduct commercial transactions. In 1602 the Dutch also began to trade and established a base in Pattani harbour. Next, the British also took part in commercial activity here. This led to conflict between the Dutch and the British and resulted in war in 1623 which the Dutch won. The commercial relations with the Dutch increased, supporting the hope for the Dutch to get needed rice and food provisions (Auni 2001:300-302).

Apart from being known as a trade area, the Pattani region had an important role in the Islamization of the Malay people. From the geographic aspect, Pattani was the channel for spreading Islam along the peninsular area to the South China Sea and reached the harbour areas in the Cantonese and Yunan regions in China. Pattani was actually similar to other areas in the South China Sea like Champa and Tonkin. Islam spread in Pattani through direct interaction between the merchants and the Pattani community. Islam in Pattani was more influenced by Chinese Moslems whose commercial relations were of long standing. D' Eredia, a Portuguese visitor wrote in 1613, that Islam had developed earlier in Pattani than in Malacca. A similar statement was made by Teeuw and Wyatt who are convinced that Islam developed in the Kuala Berang area and Terengganu between 1386 and 1387 (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:4). For this reason it can be said that Pattani was a cultural and dissemination centre of Islam in the Malay world. Trade with Arabs, Indians and Chinese Moslem merchants, introduced Islam to Pattani where it became a religion embraced by the local residents.

About how Pattani accepted Islam, Hikayat of Pattani explains that Phya Tu Antara, the son of Phaya Tu Kerub Mahajana of Kota Mahligai, accepted Islam through a Pasai Moslem scholar, named Sheikh Said. When the King had a skin disease that was difficult to cure, he looked for a traditional healer. A Pasai man called Sheikh Said came to cure the King on one condition; if the King recovered from his pain he must embrace Islam. As a result of being cured the Pattani King accepted Islam and after Islam was accepted by the King, a lot of Pattani people also entered Islam (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:68-69)²³. After embracing Islam, Phya Tu Antara changed his name to the Islamic name, Sultan Ismail Syah Zillullah Fil' Alam. Sultan Ismail was the first king of Pattani.

The existing commercial contacts and spread of Islam propelled Pattani into even greater prosperity. A long local tradition of trade activity formed Pattani into a strong economic and political area. Under Sultan Mudaffar Syah's administration, which replaced that of Sultan Ismail Syah, Pattani interacted with and joined their neighbours like Johor, Pahang and Kelantan Kingdoms to become one force from 1530 to 1540. The important position of Pattani from the geographical and political aspects placed Pattani to be acknowledged as an area to be reckoned with.

Growth and strength of the Pattani region made this Kingdom expand its region to the northern area. This matter was proven when Ayutthaya was attacked by Burma, Pattani took the opportunity to strike at the Ayutthaya kingdom under the leadership of Sultan Mudaffar Syah (Puaksom 1996). This war story continued while the Kingdom of Siam was ruled by King Ramathibadi II and King Chakkraphat (1491-1569). Apart from Pattani, the Burmese kingdom and the kingdom of Vietnam took the opportunity to attack Ayutthaya. According to Davisakd Puaksom²⁴, conflict between Pattani and

²³ In fact before the King embraced Islam, the Pattani people were already believers. This is deduced from the existence of commercial contacts with Arab, Indian and Chinese merchants that influenced the spread of Islam among the Pattani residents. See also the description of Siti Hawa in the Hikayat of Pattani.

²⁴ Puaksom, Davisakd in Pompejra, Dhivaratna. 1996. A Course Taught in Southeast Asian History. Ayudhya in Pattani's Grasp: Historical Writings and Local History, Chulalongkorn University, Departement of History, Faculty of Letters

Ayutthaya began when Sultan Mudhaffar Syah went overseas to develop cooperative contacts with Ayutthaya, since he thought that two were better than one, this was a good basis for conducting trade relations. Before Sultan Mudhaffar Syah sailed to Ayutthaya he ceded his position to his brother Sultan Manzur Syah to prepare for a war campaign against Siam.

When the Pattani war preparations were complete, a Pattani troop sailed to Ayutthaya with the intention of attacking it. The Pattani troops placed themselves close to the King's Palace which a Pattani delegate was invited to visit. This opportunity was used by the Pattani to try to kill the King of Siam, an effort that failed with the Siamese King running away and hiding. Attack tactics were readjusted but bloodbaths and death followed in both parties, including that of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah, while Sultan Manzur Syah went back to Pattani. Some time later he sent Wan Muhamad as ambassador to the Ayutthaya palace to make an agreement of peace and friendship. Pattani then became an independent region of the Siamese royal government under 'Pira Pat Pichai' or Siamese government supervision.

After the death of Sultan Manzur in 1564, the Pattani Kingdom leadership went to Sultan Patik Siam, the son of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah, who was then about nine or ten years old. Due to incitement by a prominent person Sultan Patik Siam was murdered by one of his brothers, King Bambang in 1573 who in turn was murdered by the prominent person Seri Amarat. This gave rise to conflict among the children of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah. In anticipation of the hiatus, Sultan Bahdur, the son of Sultan Manzur Syah, became the king of Pattani. Sultan Manzur actually had seven children, that is, Hijau, Biru, Unggu, and Bima (by a concubine), Emas Kerencang (who died when five years old) and Sultan Bahdur Syah while Kuning was the child of Unggu. Following incitement from the prominent Seri Amar Pahlawan, Bima killed Sultan Bahdur and took over his power but was in turn murdered by Seri Amar Pahlawan. After various internal political conflicts in the empire, Pattani did not have a male heir for its throne. The kingdom therefore elevated a woman to run the empire. This was the start of female


leadership which became very famous in Pattani legend. The Pattani Kingdom reached the zenith of prosperity when governed by four women that is: Queen Hijau (1584-1616), Queen Biru (1616-1624), Queen Unggu (1624-1635) and Queen Kuning (1635-1651). It emerged as an important centre of trade and a point of entry into China where Pattani had contacts with all Southeast Asian countries.

Economic strength indicated also by domestic political stability made Pattani respected by all neighbouring countries like those in the Malay Peninsula: Pahang and Johor Baru and including the Ayutthaya Kingdom. Pattani commerce extended to reach the area of *nusantara*; Palembang, Aceh, Batam, Batavia (Jakarta), Makassar up to Ternate (Auni 2001:303).

Pattani power expanded as far as the Kelantan and Trengganu regions an expansion that made Pattani known as *Negeri Pattani Besar* (The Great Pattani State). Except for Johor, there was no other country on the east Malay Peninsula of the strength and prosperity of Pattani. This is indicated by marriage between Queen Unggu and the Sultan of Pahang which added Pahang to the Pattani region.

Thus Pattani progressively confirmed its strength. In this period, Pattani became stronger both commercially and politically. The strength of Pattani is proven by its ability to break political effort and attacks from the Siamese Kingdom which tried to take over its sea trade routes. The strength of Pattani is shown by its ownership of three big cannons that is: Negara, Pattani and Mahalel. They could conscript 180.000 troops for combat and had a famously impregnable fortress, namely, the Benteng Raja Biru (*The Blue Queen's Fortress*).

Diagram 1
The Inland Dynasty Of Pattani ²⁵



S. = Sultan; m. = married; r. = reigned

The geographically strategic position of Pattani on the Malay Peninsula was a reason for the town being expected by foreign merchants from east or west to be a halting-place for rest or trade. Within a short time, Pattani became an important

²⁵ Teeuw, A. and Wyatt, D.K. Hikayat Pattani, Bibliotheca Indonesia 5. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, Page 11.

kingdom, progressive both economically and politically and stable with good governance. Besides that the international communications base prevented Pattani from falling into the hands of colonisers like the Kingdom of Siam, Britain and France.

III. 3. Internal Politics and The Pattani - Siam Conflict

The strength of Pattani was supported by several other kingdoms in the Malay region which during the female ruler era influenced political behaviour and overseas relations. When Pattani was led by Queen Unggu, (King) of Pattani VIII (1624-1635) released an anti Siamese policy which broke off the political relations with Siam. One of the policies released was not to use the ceremonial title of Siam 'Pera Chau' (*Phrao Cao*) and cancel the marriage between her child, Kuning, with Okaphaya Deca the child of Gabenor Ligor (Nakorn Si Thamarat). Kuning then married Tuan Syah Alam a king of the Johor Sultanate. Van Vliet cited by Nik Anuar (1999) wrote that one reason why Pattani severed relations with the Kingdom of Siam was because Queen Unggu assessed '... Siamese King (Prasat T'hong) was not entitled to become King, having killed the previous king and his heirs'. That statement and policy released by Queen Unggu angered the Siamese Kingdom which unsuccessfully tried to attack Pattani..

One reason for the failure of the attack in 1630 was Pattani's obtaining armed support from the sultanates of Johor and of Pahang which defeated the Siamese troops. The capacity of Pattani to repel this attack forced Siam to acknowledge that Pattani indeed had strength. Meanwhile Songkhla where the Siamese kingdom had a fortress which had the responsibility to oversee the southern regions including Pattani, did not have enough troops to supervise the Pattani autonomous movements (Nik Anuar 1999).

The policy of normalization of relations with Siam was brought in by Queen Kuning who succeeded Queen Unggu when the latter passed away. The goals of this policy were to restore the situation in order that the relations between Siam and Pattani would not worsen. This policy between them dictated that Pattani be ready to send a tribute of 'Bunga Mas'(artificial flower of gold) and Silver to Ayutthaya²⁶, and Queen Kuning accept the Phrao Cao title again. The rivalry for power between Pattani and Siam can be seen as a struggle between two equally strong kingdoms that has been happening over the period from the 13th.to the 16th. centuries.

In the last period of Queen Kuning's administration (1635-88) Pattani flare ups of internal conflict in the kingdom began. The situation was reiterated by Queen Kuning's death leaving the Pattani kingdom without a legal heir. After the death of the ruler, Pattani experienced internal political problems that triggered off a dispute over who was entitled to inherit the kingdom. In the Hikayat Pattani it is written that the conflict among the prominent people of the kingdom was over who would become the *Bendahara* (treasurer) and make the King of Pattani merely a puppet (Teeuw & Wyatt 1970: 72-94). In this period there was a change in the dynasty of the kingdom which had initially been ruled by an indigenous person to be ruled by someone of the Kelantan dynasty. The trigger for this dynastic change was the fact that Queen Kuning was married to the King of Johor of the Kelantan region. Relatives of Queen Kuning's husband disputed over who should become the King of Pattani. This conflict continued to the beginning of the 17th.century and resulted in the Pattani administration changing to be ruled by the Kelantan dynasty.

²⁶ The presentation of a 'Gold Flower' can be seen as an effort to form a close relationship between two kingdoms even if conducted by only one side. The symbolism of the delivery of a Gold Flower in fact has several perspectives. From the perspective of trade, the delivery of this flower could stand for the existence of commercial relations between the two Kingdoms because at that time Pattani was a centre of trade. While from the political view the delivery of a Gold Flower can be interpreted as a tribute which acknowledges the sovereignty of a power. In the eyes of the Kingdom of Siam, this tribute was seen as a symbol of submission to and acknowledgement of the Kingdom. This means that in the eyes of the Siamese people Pattani was in fact a region submissive to the Kingdom of Siam. In some cases this view has become the ideology embraced by Thai historians.

The governance by the Kelantan dynasty began with the leadership of King Bakal, an important man of *Kampong Teluk*. For about 41 years the Pattani Kingdom was led by this dynasty. There were eight people who had power during this period of the Kelantan dynasty. One of the rulers was a woman. During her leadership there were around 10 prime ministers who changed function 15 times. According to Teeuw and Wyatt the last king to lead Pattani was Alang Yunus. King Alang Yunus was the last king about whom little is known, apart from the fact that his government was the last of the Kelantan dynasty. He only governed Pattani for 11 months when he was murdered by his older brother, Datuk Pengkalan Pauh, the Bendahara (treasurer), in a conflict between them. That murder resulted in a civil war in Pattani which brought about chaos and disorder among residents. Civil wars in Kelantan government circles brought about uncertainty in the political situation in the Pattani region.

Table 2²⁷
The Kelantan Dynasty: Rulers And Treasurers

RULER	TITLE	TIME	TREASURER
Raja Bakal	Marhum Teluk	1688 - 1690	Datuk Terenam
Raja Emas Kelantan	Marhum Kelantan	1690 - 1704	Datuk Dipera' Datuk Bangrekam Tuk Tua Datuk Sai Tuk Tua Alung Cang' Tuk Tua Phra Phetphichai Datuk Kempul Datuk Tanah Merah
Raja Emas Jayam	Baginda	1704 - 1707	(Datuk Bangrekam?) Datuk Tarab
Raja Dewi	Phra-cao	1707 - 1716	
Raja Bendang Badan	Paduka Syah Alam	1716 - 1720	
Raja Laksamana Dajang		1720 - 1721	Datuk Tarab (discharged)
Baginda		1721 - 1728	Datuk Tarab
Alung Yunus		1728 - 1729	

²⁷ Op cit. p. 22

The political conflicts and power struggles in Pattani made local affairs chaotic. In the field of commerce there was a decline in attraction and foreign merchants in this uncertain situation moved their trade to other regions. Their trade plan was to move to other countries like Malacca and Singapore which were more peaceful. This commercial change was supported by the emergence of new commercial regions in the Malay areas and several others around *Nusantara* (the Indonesian Archipelago). This situation certainly had an adverse effect on the economy of Pattani. Besides, the lack of leadership caused the situation of the people of Pattani to progressively decline (Teeuw & Wyatt 1970: 72). At the same time the Kingdom of Siam was at war with Burma. The Burma-Siam war indirectly entangled north Malay areas, including Pattani, which became 'objects of the struggle' between the two monarchic powers.

In the Pattani region struggle there were several motives which triggered off the above: First, the 'political prestige' motif meant that the wider the scope of the regional kingdom the greater the influence of and appreciation by other nations. Second, the socio-economic motif which was tied to the importance of obtaining human labour while getting raw resources in keeping with the kingdom's requirements in traditional war. Third, the economic strategy motif to dominate the strategic Segenting Kra region to connect the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Thailand. The Burma-Siam war inevitably involved the region with the disturbances in Pattani sovereignty.

In 1776 Phya Taksin, the King of Thonburi led the Ayutthaya kingdom in a successful defeat of the Burmese in Ayutthaya. Siam immediately shifted its attention to other countries in the southern peninsula which had tried to separate during the Burma-Siam war. Countries in the south of the Peninsula like Ligor, Songkhla and Pattalung were attacked by Siam. This situation forced the rulers of those countries to seek protection in Pattani because their governments were forced to submit to the Kingdom of Siam which forced their kings to surrender. Siam did not attack Pattani which had become the place for the kings on the peninsula because of a return attack from Burma. In 1779, Sultan Muhammad was requested by Siam for help in an attack by Burma.

Sultan Muhammad, however, refused to give aid. This triggered off Phraya Chakri's attack on Pattani. Putera Surasi a younger brother of Phraya Chakri assisted by Phraya Senaphutan, Gabenor Pattalung, Palatcana and Songkhla attacked Pattani in 1785. Although the Pattani Malay Kingdom tried to defend itself Siam succeeded in taking the Pattani region in the following year.

The defeat of Pattani by the Kingdom of Siam forced Sultan Muhammad to surrender in 1786. The terrible effect of that drubbing was that 4,000 Pattani Malays were imprisoned and taken to Bangkok as ransom slaves. After the fall of Pattani, the old kings were dismissed and replaced by those chosen by Siam. Tengku Lamidin, the administrator of the Bendang Badan region was inaugurated by Siam as the new King of Pattani. But the power of Tengku Lamidin did not last long. In 1791, Tengku Lamidin rebelled with the help of the regional leader of Annam who was a believer in Islam, Okphaya Cho So, to attack the Siamese army in the Tiba, Chanak, Songkhla and Saiburi areas. In that attack, Tengku Lamidin was also assisted by Sheikh Abdul Kamal, a Moslem scholar from Mecca, but finally the effort failed (Teeuw & Wyatt 1970: 23). Then the Kingdom of Siam following the advice of the superintendent of the southern region in Ligor (Nakhon Si Thamarat), installed Datuk Pengkalan as the new Pattani regional administrator. The appointment of Datuk Pengkalan did not last long because during his leadership it culminated in the revival of rebellion against Siam in 1808. That rebellion was defeated by Siam after military help was obtained from the centre of the Kingdom in Bangkok.

Not satisfied with only mastering the Pattani region, in 1821, Siam went on to attack Kedah and force Sultan Abdullah to run away to Pulau Pinang. The aim of the attack was to reduce the Malay power and influence in the Pattani region. The power of Siam in the Malay area was acknowledged by the British who had seized the Malay region (Malaysia now) as indicated in the Burney Agreement of 1826. From 1817 to 1842, Pattani was governed by at least two Malay kings. The first King to hold the position was Tuanku Haji Sulong, the son of the King of Kelantan's Treasurer, Long Jenal. Tuan

Sulong who had the title of Haji held the position until 1832. The Siamese government removed Tuan Sulong later because of his involvement with the evocation of the anti-Siam issue in 1831. After that elimination effort, the Siamese government inaugurated Nik Yusof, a man from Grisek, as the King of Pattani. During the resurgence of the anti-Siam movements in 1838, Nik Yusof was not involved and in 1842, Nik Yusof was inaugurated as the King of Jering after the death of King Nai Him Sai. To fill the empty position of the Pattani King, the Siamese government inaugurated Tuan Besar Tun Ahmad, the King of Kampong Laut and the former Prime Minister of Kelantan as the new King.. From then, until 1902, Pattani was governed by Tuan Besar and his descendents (Nik Anuar 1999).

By the end of the 18th. century, Pattani had already lost its golden era. Negeri Pattani Besar which had included the Kelantan, Trengganu, Pattani Awal, Senggora and Pethalung regions, slowly began to disintegrate. The last Pattani - Siam war weakened its economic structure and power. Its political strength and the attraction of its port as a special trade centre had also progressively dulled along with the increase in new trade centres like Johor, Malacca, Aceh, Banten and Batavia (Jakarta). As a coastal state, the economy of Pattani was very dependant on trade. The decline of this caused the Pattani economic barometer to drop. Indeed it can be said that since the early 18th.century, the Pattani port had only been a place of transit and not a trade centre or the place for the development of Islam. The growth of political instability, dissolution of the region and crisis among the leadership made Pattani into the '*sick person of the Malay Peninsula*'.

III. 4. Integration of The Pattani Region

Between 1842 and 1900, Pattani faced commercial competition from the new Southeast Asian ports which were starting to expand. In contrast, the development of relations with Siam continued fluctuating. In this period anti Siamese sentiments increased and gave rise to struggles against the government conducted by the Pattani elite. These conditions made it necessary for the Siamese royal government to release

policies to handle the problem. One policy that was released by the Kingdom governance was the regulation to divide the Pattani Malay kingdom into 7 regions or 'hua muang'. This radical policy design directly used the system of regulating the kingdom through provincial towns or through government agents (representative system). The policy of transforming traditional bureaucracy of the Kingdom was later referred to as the 'Thesaphiban System'²⁸.

With this change, the union of the Pattani Malay kingdom was broken into 7 regions to be governed by kings like: (1). Pattani Tuan Sulung, (2). Teluban Nik Dir, (3). Nongchik Tuan Nik, (4). Jalor Tuan Yalor, (5). Jambu Nai Pai, (6). Rangae Nik Dah and (7). Reaman Tuan Mansur. Through this Thesaphiban System, regional division was arranged and unified into one unit recognized as *Monthon*. Every Monthon was led by a Governor (Khaluang Thesaphiban), who was responsible to the Minister for Internal Affairs. Under this system, every administrator in the Kingdom from the highest to the lowest was paid a salary according to the national regulations. The division model for this region was arranged directly and indirectly. In the direct system the local power was replaced by an officer appointed by the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Kingdom. Under the indirect system the local power was not replaced but had to follow the already specified regulations of the Kingdom. All the Sultans were appointed as the Kingdom government heads of only their area and obtained a salary from the Kingdom with a part from the tax levied on the local people (Scupin 1980: 55-71). In each region hua muang was headed by a strong man on the level of king or *chao muang* under the kingdom of Siam in Songkhla.

²⁸ The division of the region was based on the Thesaphiban system. Under this regulation, the Malay kingdom no longer had autonomous power and Malay Kings lost their sovereignty. King Chulalongkorn brought in this Thesaphiban system in an attempt to ward off the unrest that occurred in Southeast Asia in 1890 when British and French colonialism began to threaten Siamese regional integrity.

Basically, this policy meant that the King of Siam had the right to appoint and dismiss state kings or governors. The state kings no longer had the power to overthrow/sanction laws (*phu samret ratchakan*) in their areas. Besides that they were now considered to be employees of the Kingdom (*phu wa ratchakan*). Under this regulation some special powers of the kings were lessened. The king no longer had the power to appoint kingdom officials. Besides that in the case of specifying several area policies the governor or king was obliged to get the agreement of the high administrator of the pertinent region. As a contrast, all regional kings' proxies only had the authority to appoint or elevate lower level civil servants in their regions.

This division policy in this region was actually an effort to divide the Pattani Malay Kingdom, with the hope that the anti Siam movement would be minimized. This was the way to weaken the strength of the Pattani Malay elite to oppose. The effect of that policy strategy was to weaken the Pattani Malays. The policy ordered that if the Malay area kings rebelled they were to be put to death or imprisoned along with their families. As an affirmation of its authority Siam inaugurated as King of Jambu, Nai Rai, a descendant of Siam, as a representative of the central Siamese Kingdom to oversee the kings of the southern region.

Meanwhile, to balance the power of the Malay resident majority the Kingdom of Siam moved Thai people from the northern region to the southern countries through a *resettlement program*. The Siamese Government also used a policy of exploitation of rubber collection and tin mining towards Pattani people and migrant workers, though most people of Pattani made a living as fishermen. The resettlement policy of the Siamese government, which affected thousands of Thais, was to manage these exploitation efforts²⁹.

²⁹ Interview with Prof Peerajot Rahimmula, Dean of Political Science and Political Science Academic, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani, 24 May 2004.

As an instrument of control of the small kingdoms outside the Kingdom of Siam, the Thesaphiban system was meant to minimize the autonomous power of the Pattani area. In the beginning the policy was released on 18 January 1896 by King Chulalongkorn who passed it to Putera Damrong, the Minister for Internal Affairs of Siam. In a confirmation given by the King, the law was to affect the regulations which were very important to the Siamese Kingdom because these could give economic advantages and support the defence of the state.

If we do not put our administration in order, we will not have enough income, which is the source of the power needed to defend the country. The expansion of the earnings which result from the facilitation of the people's methods of earning their livelihood and making a living out of the produce of the soil. The strengthening and the rationalization of the administration and the development of the economy are therefore the ultimate aims of this kingdom (Tej Bunnag 1977: 91 in Nik Anuar).

The decision to change the base of the government system was not only because of domestic conflict in the Kingdom of Siam. This policy was also influenced by the external situation of colonialism in the Southeast Asian region. Some reasons for this policy were: *First*, the change in the government base had a close relationship with the political situation and security in the Southeast Asian region in the 1890s (Iraklein 1968: 52-68; Chandran 1971: 143-59). This can be seen from the presence of European colonialists with their imperialist movement in Southeast Asia which influenced Siam in its attitude to maintain the integrity of its region especially of that distant from the centre in Bangkok as of the Malay areas in southern Siam. The Kingdom of Siam worried if this region could not be united under Siamese power, there could be big implications because those areas could fall to western imperialism.

Second, in the 1890s, mass imperialism appeared in the Southeast Asian region where French and British colonial powers had begun to compete to colonise the Asian region which reached the peak in 1893. The French started to overpower the east River

Mekong area after succeeding in defeating the Siamese army, while the British also paid attention to the Burmese north east area, the south of China, and the north of the Malay countries up to Segenting Kra. Although the British respected the independence and the sovereignty of the Siamese region, their influence was big in the 1890s when the British already had a representative council in Malaya. This influence reached other regions like the north Malay area up to Segenting Kra. In fact, in 1896, after Frank Swettenham became the first Resident-General of the United Malay States, efforts were made to fuse all the Malay areas including Pattani.

The effect was that Siam was jammed in between English and French imperialists making it apprehensive that the two states at any time could attack the Siamese monarchic region. Based on that situation, Siam tried to remodel its system of regional division. It released its policy system called the Thesaphiban in 1899 which became better known as the 1899 Regulation. This regulation gave authority to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to arrange or abolish 'local governance authority'. Under this regulation, the local king's or governor's position would no longer be 'semi-hereditary'.

This regulation of course influenced local governance systems by indirectly little by little reducing Malay Kings' sovereignty. It gave a stimulus to the conflicts between Pattani Malay Kings who refused to apply the regulation. Economically the Thesaphiban policy made the local kings lose some of their income from taxation and limited their authority as well as forbidding them from taking part in commerce or levying duties (tax-farms). They were not able to obtain any income apart from the salary paid by the central Siamese Kingdom authority. That regulation also affirmed that the governor was responsible to the Regional High Official of the Kingdom. The governors did not have power over their subordinates. All governors had to report their activities to the Regional High Official within seven days of that activity.

This 1899 Regulation was targeted at paralysing the local power of the Pattani kings and strengthening that of the central Siamese Kingdom. With this regulation Bangkok could supervise the regions within its reach, especially from foreign

interference. The process was carried out step-by-step so that Siam could influence the southern regions. The Siamese were especially anxious to get the support of the British to counter the threat from the French in their region. Besides this, another target was to prevent the local powers from feeling alienated and perhaps asking for help from a foreign power.

Other influences to make this regulation effective were due to the geographically and administratively very strategic position of Pattani. This means that the Pattani region, initially an independent kingdom, following a defeat in a war became an integrated part of Siam. Evidently the Kingdom and people of Siam saw Pattani as a kingdom defeated by the Siamese Kingdom while to most Pattani Malay people, Siam governance in their region was assumed to be that of a guest or foreigner.

Those Siamese policies were felt to be very dominating. One policy step taken by Phya Sukhum a well known official of the Kingdom, was to try to introduce a new way in tax collection. Like the opium tax system (opium-farming). Tax would be divided between Siam and Pattani, that is, half for the King of Pattani and half for the King of Siam. This proposal of Phya Sukhum's was rejected by the Malay kings because they assumed that the job of collecting duty or give opium contracts was their responsibility and the Siamese government did not have the right to interfere in this activity.

The effort to reject Siamese policies was conducted by Tengku Sulaiman representing the elites of other kingdoms. King Chulalongkorn explained that the steps taken by Phya Sukhum were quite beneficial since opium farming was a profitable business. In the first year of the opium farming system Pattani kings each received a share of the opium tax. During the period, opium tax results from the seven Pattani countries amounted to \$ 30,200 a year. But this situation did not last long as the Siamese Kingdom no longer fulfilled the payment contract to Pattani kings although that tax contract was still in place. This enraged the Kings of Pattani. After Tengku Sulaiman Syarifuddin died, all the Pattani prominent people agreed to inaugurate Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, or *Raja Muda* (Young King), as the new King of Pattani. According

to a note by Nantawan Haemindra, there was nobody who officially acknowledged that the power was a legacy from the King of Siam. Two years after Tengku Abdul Kadir was chosen as King, the Siamese Kingdom authenticated his position. In Tengku Abdul Kadir's governance era, the actions of the Siamese representative government did not only harm the sovereignty and authority of the King of Pattani but was also involved in generating problems for the people of Pattani as from the Siamese officials there was often interference in the religious affairs of the local residents.

The declaration of protest sent by Tengku Abdul Kadir Pattani to the King of Siam to solve the problem in Pattani met a dead end. Tengku Abdul Kadir had no other choice but to invite the British based in Singapore to help solve the problem of the authority of the independent King of Pattani. Frank Swettenham, as the Governor of the southern states was asked for help to solve the problem which fell on the King and people of Pattani. Because the United Kingdom had a relationship with the Siamese Empire, in fact Frank Swettenham could not interfere in the Pattani problem. He proposed that Tengku Abdul Kadir meet with King Chulalongkorn and look for a solution since the Pattani region was administratively still under the Siamese.

The position taken by Frank Swettenham regarding the Pattani problems forced Tengku Abdul Kadir to look for an alternative to free Pattani from the shackles of Siam. With the support of the other Malay Kings, Tengku Abdul Kadir formulated a policy of resistance and launched a rebellion against the Siamese Kingdom not to continuously interfere in the business of the Malay countries. Tengku Abdul Kadir hoped to launch a rebellion against the French in Indochina so in turn the French would attack Siam in the east and force Siam to move their soldiers there. If these scenarios applied, Malay kings thought that they would be freed from the shackles of Siamese colonization.

Meanwhile, Tengku Abdul Kadir also asked for support from R.W. Duff, the former Chief of Police of the Straits Settlements to support his rebellion. This policy was performed to get independence for the Pattani people from Siamese oppression. This idea basically tried to place the Pattani problem in a better position. The discussion

between Tengku Abdul Kadir with Duff mentioned that '*... the action of the Siamese authorities differed so entirely from the document*'. Although Duff did not sympathize with Siam against Pattani he did not agree with Tengku Abdul Kadir's device to overcome the problem violently. In his opinion, the Tengku's way would not only harm Malay interests but also '*... would bring about his own down fall and which would ruin many hundreds of his people*'.

Duff advised Tengku Abdul Kadir to try to resolve the problem in Pattani through negotiation rather than violently. He proposed that Tengku Abdul Kadir contact groups in Singapore and draw up a petition to the United Kingdom. In his petition, Tengku Abdul Kadir explained his dissatisfaction and tried to explain Siam's rule over Pattani, Tengku Abdul Kadir hoped that the United Kingdom would submit his complaints to the Kingdom of Siam.

Tengku Abdul Kadir, on 13 October 1901 delivered the petition to Swettenham to send to the United Kingdom in London. King Saiburi, King Reman and King Legeh also joined in the petition letter to Swettenham for the same purpose. Tengku Abdul Kadir asked the United Kingdom to participate in overcoming the problems of the Pattani Kingdom and people as a consequence of interference from Siam. Those feelings of dissatisfaction revolved around two issues, first, interference from Siamese officials in Pattani domestic business, especially in the case of taxation and second, in the interpretation of the Islamic religion. Tengku Abdul Kadir emphasised that measures of Siamese officials were in contradiction with the principle of communication between countries as outlined by Chulalongkorn in the same manner as contained in the letter of inauguration of a King of Pattani.

Tengku Abdul Kadir warned that if the oppression and brutality of Siam was not overcome, gradually he would claim peace and welfare for Pattani and possibly for other north Malay areas. He also warned that if the protest to the United Kingdom failed he would look for support from other big powers. The letter of Tengku Abdul Kadir and

the other Malay Kings received special attention from Swettenham as well as the United Kingdom in London. The King of Pattani's warning that he would rebel and contact foreign powers forced the British to try to solve the problem. They ordered Frank Swettenham to overcome the problem in their colonial area of the north Malay region. If the resurgence occurred in the Malay states of Pattani it would not only affect British trade but also provide an opportunity for foreign powers, most especially the Germans to involve themselves and obtain a foothold in the region. At that time Germany was looking for a colonial base in Asia to meet its demand for 'Westpolitik'. If this happened the importance and safety of Britain in the area would diminish greatly. (Chandran, J.1968, Numnonda, T. 1965)

Considering the situation, Swettenham met Tengku Abdul Kadir in Singapore in October 1901. He advised Tengku Abdul Kadir to be patient and try not to rush into a decision. Frank Swettenham guaranteed that if the King listened to his advice he would get United Kingdom sympathy which would be able to restore his initial powers. On that guarantee, Tengku Abdul Kadir agreed to delay his plan to rebel. Meanwhile Swettenham released the prohibition order to export guns from Singapore to Pattani Countries. At the same time Swettenham informed the British colonial officials of the turbulence in Pattani and the Malay Kings' threat to get support from European powers if the British refused to help.

Apart from that, the consideration of why the British did not want to get involved in Pattani affairs was because they considered their strategies in the Peninsula region. At that time Germany was pressing Bangkok to give it concessions on Langkawi Island in the Andaman Sea for a refuelling place for its ships, meanwhile Russia was competing with France to obtain concessions to make a trajectory canal in Segenting Kra. In the face of progressively intensive pressures, Siam tried to listen carefully to the British compulsion to fulfil the requests of other nations.

The British in fact had a special plan with the four subjugated areas close to Pattani. Those areas were thought to be more important. The British consolidation there was more beneficial than enmity with Siam over the Pattani problem. This attention and British diplomacy resulted in the signing of an agreement between the British and Siam which resulted in the surrender of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis to the British. As a reward the British acknowledged Siamese sovereignty over the Pattani Province and restored all problems concerning extra territorial and political rights to Siamese jurisdiction. This agreement was recognized as the British-Siamese Agreement of 1909.

The integration process of the most southerly provinces into the Kingdom of Siam was a difficult and slow process. In the 16th. century when the colonial supremacy reached Southeast Asia, Siam confronted the particular need to consolidate its power and political unity to face the danger of colonialism. For this reason, Siam tried to bring about administrative renewal with consideration given to national security and political efficiency.. The reforms of King Chulalongkorn in 1909 were meant to unify the regions of Thailand into one regional arrangement mechanism.

III. 5. Conclusion

Pattani was a commercial centre which directly or indirectly developed to become a centre of Islam in the Malay Peninsular area where Islam entered the region in the Middle Ages through trade and Moslem scholars from Arab, Persian and Indian sources because the tradition of sailing and commerce to East Asia and Southeast Asia as well as eastern *Nusantara*, existed long before the birth of Islam, or spread through Chinese or Champa merchants.

Pattani as an Islamic sultanate emerged in about the 15th. century and replaced Hinduism It then grew quickly through the community through intermarriage and the power structure which was inspired by the structural system of the distribution of Islamic power which existed long before the kings embraced Islam and the area became a sultanate.

Pattani as a centre of trade and a port as well as the centre for the development of Islam had at least two streams: Islam expanding among the elite of the Kingdom and Islam expanding at the grass roots which was influenced by political power and economic and commercial power.

Pattani's defeat in the war with the Kingdom of Siam made it a subordinate region of that Kingdom. The Pattani region then became integrated as part of Siam and obliged to pursue all Siamese policies. These specified policies drastically reduced the power of the elite of the Pattani region. In their struggle to make the Pattani area independent the anti Siam movement failed because Siam and the British succeeded in signing the British-Siam Agreement in 1909. This agreement resulted in the Pattani region being integrated into the Siamese territory and its submission to the higher authority of Siam.

CHAPTER IV

THE STATE POLICIES TOWARDS SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES

Cahyo Pamungkas

IV.1. Introduction

Rainer Bauböck describes the three kinds of political community borders of a modern society as: the territorial borders of states, the boundaries of the polity that is a member of a political community which is determined by the status of citizenship and citizen rights, and the boundaries of a cultural community that is a member of a culture associated with the national identity or the state that has given a set of special rights to a minority cultural group. (1998:17). Starting from the above statements, so that the colonialization of a political community be other is often followed up by some policy stages: territorial integration, political integration, and cultural integration to construct a perfect political integration.

Learning from the case of the formation of nation states in general, the political integration to a territory inhabited by a minority of an ethnic-religious community will be impacted on at two levels; structural and superstructural. The Impact on the superstructure is the development of an ideology of nationalism and the concept of a nation state; meanwhile the second level relates to a social system such as politics, culture, and economy. Nationalism as defined by Benedict Anderson (1987), as a political community imagined to have a sovereign, demanding an ideological process from the society to include minority groups to become members of the nation. This is undertaken since nationalism always requires some borders to differentiate one national community from another. Those matters in some cases have encouraged a set of forced integrations from the majority political community groups to the minority on behalf of nationalism and the nation state

Mouffe (1993 in Bonura 2002: 69) explains that a political community did not naturally take place in a political community or by design and reconstruction by certain groups in a political community. The political life is concerned with public action addressed to make a society out of a state of differences and conflicts. So that political policy always means to create an image of a political community and a final regulation that cannot be realized for what is called a constitutive outside, i.e. a border to a society that gives them life.

As the consequence of administrative political integration, on the level of structure, there has taken place political and economic integration through state policies and state programs. The people integrated in the national majority undergo positional changes from the majority group to become a national minority. This encourages a contradiction of majority-minority categorization in the society. At this level, the relation between the majority and the minority is marked by forced migration, giving rise to the demand for local autonomy, and inequality in resource distribution: the domination of the majority groups over the minority groups in the political, social, culture, and economic aspects that have become a main pillar of a nation state in forming a plural society.

Thai Integration Policies

In relation to the political integration in the southern border provinces of Thailand, Carlo Bonura Jr. (2002) puts forward a number of problems that show that there is a contradiction between political reforms under the Thai democratic system and the values and political identity of bangsa Melayu Pattani (the Malay Moslems). The contradiction covers two matters as follows: *First*, contradiction relates to the level of institutionalisation of the Moslem political elite incorporated in representative political practice and national administrative expansion including an involvement of Moslem people in the policy decision making political process. Culturally, these reforms come back again when facing the acceptance of Malay culture, Moslem practice, and the status

of the minority in a democracy as written in the Constitution of 1997. *Second*, contradiction covers democratic political community development and past political practices that may be incomplete in a nation state concept. The claims of the Moslem political community are based on pan-Islamic identity, Malay heritage, and history (as the Great Pattani). All of the identities were not acknowledged fully as a political community manifesto since they lost their sovereignty to the Kingdom of Siam. There is a lack manifestation in matters such as autonomous assemblies, territory or recognition of sovereignty which are assumed as political community majority practices and an inability to give assurance in any change of minority community borders. The political community in the south was dominated by tension in overcoming complex problems mainly related to the endeavours for political integration of the central government.

This paper is addressed to shed light on a set of Siamese (Thai) political integration policies on the southern border provinces that covered the state-society relations. To make the narration easy, the state policies of the Kingdom of Siam will be divided into three parts. First, political and cultural integration such as the administrative integration of 1902, the Anglo-Siam treaty of 1909, coup over the absolute monarchy of Siam in 1932, and the nationalism politics of Marshall Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944). Second, political integration of Islamic intellectuals and traditional institutions covered: accommodating politics to Islam by the Patronage of Islam Act 1945, political integration of Islamic traditional scholars, secularisation of Islamic traditional institutions, and state programs to cope with separatism. Third, post integration policy that covered state policies to cope with separatism and disturbances to security in relation with the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Those matters can be seen in the Table below:

Table 1.
List of State Policies of the Thai Administration in the Southern Border Provinces

No.	Background	Policies	Administration	Results
1.	To blockade British-Malay and French-Indo-China political expansion.	Territorial integration of 1902, Aristocrat integration, administrative reform based on Thesaphiban.	King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910)	The rebellions of 1902 and 1922
2.	The Thai nationalism of King Vajiravudh	Integration of education based on the Act of 1921.	King Vajiravudh (1910-1925)	Introduction of Thai language into Islamic traditional institutions (pondok)
3.	Coup d' etat and constitutional change of 1932.	Political liberalization	Mr Pridi Banomyong	Limited participation
4.	Development of Fascism in Europe and East Asia; approach of World War II	Thai-rathaniyom 1938	Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1948-1957)	The Pattani defended ally states, the Malay-nationalism.
6.	The defeat of Thailand in World War II.	Patronage of Islam Act 1946: Integration of Ulama	Pridi Banomyong (1946)	Chularajamontry, Haji Sulong petition, rebellion 1947.
7.	Vietnam War	Integration of Islamic Traditional Institutions (pondok) in 1960s	PM. Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963) and later.	State control of pondok, separatism under PULO, etc.
8.	Development and Cold War between USA and USSR.	Prime Ministerial Order no. 65/66, <i>Tai Rum Yen</i>	PM Prem Tin Sulanonda	The decrease of separatist movements and sympathy for the government.
9.	International campaign against terrorism	Martial Law 2004	PM Thaksin Sinawatra	Increase in violence in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala

Source: Data Processing

IV. 2 Political and Integration Policies in Southern Border Provinces

The political integration of Pattani in Siam should be seen comprehensively from their backgrounds, i.e. establishment of the Thai nationalism concept and Thai modernization in the early 20th. century. David J. Steinberg (1971:313) says that the history of Thailand between 1919 and 1941 basically is a political work resulting from reform policies undertaken by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). The policy was implemented when the Siamese Kingdom borders at the end of the 19th. And in the 20th. centuries went backwards to fulfil the French demand for Siam to release some Indo-Chinese territory. As a result, Siam had to acknowledge Laos and Cambodia as French territory. The western colonial powers finally determined the borders of the Siamese kingdom i.e. France through the 1907 agreement and Britain through the Anglo-Siam agreement of 1909.

Furthermore, King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910)³⁰ implemented reforms in his kingdom by changes in the authority and power of local government which became dependent on the central government. Before this policy, the kingdom allowed local governments and kings to be autonomous. The King and his ministers fundamentally and radically changed the structure of the Kingdom by erasing the powers of local governments and kings. King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) returned Siam to its past by reviving royal authority to fight against the old nobility through depersonalisation and the establishment of an administrative system, and also created a civil servant class the position of which was legitimised by education and giving them a function in the hierarchy of the administration. In relation to that, Keyes (2003) explains:

³⁰ King Chulalongkorn, known as Rama V, ruled between 1860 and 1910. He was the son of King Mongkut (Rama IV), He was the first King of Siam to travel to Europe to countries such as Britain, France, and Russia and Java, Sumatra and British-Malaya. King Chulalongkorn introduced a centralized government system that was called the Thesaphiban. The system included all local noble groups in the administration and bureaucracy of the Kingdom.

In response to the threat of colonial expansion, the Siamese government of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) instituted beginning in the last decade of the 19th century; radical reforms which transformed the empire that allowed many people a significant degree of local autonomy into a state in which the authority of all officials depended on their appointment by the court. Associated with the reform of provincial administration was establishment of a permanent military whose officers were trained – often in western military academies – for their positions.

One of the impacts of this policy on local nobility including that of the Pattani Kingdom (the southern border provinces of Thailand) was the decrease of their authority and power.

They were predominant in the tributary states of Siam and in the provinces where noble families had significant roles. As we know the policy meant to unite all tributary states and provinces under the Kingdom of Siam both in administration and social-politics. The stages were basically policies to prevent political expansion of Britain in Myanmar and the Malay Peninsula, and France in Indo-China.

Besides that, the integration policy was closely related to the efforts of the Siamese Kingdom to promote Thai nationalism since there was then no, what is called, nationalism or the peoples' sense of being Thai was not strong. In relation to the rise of Thai nationalism in the early 20th century, D. G. E Hall (1973: 963) states as follows:

As with the rise of nationalism in Burma and Indonesia, so it was also in Siam where religion was already a unifying power. There was one common unifier in Siam and Burma in this matter because in both the propaganda of nationalism claimed that only they who were Buddhist truly loved the motherland. The victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 created the impression which clarified the sentiment of nationalism.

The Thai nationalism defined by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) and his successor King Vajiravudh (1910-1925),³¹ was that the national spirit was based on loyalty to the Siamese Kingdom, the Thai nation, and Buddhism. King Vajiravudh assumed that what was called the *national heritage* of the Thai people, was one language (the Thai language), one religion (Buddhism), and a relation with the Kingdom (Chakri monarchy) (Keyes 2003). The concept of Thai nationalism was proposed to unite all nations under the Siamese Kingdom including non-Thai minority groups such as Hmong, Chinese and Malay Moslems. The policy impacted positively in the internal context i.e. promoting of national consciousness among ruler groups and developing the spirit of professionalism in administration to accomplish a modern nation state that was acknowledged by the international world, and establish a modern legal system. (Kahin 1964:14).

The integration policy at the superstructure level was followed up by the political administrative policy which was pioneered by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). On one side, the policy impacted considerably on disturbances of the social order of minority groups mainly the Malay Moslems. The administrative and political integration of the Malay Moslem areas (Pattani)to Siam as southern border provinces was implemented in 1902 and strengthened by the *Anglo-Siam Treaty* of 1909. Based on the agreement, Siam delivered their tributary states Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu to the British in Malaya, and maintained their control over the southern border provinces: Pattani, Naratiwat, Yala, Songkhla, and Satun.

Basically, the political and administrative integration policy also was implemented into all other kingdoms such as Chiang Mai and Nakhon Sri Thammarat which were independent countries before the establishment of the Sukhotai Kingdom,

³¹ King Vajiravudh or Rama VI was the son of King Chulalongkorn and ruled between 1910 and 1925. The king is well known because of his policy resulting in the National Education Act of 1921 that forced every educational institution in Thailand to use the Thai language. The King was educated at Oxford and introduced what was called Thai nationalism. In World War I between 1914 and 1918, the King sent his troops to Europe to help the allies.

the first kingdom that was acknowledged nationally. The sovereignty of Siam over its tributary states was never unquestionable since the colonial period except in the southern border provinces (Pattani). The writing of Pattani Kingdom history is related to the spirit of separatist movements to set the Pattani free from Siam. A historian from Wailalak University, Patrick Jorry (2003), writes:

The fact that Chiang Mai or Nakhon Sri Thammarat can claim to have existed as independent "Thai" states prior to Sukhothai, the first officially recognized state in the national narrative, is no longer controversial because Thai sovereignty over these regions has not been in question since the colonial period. However, the case of Pattani is the clear exception. The historiography of the state of Pattani written by local historians in both Malay and Thai are linked in spirit (if not directly politically) to the separatist movements that have sought to free Pattani from Thai political control since its integration into the Thai state during the Fifth Reign and the deposition and imprisonment of its last sultan, Abdul Kadir. Davisakd has described the on-going struggle between Thai centralist and Pattani local historians for discursive control of Pattani's past, which relates directly to the question of Pattani's sovereignty.

Since 1902, all the kingdoms of Pattani: Pattani, Legeh, Rahman, and Saiburi were united into one administrative unit called monthon Pattani. The policy was followed by the implementation of the Local Government Act of 1898 put into effect by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). The Malay Moslem kingdoms such as Pattani were tributary states which had a local autonomy before the kingdom changed into an administrative unit that was controlled by the central government. Since the reform movement in 1902, the King of Pattani's position was replaced by that of a Governor appointed from Bangkok.

Before the reform, in 1901, the King of Pattani, Sultan Abdul Kadir Kamaraddin³² had sent a letter to Sir Frank Sweetenham, the British Governor of the Strait Settlements (Pitsuwan, 1989; 22). The letter claimed that the Thai administration was oppressing the people of Pattani, intervening in their peaceful lives, and also encouraging misery and poverty among the Malay Moslems. Although the British in Malaya had a strong desire for expansion, they still wished for Siam to be a buffer between British Malaya and French Indo-China. In that period, the role of Siam was needed to blockade the Germans who wished to set up a refuelling base on Lengkwai Island and France that wished for a canal in Genting Kra. Besides that the British in Malaya had other plans for the four kingdoms south of Pattani to consolidate their power in the Malay Peninsula (ibid: 23).

Nevertheless, the Siamese Kingdom also set up a policy to accommodate a number of demands from the nobility in 1905 as follows (ibid.: 26). First, the central government only would regard the nobility and their descendents as appointed civil servants. Second, reward of the nobility was addressed to the full political integration into Thailand. Third, the government released the nobility of royal descent from compulsory military service. After that, the government undertook improvements in roads, postal services and security, and building residences for governors and their assistants.

Besides implementing infrastructural development, the government also put into effect political integration in law and culture. The central government proposed that all legal problems should be resolved under Thai laws except for family and heritage laws. The appointing of Islamic judges (qadi) became prerogative rights from Thai judges. In October 1902, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Thai Kingdom, Prince Damrong decided that every Malay Kingdom should get six qadi (ibid.: 32). In conflicts

³² He was the last Sultan of Pattani from the Kelantan dynasty. The King refused political and administrative integration into the Siamese Kingdom and instructed his officials to fight against the rulers from Bangkok in 1902. This policy encouraged the rebellion against Siam and the King was arrested in Pitsanulok and held until 1916.

people had a right to choose a qadi as an arbitrator, but the Thai judges had the authority to give a final decision on every affair that had been decided by a qadi. If Thai judges agreed with qadi decisions there was no further dispute. But if the Thai judges disagreed with the qadi decision, the people who lost in the conflict could appeal to a higher court that was closed to the qadi (ibid: 33).

The culture assimilation program was addressed to activities that could support and obliged the Malay Moslems to take part in secular education systems undertaken by the government. The Siam education system was supposed to be implemented for all people of Siam based on the Education Act of 1921 determined by King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) (Rahimulla, 2003). As a consequence, all of the madrasah (Islamic schools) under mosques were compelled to change their curricula to include the Thai language and Thai citizenship doctrines. Furthermore, the government controlled all sectors of the social lives of the Malay Moslems. The Malay language, Islam, and the traditions that they had followed for hundreds of years were replaced under an authoritarian Buddhist kingdom (ibid: 50).

The policy gave birth to great disappointment from the nobility which lost its authority and Islamic leaders (ulama groups) with Thai laws replacing Islamic laws. The changes had invited great resistance from the Malay Moslem people because they had been united under an Islamic kingdom which had become the centre of civilization in Southeast Asia. The Siamese kingdom tried to implement a lot of the cultural assimilation programs by force by intervening in the laws and social institutions of the Malay Moslems in order to adapt to Buddhist thoughts and to strengthen Thai nationalism. Alexander Hortsman (2000) states as follows:

With the transformation of Pattani from being a Malay principality to an ordinary Thai province, local Malays, remember the old times, when the Pattani sultanate was known as a cradle of Islam, attracting Muslims from the Malay Peninsula to its famous Islamic schools. The nostalgia for a lost state characterises the psychological situation of the Malays, cut off from the Islamic heartland, and bound up with the religious cosmology of the Buddhist nation-state of Thailand.

The political integration policy of 1902 through law and administration encouraged two armed rebellions of the Malay Moslems in 1903 and 1922. The armed rebellion of 1903 was led by the king of Pattani, Sultan Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin and resulted in the Malay Moslem people becoming more oppressed and asking for military aid from the British in Malaya. The resistance was a failure since the British still had their policy of support for the Siamese Kingdom. Furthermore, The Sultan Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin was arrested and jailed in Phitsanulok until 1916. After his release from prison, the Sultan moved to live in Kelantan. Meanwhile his struggle continued to give a great inspiration for the Pattani independence struggle. The second rebellion took place in 1922 by the Malay Moslems in Namsai village, so it is known as the Namsai Rebellion that caused thousands of Moslem deaths by Siamese armed forces.

To resolve that rebellion of the Malay Moslems, the administration of the Siamese Kingdom started to implement the accommodation policy to obtain their sympathy. King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) ordered the Minister of Internal Affairs, Prince Dewawongse, to impose political policies as follows: First, those regulations and practices contradictory to Islam should be stopped immediately. Second, the level of taxes imposed on the Malay Moslems could not be higher than those imposed on other Malay kingdoms. Third, high officials assigned to the southern border provinces of Thailand should be honest, fair, and firm (Rahimmula 2003).

Meanwhile, in practice, the policy could not be implemented by the Siamese officials (Wilson 1960:112). The interest to maintain Thai nationalism based on Theravada Buddhism contradicted with the interest to maintain minority cultures.

Siamese officials could not undertake the policy since they placed Thai nationalism as the first priority. The King's statements were always suspected by the Malay Moslems as insincere; merely addressed to resolve the fury of Malay Moslems in a short time. King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) intended to not repeat the failures of their pioneers to deliver their territory to western colonialists.

After the death of Vajiravudh in 1925, his position was taken by King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), when the treatment and policies of Siam towards Pattani can be divided into two categories i.e. limited political participation and a broad cultural assimilation policy. The political participation was made possible since there was a significant political change in Thailand; a coup by the People's Party of the King's power. As an impact of the world crisis, the administration of Siam underwent a shortage in the national budget of 11 Million Tikal (Hall op. cit: 967). At that time, when the King was still receiving medical treatment in the US, there was conflict among the highest council members of the Kingdom, mainly between the Minister of Defence, Prince Bovaradej, and the Minister of Trade, Prince Purachatra. It resulted in a political crisis in Bangkok. Coinciding with this, scholar groups under Mr Pridi Banomyong³³ established a political institution to take power. By support from military groups, the party occupied Bangkok and undertook a non violent revolution on 24 January 1932.

The main concept of the Constitution of 1932 was to implement a decision that the status of the King was Head of the Armed Forces and the Protector of Buddhist and other religions. The King was a sacred and inviolable figure all over Siam. His power

³³ Pridi Banomyong was the father of democracy in Thailand. He was born on 11 May 1900 in Ayutthaya of common people. At the age of 20 he got a scholarship to study Law in France, from the Ministry of Justice of Thailand, from 1920 to 1927. Although he studied abroad, he never lost his ideals or awareness of the need to cope with the social and economic problems facing his nation. His ideals were to change absolute government into a democratic government as a basis to develop Siam in the future. He believed that the democratic political system was a way to develop the civilized society of Thailand. For this, he established the Peoples' Party and launched a non-violent revolution on 24 June 1932 in Bangkok. Its principles were to: maintain and assure all of citizen liberation both in politics and the economy.

came from the people of Thailand. As the King, he carried out legislative authority through the parliament and executed executive power through a ministerial council headed by the Prime Minister and undertook judicative power through the Court. The King was also strengthened by the right to be *consulted*; the right to *encourage*; and the right to remind the government of its function to serve the state.

King Prajadhipok came back from the US two days later and accepted the Peoples' Party as a political institution. On 10 December 1932 he signed the first Constitution in Thailand and ended 800 years of absolute monarchy.³⁴ Based on the Constitution, the king lost all of his powers except the one to grant amnesty. The nobility also was discharged from all political positions in the ministerial council and the armed forces. Furthermore, a Senate consisting of 70 people was transformed and the name changed to the Consultative Council consisting of 156 people half of whom were appointed (Hall op cit: 968). The king resigned in 1935 and was replaced by Ananda Mahidol (1935-1945) who was 10 years old³⁵.

The political liberalization impacted on the Siamese policy regarding the Malay Moslems through political participation in the General Election to choose their representative in the Consultative Council. The Malay Moslems also exploited the political opening. The candidates chosen by the election came from intellectual groups supported by Islamic intellectuals. Surin Pitsuwan (1989) states that the level of Malay Moslem political participation depended on their perception on the Siamese administrative policy regarding the Malay Moslems. If the collective interest of Malay Moslems was protected and promoted by the government, the Malay Moslems would

³⁴ After the non-violent revolution of 1932, King Prajadhipok or Rama VII (1925-1935) went to Britain; he resigned from his position and was replaced by his nephew, Ananda Mahidol who was 10 years old. .

³⁵ King Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII) was killed in 1946, after his return from Europe in December, 1945. After World War II ended, the state of politics and economics were made worse in Thailand when the Japanese government arrested many politicians. In the midst of the turbulence, the King was found shot in June, 1946. His sudden death is still a mystery. The present King, his younger brother; Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) replaced him.

participate greatly in the political process and vice versa. However, the role and influence of parliament were very limited in the fight for the Malay Moslem interests and aspirations in order to reduce the central government intervention in the Malay Moslem affairs. The roles of parliament or the Consultative Council were limited to only accept the Malay Moslem complaints, with the institution having no authority or power to control or execute a set of government policies in all the countries. The policies were under the supervision and control of the armed forces and bureaucracy. Riggs (1966) explains that the Malay Moslem aspirations for an independent institution outside the government to control the government had lost in the structure of the parliamentary constitution itself. This was made worse by the implementation of ultra nationalist policies under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram (1938-1945)³⁶.

The politics of ultra nationalism meant to implant Thai nationalism in all sectors of social life. It was basically related to the acknowledgement that Thai culture was the only culture in Siam and the Siamese kingdom had to develop and implant the Thai culture in the minds of the people of Siam. Even, the minority groups such as Malay Moslems and Chinese must be subjugated to all forms of Thai culture.³⁷ The name of the country, Siam, was changed to Thailand, Phibun Songkhram thought that the Kingdom belonged to the Thais not to the Chinese people that were predominant in the economic sector at that time. The policies were inspired by fascist regimes such as those of Adolph Hitler in Germany, Benito Mussolini in Italy and the Japanese Kingdom before World War II. In the nine month period of ultra nationalist

³⁶ Plaek Pibun Songgram, was an ultra-nationalist figure from a military background. He was appointed Prime Minister in 1939. Before becoming Prime Minister, he had contributed his services to defeat the military pro-monarchy that wished to mount a coup of the parliamentary government. Their policies were known as *Tai Rathaniyom* or Thailand for the Thais. In the period of World War II, Phibun Songgram declared war against the allies and joined the Japanese. After the war ended, on 7 September 1945, Phibun Songgram came back to Bangkok where the administration of Prime Minister Pridi Bhanomyong established a democratic government with the cultural policies addressed to strengthen and establish Thai nationalism: *Chat, Satsana, Phramahakasat - Nation, Religion and Monarchy*.

³⁷ The Phibun Songkhram policies were known to be very racist. Called *Thai Rathaniyom*, it can be translated as 'Thailand for the Thais'.

administration, a set of policies that were anti-China and anti- the Malay Moslems were put into effect in Thailand (Lubis 2003: 9).³⁸ The policies of assimilation resulted in a great fury of the Malay Moslems. In World War II, the Malay Moslems refused to join Thailand because of the politics of ultra nationalism implemented by Phibun Songkhram. Coinciding with that, the Malay nationalism movements appeared in the Malay Peninsula along the Malay Moslem borders. This grew into the Pan-Malay movement which gave rise to Malay nationalism in colonial lands. The disappointment and fury against the policies of assimilation or Thai Rathaniyom encouraged young Malay Moslems to revive the Malay identity and raised an Islamic awareness. Traditional Islamic institutions or Pondok had significant roles in campaigning for Pan-Malayanism and Islamic resurgence. As is stated by Naimah Thalib (1999):

In the 1930s and 1940s, attempts by the Phibun government to assimilate ethnic minorities into national life had a direct impact on the Muslim community in the South. Malay-Muslims protested at the assimilation measures and there emerged growing dissatisfaction, especially among the young. This resulted in a determined attempt to revive Malay identity and raise the level of Islamic consciousness. Religious institutions such as the pondok were used to disseminate ideas of Pan-Malay nationalism and Islamic revivalism.

Entering World War II, on 25 January 1942, Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram declared a war against the British and the USA. The invasion of Japan was welcomed warmly as Japan delivered Indo-China, northern Malaya, and Myanmar to Thailand. In return, the Thai administration supported the Japanese Kingdom in its War after the War ended; the southern border provinces still were placed under the Kingdom of Siam

³⁸ A set of cultural policies was established as the *Twelve Cultural Mandates*, enacted by the administration of Phibun Songkhram between 1939 and 1942. They were addressed to promote the national awareness and moral code of the Thai nation and implant what is called the new values in the public. Since 1940, the politics of ultra nationalist policies were implemented forcibly on the minority groups including the Malay Moslems. Thai law replaced the marriage and heritage laws and the Malay language was replaced by Thai. The way of dressing was dictated by the *Thai Custom Decree* 1939 that determined that people should dresses like westerners by wearing long trousers.

although there were endeavours from the Malay Moslem elites to found an independent state. The failure of the Malay Moslems was the result of factors as follows. First, the British needed great quantities of rice from Thailand for their colonies. Second, US pressure on the British not to take over southern Thailand to keep stability and peace in those areas. The existence of Thailand was needed by imperialist states, the victors in World War II, not as a buffer state but to blockade the influences of communist ideology from China to Southeast Asia.

The Siamese policies in the southern border provinces were based on the state policy to develop Thai nationalism and to strengthen the government political grip on the tributary states. The spirit of nationalism developed first by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) was used to keep Siam from the political influences of British Malaya and French Indo-China. After World War II ended, the context of Thai nationalism changed to prevent communist expansion. Although Thailand was an independent state it was always under the influence of western colonial countries. As a consequence, Thailand was always forced to adapt its political culture to adapt to regional and international situations (Vatikiotis 1996:51). In this case, the Malay Moslems were the most disadvantaged group since western colonial intervention never respected the Malay Moslem aspirations. We can conclude that Thai nationalism was basically influenced by the political international order and had the policy to maintain Thailand. The following explains the Thai policies in the southern border provinces after World War II.

IV. 3. Thai Political Integration and Islamic Traditional Institutions

After World War II ended, some adaptations in the borders between British Myanmar, British Malaya and French Indo-China took place. The International Commission determined that Thailand had no right to Indo-Chinese territory because of the differences in ethnicity, geography, and economics. So Indo-China was redelivered to France. Meanwhile, in relations with British Malaya, Thailand had to relinquish Kelantan, Kedah, Trengganu and Perlis to British Malaya which had held them before

the War. The southern border provinces were still under Thailand as determined by the Anglo-Siam Treaty of 1909. However, some turbulence in the southern border provinces became greater, influenced by nationalist awakening in the Malay states mainly in British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

In response to the rise in Malay nationalism in the southern border provinces of Thailand, the administration of Thailand enacted the *Patronage of Islam Act* on 3 May 1945 proposed by pro democracy scholars and the architect of the Revolution of 1932, Mr Pridi Banomyong, and a Moslem senator from Bangkok, Cham Promyong. Based on this, Islamic intellectuals (ulama), mosque councils, Islamic schools (madrasah), and chularajjamontri (National Ulama Council), were integrated into the Thai administration. Surin Pitsuwan (1989: 78) says that the policy was addressed to weaken the separatist movement. The separatist groups were supported by some traditional elite members such as Tengku Mahyidin (a son of Sultan Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin) and Tengku Abdul Jalal.

Astri Suhrke (1989:5) explains that the chularajjamontri was a council established at the national level to manage the problems of Moslem people in Thailand. At the provincial level, The Majelis Ugama Islam or Islamic Religion Assembly was set up by the local government to give advice to the local government about problems regarding Islam and the problems of Moslem people. Besides that, the government also acknowledged the Mosque Council or Dewan Masjid to manage any mosque problems. The Islamic law relating to the family and heritage law was put into effect in regions where there were Moslem people. The Islamic judges were civil servants of the Ministry of Justice and were appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to an informant, the MUI Pattani, of the 76 provinces in Thailand, 33, in southern, central, and northern Thailand,³⁹ were inhabited by Moslems.

³⁹ Based on an interview with Tengku Hasan, the secretary of the Majelis Ugama Islam of Pattani on 25 May 2004 in the Majelis Ugama Islam building in Pattani.

The Ulama integration policies were intended to disrupt relations between the Ulama groups and the groups of aristocrats and give a sense of belonging from the Ulama groups to the Thai kingdom (ibid.: 79). Before World War II, the Thai administration never intervened in Moslem peoples' problems. King Chulalongkorn always emphasized that Islam was acknowledged as a religion in Thailand for the southern border province citizens. The Kingdom never regarded the Ulama groups as the foremost leaders. The act mentioned that it would found what was called chularajjamontri, a state institution that connected Moslem people and the government. The chairman of the chularajjamontri was acknowledged as the spokesman for the Moslem people in Thailand and was assigned as an adviser to the King and the administration concerning how to help Moslem people and their activities.

Prime Minister Pridi Banomyong tried to return legal autonomy to the Malay Moslems in the southern border provinces thus influencing the State Accommodation Policy in 1945-1946. After Pridi was overthrown in 1946, the situation in the southern border provinces got worse. The new Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram arrested those Members of Parliament who were sympathetic the Malay Moslems. On the other side, the struggle of Malay Moslems for local autonomy increased under a very popular Malay Moslem figure, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al Fatani.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Haji Sulong was born in 1895 in Arnohru, Muang District, Pattani, when Pattani was under Sultan Sulaiman's governorship. After studying Islam with his father, Haji Abdulqadir Bin Muhammad who was the nephew of Tuan Minal (Haji Zaidal Abidin Bin Ahmad), he was sent to Pondok Bana Phatham of Datoh Haji Abdurorseh (Sas Sanu Phatham School, Bana, Muang District). In 1907, his father sent him to Mekah to study Islam with the Tunisian ulama 'Habi Bulloh'. After the death of his first son in 1927, Haji Sulong came back to Pattani with his family and hoped to live there for 2 years. However, he felt the call to improve the situation of the Malay Moslems, so in 1929 he established the first Islamic Studies School, Madrasah Al-Ma Arif Al-Wataniah. After his demands to implement Islamic law were rejected by the local government, he convened a conference of 100 ulamas on 28 Shawal 1362H (1943) to talk about the responsibilities of an ulama. The meeting appointed Haji Sulong Abdulqadir Tohmeena, Haji Muhammad Idris Burmin or Poomee, and Haji Abdulmajid Bin Abdulloh as judges, responsible for the implementation of Islamic principles. In 1945, the central government appointed Haji Sulong chairman of the Majelis Ugama Islam Pattani. Because of his petition in 1948, the Governor of Pattani under the charge of separatism arrested him. The court of Nakhon Si Thammarat imposed a sentence of 3 years in 1949 which the Appeal Court lengthened to 7 years and the Supreme Court of Thailand upheld.

If looked at more closely, Haji Sulong's demands were addressed to maintain the culture and Islamic identity that already united the Malay Moslem people.⁴¹ These steps were needed as minimum programs to maintain the traditional ways and Islam (Pitsuwan 1989:118). The administration of Thailand did not accept the demands since they were worried that other provinces inhabited by minority groups such as those in northern Thailand would make the same demands and so threaten the integrity of Thailand. Responding to the rejection from the central government, the Malay Moslems in the southern border provinces threatened to boycott the General Elections in 1948. The administration of Thailand responded by arresting Haji Sulong on 16 January 1948 for instigating separatist movements and being involved in political activities.⁴²

Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram continued his ultra-nationalist policies until 1957, when he lost his position to Marshall Sarit Thanarat⁴³. The administration replaced his ultra nationalist policies with ones for development or *patanakarn*. National integration would be achieved through social and economic development. The policy was easy to understand since as a result of the implementation of the development in the southern areas as western strategy to blockade communism in developing countries.

⁴¹ The leaders including the governor in the southern border provinces should be Moslems and sons of bumi-putera (indigenous), there should be teaching of Malay language in schools in Pattani, all taxes from Pattani should be used for the welfare of Pattani people, 80% of local government officials should be Moslem, Malay should be allowed to be the formal language along with Thai, Islamic law should be implemented in the southern border provinces and the Majelis Ugama Islam given full authority for laws and regulations regarding all Moslem problems and Malay culture.

⁴² Haji Sulong was released from prison in 1952. Two years later, on 13 August 1954, he was drowned in the Lake of Songkhla with his two friends and a son (Ahmed Tohmeena) as translator, after being interrogated by the Police in Songkhla, according to the report of the Investigation Commission established by Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963). As an impact of Haji Sulong's petition, rebellion came to the southern border provinces in 1958 when Phibun Songkhram became Prime Minister. Haji Sulong is known as 'the Father of Freedom of the great Pattani'. Although Indonesian and Malay leaders sympathised with him and the Malay Moslem movement, there was no support from British Malaya. The rebellion of the Malay Communist Party in northern Malaya disturbed British Malaya.

⁴³ Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963) is known for his declaration of a state emergency in October 1958 that killed the democratic process that had been in place since 1955. Sarit Thanarat emphasized his policies on two fronts i.e. the realization of the Thai social order of the past and acceleration of economic development in Thailand.

In line with the development ideology, the administration focused on economic development and national integration rather than on improving democracy. Buddhist institutions which had supported the Kingdom of Siam for a long time, had a significant role in overseeing development.

The administration of Thailand tried to integrate the ulama groups in 1946, but really only started to incorporate all social and cultural institutions from all groups of society including Islam, in 1957. Like the Sangha (Buddhist institution) hierarchy that supported and inspired the unity of the Kingdom, the Malay Moslem groups were expected to let themselves be reconstructed by the administration to support the state authority. The state proposed to intervene in Islamic traditional institutions, so conflict moved from political conflict to ideological conflict. This appeared particularly in the state policy on the modernization of Islamic traditional institutions (pondok).

Thalib (1999) says that the pondok (*private Islamic boarding school*) was an institution that had a significant role in the history of the Malay Moslems in maintaining the Malay Moslem community in the southern border provinces of Thailand. The pondok had a role in the teaching and development of Islamic thought and the construction of the knowledge of society about Islam. The pondok had become an identity that closely bound the Malay Moslem people. The pondok even became a symbol of resistance in fighting against the *wat* (Buddhist temple). Hasan Madmarn (1999) in his studies about the pondok 1930-1950 in Chana, Songkhla, claims that Chana society respected the pondok which had a high reputation among Thai and British Malayan scholars who came to study in the city. Ulama from the pondok came from old ulama groups or Islamic traditional schools that implemented studying like in the Middle East. As in the states of the Malay Peninsula, the old ulama were challenged by young ulama groups. According to Hasan Mamarn, Tok Guru Ghani, a youth leader implemented a modern education system, which was called *madrasah* into the traditional education system represented by the *pondok* (Thalib, 1999). The madrasah

was different from the pondok since they were not only focused on religious teaching but also applied science and had a curriculum that could be measured by the standards of the Islamic schools in the Middle East.

Marshall Sarit Thanarat launched a set of education improvement programs in 1961 to change the pondok to become pioneers of social change and modernization. The Ministry of Education was assigned to enlist all the pondok and to determine which pondok fulfilled the pre conditions to get funding from the administration. A research centre and coordination institution was founded in Yala to incorporate a secular curriculum into the pondok. The government thought that it could better and more efficiently adapt the pondok than establish secular schools in the southern border provinces. This was addressed to guide the Malay Moslems to accept the changes needed by the administration. (Pitsuwan 1989:145).

To realize the administrative policies Sharit Tanarat took some steps as follows: First, the government gave a new status to the pondok as Islamic educational institutions since the institution stood outside the primary education category and private middle or state schools. The pondok was a private school that taught Islam. Second, the government persuaded the pondok to accept adaptation by offering them financial support. The schools were under the supervision of the government and became private schools as private schools for Islamic studies. Although the pondok were private schools they had to be subjugated to government regulations if they wanted to receive financial support (ibid: 145). Nuaimah Thalib (2003) explains that the program was addressed to transform the pondok from private schools to become schools that were subjects to government regulations. This changed the image from the pondok as a religious institution to an educational institution and indirectly to reduce the role of Islam in social life.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Until 1971, the administration of Thailand had enlisted 400 *pondok* in the southern border provinces of Thailand and gave them the status of private schools. Hasan Madmarn (2003: 74) mentions that Moslem teachers objected to Islam being under the supervision and the control of the government

The pondok secularisation policy resulted in great negative impact on endeavours to create an Islamic identity and the Malay Moslem culture. The pondok no longer produced Islamic scholars who served rural society. State intervention in the pondok certainly encouraged negative responses from Moslem figures. In June 1907, 109 pondok were closed as a protest against the state intervention policy in pondok management. The state policy had assumed that by developing the Thai language and the Thai moral order, it would create a sense of brotherhood and awareness among the people. This policy was addressed to force the Malay Moslems to change their identities to Thai Moslem such as that of the Moslem people who lived in Bangkok and northern Thailand. This hypothesis was not right and these policies promoted the growth of separatist movements that broke out in 1970. The private Education Office controlled the pondok and formulated the objective of pondok secularisation policy as follows: (Pitsuwan 1989: 149):

1. Implant and create awareness and imbue the Malay Moslems with loyalty to the Thai nation, Buddhism and the Thai administration.
2. Develop the Thai language as the national language among low status people by emphasizing language and social sciences.
3. Improve the quality of secular and specific education.
4. Support basic education in Islam for all children in the southern borders of Thailand.

but did not resist the registration that enforced the use of the Thai language in pondok activities. As a result, non Moslems were included in the pondok to teach the Thai language and thus increase the political grip of the government on pondok activities. Besides that, the curriculum on ethics and morality was taken from Buddhist thought and not Islam. This was direct state intervention in Islamic institution that had been respected as sacred institutions.

The policies had a background of government elite political interest that seized power through a military coup. Keyes (2003) says that Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) became a supporter of the monarchy to obtain political legitimacy for his administration. The basic principles of Thai nationalism, first introduced by King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) were activated again and became social and cultural programs. To implant nationalism, every child in Thailand was obliged to be taught Thai principles through schools and every adult person should hear those repeatedly in all activities. The principles were acknowledged as three pillars in Thailand i.e. *chat*, (the Thai nation), *satsana*, (Buddhism), and *phra mahakasat*, (the monarchy).

As it was implemented in the administration of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), this regulation was put into effect for every ethnic group in Thailand including the Chinese and Malay Moslems. Whatever their background and citizenship, Chinese people were obliged to speak Thai and be loyal to the Thai nation, Buddhism and the Thai administration. However, as Thai society was basically a plural and diverse one that policy was resisted by minority groups. They called this a forced cultural assimilation which should be rejected. The forced assimilation policies of minorities were undertaken by the military administration in 1957-1962, 1976-1987, and 1991-1992. Almost all of the military elites in Thailand based their legitimacy on the nation, religion, and kingdom. So that, the continuity and existence of minority culture was sacrificed by military administrations in order to get political legitimacy for their administrations.

Surin Pitsuwan (1989:152) strengthens that opinion by stating the fact that the Special Committee of Parliament concerned with the Malay Moslems had recommended that the Thai administration should adapt its bureaucracy to the social and economic characteristics of local the people. The Committee did not advise the government to change the pondok to become private schools as ordered by Mr Kukrit Pramoj. Parliament suggested that Thai officials should learn the Malay language and not force the Malay Moslems to speak the Thai language. The Committee also recommended that the secular curriculum of the government should be reviewed and adapted to the Malay

Moslem culture. The government should establish higher education institutions and develop human resources to handle the requirements of Islamic knowledge. However, the military had different views. They were still holding on to Thai nationalism which every minority in Thailand should accept without regard for their culture or religion. The military assumed that integration in Thailand should be undertaken without regard for the Malay language or pondok as among Bangkok Moslems. This assumption implied that Malay culture should be separated from Islam. Between 1967-1973, the administration determined that teachers in the pondok should be supervised by government officials to make certain that they did not become enemies of the state.

After General Thanom Kittikhachorn replaced Marshall Sharit Thanarat⁴⁵, the secularization policies aimed at the pondok were continued without significant changes. As a consequence, the Malay Moslems were treated as second class citizens undergoing exploitation, social inequality, and injustice (Rahimmula 2003). The killing and punishing of the Malay Moslems continued without legal procedures. The Malay Moslems had no choice but to struggle against the Thai government to maintain their lives and culture.

The forms of their struggles varied from protests to rebellion movements undertaken at the end of World War II. The objective of the separatist movement was to set the Malay Moslems free or realize an independent Great Pattani from the Thai political elites that had lost their power and ulama groups that had failed in maintaining the Malay culture such as language, ideology, and Islamic traditions. The alumni of the pondok and the people who were loyal to the continuity of Islam and Malay culture supported the movement (ibid).

⁴⁵ After the death of Marshall Sharit in December, 1963, General Thane Kittikachorn (1963-1973) became Prime Minister and Praphas Charusathian (Deputy Prime Minister). Thanom and Praphas maintained the government policies of Sharit Thanarat in economics and politics such as GNP growth of 8% a year in 1960.

The fall of the military regime in 1972 and establishment of a democratic system for 3 years (1973-1976) resulted from university student protest in Thailand⁴⁶. All social, political, and economic violence from the military regime towards the people surfaced including the worst treatment of the Malay Moslems.⁴⁷ In the period of democratic regimes, high ranking official's torture, implementation of state violence, and corruption in the state apparatus towards the Malay Moslems blew up. The political changes in 1973 brought a new spirit to politics and encouraged the Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj (14 March 1975-20 April 1976) and Seni Pramoj (15 February-14 March 1975, 20 April-6 October 1976) to determine a policy delivering greater authority to the local government through the *tambon programme* (op. cit. Astri: 7). The Tambon Council was an institution which functioned as a legislative council at the district level where their membership was elected from every village. Nevertheless, the old democratic government did not get a long term. After this, the administration of Thailand was under the ultra nationalist administration of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivixien (8 October 1976-20 October 1977). The General Kriangsak Chomanand (1977-1980) replaced the government in 1977.

The Malay Moslems needed an effective leader after Thailand succeeded in entering the Islamic traditional education system. When they faced the government officials, the people depended on the university students. The Moslem Malay youth who came from universities and Islamic high schools started to articulate peoples' aspirations

⁴⁶ In early 1970, it was revealed that his son, Narong Kittikachorn, would replace Prime Minister Thanom. But he was not a popular figure either in civilian or military political elite groups. The student movement articulated their disagreement and launched demonstrations at the Victory Monument, Bangkok in October 1973. They demanded that Prime Minister Thanom should resign. Public sympathy increased when the police killed some of the university students. Finally, the Kingdom and the military withdrew their support of the Prime Minister. After this the Prime Minister went into exile overseas.

⁴⁷ The military regimes administered Thailand under a Prime Minister from a military background, implemented ultra nationalist policies, and seized power through a military coup. Until 1973, Prime Ministers of military regimes were: Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944, 1948-1957), Sarit Tahanarat (1959-1963), and Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-1973).

based on principles campaigned for by democratic regimes for freedom, equality, and insurance of political rights for all citizens. They said: 'if every Malay Moslem should be a Thai Moslem, the Malay Moslems should get the same treatment as other Thai people' (Pitsuwan 1989: 168).

One of changes in that period was the development of Moslem militant groups in the southern border provinces to free Pattani from Thailand. In the middle of 1970, the separatist movement organization was established with the name Organisasi Kesatuan Pembebasan Pattani (*the Pattani United Liberation Organization/PULO*). The organization succeeded in getting considerable support from the Malay Moslems. There was even talk that the government of Libya under Colonel Khadaffy gave financial and military aid to the organization. Conflict between PULO and the administration of Thailand escalated at the end of the 1970s when ultra nationalist groups took power from the democratic regimes.⁴⁸

The administration of Thailand in the early 1970s faced criminal movements and communist rebellions after the US withdrawal from Vietnam. The administration determined policies to cope with the rebellions, known as 'The Policy to win over the Communists or Prime Ministerial Order no. 66/2523'. The policy gave much authority to Prime Minister General Prem Tin Sulanonda (1980-1988)⁴⁹ and the Central Command of Military Operations of General Chavalith Yongchaiyudth. Coinciding with this, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) launched an armed rebellion and developed as a dangerous power beside the Malay Moslem resurgence. In some cases, there was cooperation between PULO and CPT since they experienced the same poverty, misery, and injustice from the government of Thailand. However, CPT was based in northern Thailand, while PULO was based in southern Thailand. The rebellions made the

⁴⁸ To learn more about separatist movement development in southern Thailand, please read the article by Chicanouk Rahimmula, *Peace Resolution: A case study of separatist and terrorist movements in the southern border provinces of Thailand*, 2003.

⁴⁹ General Prem Tin Sulanonda was chosen by the Parliament following the General Election of 1979 called by General Kriangsak Chomanand.

political elites search for an alternate way to overcome the separatist movements.⁵⁰ The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) concluded that the alternative way to cope with the separatism was to separate the separatism movement from the common people. Furthermore, military and political operations focused on communist rebellions and placed military agents in communist organizations using political methods to obtain intelligence. On the other side, to weaken separatist movements, the administration of Thailand also campaigned in a war against corruption and poverty. To follow up the policies, the administration set up the Prime Ministerial Order no. 66/2523 *The Policy to Win over the Communists* and no. 65/2525 *the Plan for a Political Offensive*.

The PMO no. 66/2523, mentioned that the root causes of the appearance of the communist movement were social, political, and economic inequality from undemocratic regimes. This gave power to a number of political elites and was addressed to personal rather than public interest. To explain the policy, Alagappa (1987: 36) says that national security in Thailand was undertaken in the following context:

The Royal Thai Government is determined to maintain strictly the nation, religion, and monarchy and the democratic form of government with the king at its head; harmonize the people's interests and preserve the Thai national identity; resolve economic, political, and social problems justly and peacefully and instill in the Thais a sense of idealism, especially one which encourages the sacrifice of the individual for common interest.

As a consequence, political democracy development and elimination of the authoritarian political system became alternative choices to defeat the communist movement besides the military operations, promotion of social justice, harmonizing the interests of different classes, improvement of bureaucracy, and the promotion of

⁵⁰ Santi Mingmomgkol in 'Communists and Thailand's Muslim Problem' in Southeast Asia Chronicle October 1980 writes as follows: *Three years of massive counterinsurgency operations in Thailand's south have produced an unexpected result: an upsurge in Muslim separatist activities and an apparent alliance between some Muslim separatists and the Communist Party of Thailand.*

democratic forces. In relation to the root causes of the separatist movements in the southern borders of Thailand, Alagappa (op.cit.: 216) details the results of the diagnosis as follows:

1. The lack of socio-economic development in the four provinces. This diagnosis has its roots in the rule of Rama V and was the basis for the Sarit approach to national security and regime legitimacy in the other regions.
2. Government misadministration in the border region. The grievances of the Malay Moslem community are a consequence of ignorance of the Thai bureaucrats of the Malay society, its language, religion, and culture and also because of the bureaucrats' arrogant and corrupt behaviour. Moreover, local government in this area is inefficient and does not meet the needs of the people.
3. Armed separatism is mainly the effort of the traditional political and religious elite to recapture political power; that is, it is characterized as flowing from selfish motives of a small elite group with little or no popular support.
4. External support is the root of armed separatism. Without external support, the Malay Muslim community will have no choice but to be integrated into Thailand. Armed separatism cannot be sustained with local means alone.

Besides the implementation of PMO no. 66/2523, to defeat the separatist movements of the Malay Moslems, the administration of Thailand also conducted the security policy as proposed by the National Security Council on 24 January 1978. The policy produced to prevent an increase in conflict escalation evaded political intervention from other countries or international organization as experienced by the Philippines. The method implemented was as follows: (ibid: 217)

1. To increase the number of people in the southern border provinces that spoke the Thai language through teaching of the Thai language focused on the younger generation;
2. To implant loyalty of the Malay Moslems in the southern border provinces to the government and the main kingdom institution to make them Thai Moslems rather than a minority group;
3. To raise the living standards of the Malay Moslems living in the southern border provinces that were living in poverty;
4. To protect the people in the southern border provinces from disturbances from terrorist and bandit groups;
5. To make the Moslem nations understand that the real problems were about management of government and common welfare in southern Thailand. This was addressed to Moslem countries that gave financial and military aid to southern border provinces.

These policies was prepared to execute a number of programs as follows: pressure to teach the Thai language and secular subjects to the Malay Moslems, tolerance in religious relations, economic development in the southern border provinces, administrative improvement, state apparatus quality and human resource improvement both civil and military, measured and limited military operations and negotiations with the separatist movement (ibid.: 217-218). Before 22 June 1977, the administration had determined a set of policies in appointing of local government officials in the southern border provinces as follows: (1). They should understand the Malay language and the Moslem people; (2) If they were not Moslems, they should understand and be able to speak the Malay-language; (3) If they could not speak Malay they should be Moslems; (4) If they were not Moslems and could not speak Malay they should have a perspective on local traditions and ethnicity.

To coincide with the cultural assimilation policy and tolerating Islamic development, the administration of Thailand also undertook a number of military operations under the coordination of the *Committee for the Resolution of Security Problems in the Southern Border Provinces* headed by the Secretary General of the *National Security Council*. At the local level military operation, it was undertaken by *The Fourth Army Region* supported by *the International Security Operation Command*, Police, and paramilitary troops. Nevertheless, the military operation policy was followed up by a peace campaign based on PMO Orders no. 66/23 and no. 65/25 offering amnesty to the separatist movement members who surrendered to the government.

LTG Harn Leenanon claimed that a number of policies were carried out effectively from October 1981 until September 1983. As proof, 700 people of the separatist movement and the communist rebellion surrendered since an amnesty was offered to them. By using that tactic, the military could limit the area of the separatist movements. Although the military could not eliminate all of the separatist movement resistance, The Civil-Police Military Task Force (CPM-43) could maintain the southern border provinces for a long time, from the separatist military disturbances. After that, the Fourth Army Region campaigned for *Tai Rom Yen*, which meant peace and stability in the southern border provinces. The military budget for the southern border provinces increased from 1,917 million baht in 1979 to 4,150 million baht in 1983 to realize this policy.

This important policy was addressed to the Islamic countries mainly Malaysia. The assumption was that the separatist movements could not persist without aid from Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries. To realize the objective, bilateral relations between Malaysia and Thailand were addressed as follows: (ibid.: 228): obtaining international acknowledgement of Thai sovereignty over the southern border provinces; making sure Malaysia did not give support to the separatist movement, and encouraging Malaysia to reduce support from the Middle Eastern countries to the separatist

movements. The growth of the separatist movement in Thailand in 1970 was suspected to have received training and protection from Malaysia. The military pressure from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) encouraged the Malays to cooperate with Thailand in fighting against the separatist movements. In 1983, Thailand established the Islamic Fund Foundation of Thailand to promote cooperation between Thai Moslems and the central government without involving political problems (ibid: 231). Funds from Islamic countries could be distributed through this institution to the Moslem people in Thailand.

The Thai policies until 1980 impacted significantly on Islamic development. Islam had been constructed as a religion in Thailand although not a national religion through the patronage to the King in developing studies about Islam and the Al-Quran. The significant policy was choosing local officials in the southern border provinces who were sensitive to the *distinctiveness* of religion and culture. That meant a number of local government official who were appointed were Malay. In line with the political liberalization and democratization in Thailand developing since 1980, the Malay Moslems had affiliated to the Democrat Party. This party undertook a political recruitment of the Thai Moslems as parliamentary candidates. A Malay from the New Aspiration Party, Wan Muhammad Nur Matha⁵¹, was chosen as the Speaker of Parliament and appointed as Minister of Internal Affairs and Deputy of Prime Minister in the Thaksin Sinawatra administration.

However, religious tolerance for those living in Thailand, encouraged since the 1980s, was tentative because of the development of fundamentalist Islamic groups which emphasized their Islamic beliefs and their ethnic identity (Keyes, 2003). Public culture

⁵¹ Wan Muhammad Nor Matha was a senior politician from the New Aspiration Party. He came from the Moslem minority or Bangsa Melayu Pattani and was the first from that group to be chosen as the Speaker of the Thai Parliament, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister. The appointment as the Speaker of Parliament by Prime Minister Chavalith Yongchaiyudh was a form of political accommodation to the Malay Moslems who had suffered discrimination from the Thai administration in the past.

established in Thailand tended to be Buddhist influenced culture. The appearance of fundamentalist groups in the southern border provinces encouraged Thai Buddhist militant groups to again demand Thai nationalism and a Thailand that was Buddhist. The conflict potential strengthened again in response to the fundamentalist groups to retain their *distinctiveness* in religion and ethnicity.

The secularization of the pondok policy and the prohibition of the Malay language in Islamic schools and pondok did not impact on the appointment of local government official in the southern border provinces. A survey undertaken in 1978 showed that 5-15% of *assistant district officers* were Moslems (Astri Suhrke 1989: 6). However, no Moslem person was appointed a governor, deputy governor or head of the provincial education office. Until now, the pattern has not changed. According to Prof Peerajot Rahimulla, the majority of kingdom officials were Buddhists. This was because the Buddhists were more fluent in Thai than the Malay Moslems. The mastery of the Thai language became a standard in the recruitment of civil servants and high officials. In reality, the majority of Malay Moslem scholars had graduated from higher education institutions in Indonesia, Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries, so they usually did not fulfill the criteria to speak the Thai language fluently.

Besides that, compulsory cultural assimilation of the Malay Moslems impacted on the migration of the Malay Moslems from the southern borders of Thailand to Malaysia. They had dual identity as Thai and Malaysian citizens that had deep feelings of brotherhood since the times of their ancestors (Hortsman 2000). This impacted indirectly to increase human trafficking from and to Pattani. The migration was most complex from the economic, the political and cultural reasoning. The migration was not only addressed to maintain their culture but also to satisfy their economic interests. So migration encouraged the growth of border economic contacts. However, the human trafficking impacted on social values transfer from the Malays to the southern border provinces mainly concerned with the development of the *revival of religious ideas in*

Pattani, as a result of the interaction between Malays and foreigners both in and outside Pattani. The human trafficking across the Thai Malaysian border on a certain level had become big problems for Thailand and Malaysia. The Malaysians stated that the northern borders of Malaysia were places of criminality, insecurity and sex-tourism. Illegal logging, drug trafficking and weapon trading also became the main characteristics of the border area. To overcome the problem, the administration of Malaysia built a high wall that separated Malaysians from those living in southern Thailand. Meanwhile the Thai administration stated that Malaysia was a haven for fundamentalist Islam since many separatist movement elites escaped across the Malaysian border. The border area was not only used as a trade area but also for the transaction of ideas between Malaysians and the Malay Moslems of Thailand. Here was the early awakening of Islamic fundamentalism in the southern border provinces of Thailand.

The policies of the Thai administration to integrate the Malay Moslems through the politics of culture by the incorporation of ulama groups in the bureaucracy and pondok secularisation policy can be said to have been successful enough to separate Islam from the Malay Moslem identity. This was proven by the economic and social developmental approach to reduce inequality in economic and social culture between Bangkok and the southern border provinces of Thailand as written in Ministerial Order no. 66/2532. However, after the Cold War ended, some military governments still implemented Thai nationalism to try to get political legitimacy. As in the end of World War II, the national integration policy of Thailand was influenced by international interests i.e. to obstruct communist power in Southeast Asia through economic development cooperation. After World War II, relations between Thailand and western countries such as Britain and the USA increased. The relations did not only cover trading cooperation but also security and defence cooperation. Thailand was one of the main supporters for the establishing of the *South East Asia Treaty Organization*

(SEATO).⁵² Meanwhile, in line with rapid industrial development in Southeast Asia, the roles of Islam and the Moslem community in Southeast Asian countries grew against the backdrop of political stability and economic development in the region as a whole in the middle of the 1980s. The Moslem situation in Southeast Asia can be categorized into three: First, becoming predominantly Moslem such as in Indonesia which is the biggest Moslem country in the world; Second, incorporating pragmatic Moslem leadership and economic advancement in a plural society such as the Malaysian; Third, become a marginalized and oppressed minority group such as in the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar. The significant issue in the third groups is how can the Moslem minority maintain its existence in religion apart from the forced assimilation policy by the states dominated non Moslem majorities and the military government. In the following part it will be described how *the survival of the struggle* of the Malay Moslems of Thailand to face a military campaign in line with the international war against terrorism supported by the USA and the governments of Southeast Asian countries. It will also be explained how the administration of Thailand declared martial law and how the Malay Moslems responded to the martial law and state violence in 2003.

IV. 4. Thai Political Integration and Security Problems

The political integration policy and security problems can be differentiated into two stages, i.e. the peace period (1992-2003) and the period of violence (2004). The peace period policies undertaken were based on the *National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces* proposed by the *National Security Council* and ratified by the Prime

⁵² SEATO was a military cooperative of allies established in 1954, the organization was the result of an agreement for defence cooperation among Australia, France, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States of America. The establishment of this organization had the background of the loss by France of Indo-China and was addressed to fight the communist movement in Asia. The agreement covered some articles called 'the Pacific Charter', strengthening of civil society of Asian and Pacific countries for equality and self-determination, and the obtaining of cultural, economic, and social objectives. The SEATO headquarters were in Bangkok. Working programs of this organization were annual joint military exercises. Since SEATO failed in military intervention in Laos and Vietnam this organization was disbanded in 1979.

Minister. The southern border provinces defined in the document are Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla, and Satun. The policy assumed that the political situation after 1999 had changed from the old situation that was dominated by violence and social restlessness, low living standards of the Malay Moslems, low infrastructure development, low tolerance for cultural differences and using military operations to cope with the separatist movements. It had changed into a new situation that was characterised as: high tolerance of other cultures and other ways of life, not using physical power to cope with the problems, appearance of scholars and the political generation.

Unresolved problems are adaptation of the Malay Moslems to political liberalization and globalisation such as drugs in youth groups, poverty, and feelings of injustice in the society, and growth of political participation based on the Constitution of 1997⁵³. So the central government intended to change its perspective on the Malay Moslems as follows: (Dasar Kestabilan Negara di Sempadan Selatan, 1999-2003: 61) First, every Thai Moslem in the southern border provinces has a right to live happily with his/her identity, religion, and culture. Thai Moslems, a minority in Thailand should be able to live as Moslems in Thai society. Second, every citizen should respect cultural differentiation that has become powerful and clever in trying to bring about political stability, security, and development. Third, the local community should have the opportunity and a role in the problem solving process and in development.

The political integration policy was intended, in the new era of the democracy development process to start reforms and change based on the Constitution of 1997. The national security policies were addressed to obtain objectives as follows (ibid.: 62): First, to develop the potential of the people and of the society both in the public and the private sectors in order to be able to understand the changes taking place in society, domestically and abroad, and to create awareness and readiness for adaptation based on their identity and way of life. Second, to develop the surroundings that would facilitate

⁵³ The change of Constitution in 1997 was carried out in the period of Prime Minister Chuan Lekphai (1997-2000) after Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries experienced a monetary crisis.

the development of the potential of the society and the potential of the people by adjusting and developing all their surroundings to support and sustain the development of the potential of the society and the potential of the people in line with cultural diversity and local wisdom. Third, to increase the participation of all parties in the area by allowing the people to take part in development and problem solving, especially public disorder and narcotic problems, by asserting cultural power to solve social problems in order to avoid conflict, and bring about peace and tranquillity.

According to Prof Peerajot Rahimmula (interview in May 2004), political integration policies in 1999-2003 were placed in the context of the democratic development process towards the establishment of a multicultural society through peoples' political participation growing in the public spaces. However, this policy had removed military operations in 2004 through Martial Law which was undertaken in the years before 1978. Even, in the period of 1999-2003, some intellectual groups in the southern border provinces had implemented political education of the society through socialization of the Constitution of 1997 protecting human and civil rights.⁵⁴ The military policies were suspected of giving a sign that there were groups of political elites that did not want peace in the southern border provinces. This was part of the endeavours of political elites to close the illegal businesses in the southern border provinces.⁵⁵

Now, state policies in the southern border provinces are influenced by the discourse of resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism rising globally. The resurgence of Islamic radicalism or Islamic militancy in southern Thailand cannot be separated from the global context in 1980-1990 which was called the era of religious fundamentalism. The modernization process undergone by western states had a specific history which could not become the only standard value or judgement to measure the advance of

⁵⁴ Interview with Prof Peerajot Rahimmula from Prince Songkhla University on 24 May 2004.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

Moslem society. In relation to the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey, Javaid Saeed (1994:1) explains as follows:

The issue of development and modernization of Islamic countries cannot be analysed, explained and addressed in terms of the existing paradigms in the discipline formulated to analyse and explain the issues involved in the development and modernization processes of developing countries as a whole.

The modernization in Thailand like in other countries in Southeast Asia was implemented with development as the main ideology. The government has a strong role in planning, executing but also controlling development programs to obtain high economic growth, promoting a better quality of life for the people, and increase of social welfare. The problem which should be questioned in this context, is what is the perception of the government of development and how it impacts on the Islamic roles in society. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis says in his book, *Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree* (1996: 139):

What does the tenacity of religious devotion in the modern context tell us about Southeast Asian societies? In general terms, it underlines the fact that, contrary to widely held predictions about the course of modernization, religious identity in Southeast Asia is still very much part of the fabric of society. Classical Weberian sociological theory argues that with modernization, primordial religious values are eventually replaced by secular national and civic values. But this vision of a despiritualised society seems misplaced in Southeast Asia.

Religious identity in Southeast Asia on some levels is bound with the ethnic identity or united with local culture. That is reflected in the Malay language as; adat bersendikan syara' dan syara' bersendikan kitabullah. It means: tradition is based on the law, and the law is based on the Quran and Islamic principles. Islam is different from other religions since it does not differentiate between divinity and social relations. The role of Islam in society is not only as an inspiration, but also as the law determining the social life and government. (Christie 2000:132). The sociological theories of Weber claim

that in modernization, religious values are replaced by secular values. It was called a despiritualization of the society. However, in reality, it succeeded in realizing an Islamic society including that of the Malay Moslems in the southern border provinces of Thailand.

On one side, development was regarded as able to increase economic growth, to promote a better social life, and to promote social welfare. However, on the other side, there is the question, for whom is the development undertaken and to what extent can it be useful for society that is marginalized politically and economically, as is the Moslem society in Southeast Asia. That has become an instigator of Islamic fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is a religious ideology to get religion back into the social order. It is not only born in the context of the religion itself, but also has a deeper root in political, economic and cultural inequality undergone by religious minorities in the midst of a national majority. It can be concluded that the root cause of the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia comes from the failure of development and the free market economy encouraging poverty, misery, and marginalization of the Moslem people.

Meyer (2002) states that fundamentalism was a political ideology born in the 20th. century inviting membership based on ethno religious equality. The experiences of *humiliation, misery, despair* and *lack of acknowledgment*, can contribute significantly to the development of a fundamentalist ideology. The joining of those elements basically is pragmatically instrumental in deriving a set of doctrines that evolved in the pre-tradition period. Fundamentalism tries to question basic assumptions and structures and their consequences on tolerance of culture in the modern era that do not accord with religious values. So that, Meyer (ibid.) says the fundamentalism project itself is a political ideology that has become a part of religion or *secular ideological ethics* to respond to the *crises of modernization*.

Fundamentalist identity is the political instrument in a society with different cultures, although there are some varied objectives meeting stresses equally varied. There is basically a dualism in the characteristics of fundamentalism they obtained, an identity through their acknowledgement of supremacy from other groups. Acknowledgement means emphasizing resistance, if needed, whenever it appears. Fundamentalist leadership implanted a desire to use their followers to mobilize their power to consolidate political power or confirm their violent activities against their declared enemies. The pressure of fundamentalist groups can evolve strongly and effectively if it is founded on oppression and conditions of marginalization joined with past experiences of *downward mobility* and *economic insecurity*. The economic and cultural crisis persisting can give a greater impetus for the development of a fundamentalist movement.

Coinciding with the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism manifested in the attack on the WTC in New York on 11 September 2001, the violent activities of the separatist movements in southern Thailand started appearing again after 10 years of peace. In response to these activities, The National Security Council of Thailand declared Martial Law on 5 January 2004 in the southern border provinces. It was undertaken after serious invasions by the separatists of the public facilities and military operations in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. Two days before the declaration, 18 schools and 1 kindergarten and primary school were burned and the separatists stole 300 weapons after they killed 4 soldiers. Almost all the school buildings were destroyed preventing 651 students, including 95 Moslems, from studying.

In the following days, a bomb exploded in Pattani and killed two police officers. Military groups in Bangkok accused local Moslem separatist groups such as Mujahiddin Pattani which was suspected of having a close relationship with the Malaysian Mujaidin Association and ties with the Al Qaidah network through Jamaah Islamiyah. Ret Gen Kitti Rattanachaya said that efficient coordination with the terrorist invasions showed that the terrorists had received professional military training from the Al-Qaida.

Martial law was put into effect in 3 provinces: Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. This policy allowed the armed forces to undertake military operations in areas suspected of harbouring terrorist camps in the southern border provinces of Thailand. In line with this mainstream opinion, the Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra⁵⁶ announced that violence in the southern border provinces was the work of Moslem separatists with dual Thai and Malay citizenship who run away from the southern border areas to Malaysia where they stay with their relatives or friends.⁵⁷

Cheow (2003) supports this argument. He says that the southern border provinces of Thailand had become centres of closed terrorist activities and involved all terror activities from drug smuggling, human trafficking and prostitution to weapon smuggling. The planning of bombing raids was undertaken in southern Thailand when Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines closed their territories to fight against

⁵⁶ Thaksin Shinawatra was born on 26 July 1949 in Chiang Mai into a transport business family. Before he joined the Thai Rak Thai Party in the General Election of January 2001, Thaksin was a police officer and a telecommunication businessman at the national level. He graduated from the Police Cadet School, Class 26, in 1973 then got a scholarship from the Office of the Civil Service Commission to study abroad. Thaksin obtained a Master's Degree in Criminal Justice from the Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky in 1974 and a PhD in Criminal Justice from the Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas in 1978. Thaksin worked in the Police until 1987. After that, he marketed the film 'Bann Sai Thong'. His business experiences were in telecommunications and in the computer industry that developed in 1982 when he signed an agreement with the Police Department to provide computer software. His business developed further in the mobile telephone sector (Shinawatra Paging) and by launching the communication satellites of Thailand. In 1990, Thaksin obtained the concession with the Thailand Telephone Organization for 20 years. Now his company is known as the Shin Corporation, a conglomerate in telecommunications, consisting of the Shinawatra Computer and Communications Plc and Advanced Info Service Plc. Thaksin entered politics in 1994 by campaigning to clean up Thailand of corrupt politicians by becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Palang Dharma Party and was appointed the Deputy of Prime Minister Chauvalit Choonhavan in 1997. Unable to overcome traffic problems, he resigned. He then established the Thai Rak Thai Party and won the General Election of January 2001. Some Thais say that Thaksin rules in the style of a policeman as is shown by his strong control of political opposition.

⁵⁷ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia on 5 February stated: 'the objective of the JI, which was established by Abdullah Sungkar and has a hierarchical set-up, aims at overthrowing by force the legitimate governments of several Southeast Asian countries and later, to unite to form a pan-Islamic Southeast Asia, encompassing a part of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and the southern Philippines. While JI is not part of the international Al-Qaeda network, the loose linkages established between certain leaders of the two groupings led to arrangements for mutual benefit'

terrorism. In reality, many Moslem separatists and terrorists escaped to Thailand to plan bombing of other Southeast Asian countries. Jamaah Islamiyah elements were suspected of meeting in southern Thailand at least twice to plan the Bali bombing and other bombings in Indonesia. The separatist movement is also assumed to have a network with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf groups in southern Philippines.

Cheow (ibid) also mentions that there are five reasons why southern Thailand had become a centre of terrorism as follows: First, the southern Thai border provinces were the underbelly provinces in Thai economics or peripheral regions in both economics and politics. The economic growth and development were not effective in producing a trickle down effect into the Malay Moslem community. The poverty and marginalization of the Malay Moslems had encouraged a state of relative deprivation which supported the concept and spread of terrorist activities. Second, many Moslem youths in pondok are Wahabi followers; they obtained financial aid from the Middle East to develop Mosques and schools. Some of them had also obtained military training in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.

Third, these area were dominated by the war against *attrition and hit and run operations* to fight against central government symbols such as: Police, Armed Forces, and local government. Some of the separatist movements had appeared in the past time. Fourth, Prime Minister Thaksin undertook a war against drugs going so far as proposing the death penalty for drug distributors. Drug smuggling was suspected of being fund raising for terrorist activities. Fifth, the terrorists were influenced by political conditions in Kelantan and Kedah where fundamentalist Islam had already established Islamic Law.

In response to the terrorist movements in the southern border provinces, Prime Minister Thaksin determined *two executive decrees* on 11 August 2003 known as the Criminal Code and the Anti Money-Laundering Regulations to satisfy civil society aspirations and human rights activists. The decree gives a base to persecute the terrorist movement. Southern Thailand is well known as a tourist destination area with

fashionable places such as Phuket, Krai, and Kor Samui. These were the areas disturbed by terrorist movements. Nevertheless, interviews with a number of civil society figures both in Bangkok and Pattani show that terrorism is only a discourse and political symbol among the government and military elites to destroy the Malay Moslems in southern Thailand. Terrorism is a political instrument of propaganda from the military and civilian political elite groups that has a hidden agenda as follows: First, the local police and local government elites control a lot of illegal businesses such as prostitution, illegal logging, and weapon smuggling on the Thai-Malaysian border. A number of people with support from the kingdom officials are suspected of undertaking the illegal business. One of the informants from the Prince Songkhla University Pattani campus (PR) said as follows:

'Some of the Thai Kingdom officials do not wish for Malays to live in peace. Because here many of us southern Thais do not understand that illegal business yields a great deal to employees who in the main are not Moslem. Economic activity on the Malaysian border according to our studies included illegal prostitution, weapon smuggling, drugs and so on, to earn an income of about 10 million baht per year (equal to Rp 2,2 milliard). Half of those who enjoyed the illegal business were members of the Kingdom's police force. If the border areas were at peace then those employees would lose their illegal incomes as this would go to benefit the community.'

Second, to repress the criticism of the Malay Moslems of government policies. Everybody that conducted a critique of the Kingdom officials or civil servants would be stigmatized by the local and central government officials as a group behind the separatist movement including a Member of Parliament from Pattani who always criticised unfair government policies, Den Tohmena bin Haji Sulong.⁵⁸ So the policy of

⁵⁸ Taipei Times, 24 March 2004, page 5 reports: *A senior Thai senator yesterday accused police of torture in obtaining evidence that he helped plan the attack on the army arsenal. Senator Den Tohmena, who represents the Province of Pattani, said in a speech that Anupong Panthachayangkoon, a village headman held by police in connection with the attack, had lied about him because of police pressure.* Besides Den Tohemana, the Police also arrested two Members of

war against the terrorists manifested by the Martial Law in the southern border provinces could be categorized as state terror against the civil society. The centralized political system enabled the kingdom officials in the southern border provinces to report to the central government that there were a number of separatist movement uprisings.

Since the PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization) power was weakened, the terrorism issues were addressed to the Jamaah Islamiyah. To follow up on these issues, the government created the Barisan Mujahiddin Pattani.

If the details are traced, based on an interview with the chairman of the Majelis Ugama Islam in the Province of Pattani, there was no organization named Barisan Mujahiddin Pattani. The suspected people were some youths who had graduated from Middle Eastern institutions, as a large number of the Pattani youth went to school in Middle Eastern countries such as the Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia since the period of the Pattani Kingdom.

Some of the incidents were planned and constructed by the police to legitimize Martial Law. One of my informants (PR) mentioned that the story about the theft of 300 weapons which supposedly took place at the Narathiwat military camp on 4 January 2004, was not true. The weapons had been lost in the previous 4 months. The military approach would not be able to cope with the separatism problem; and would indeed encourage new problems. Prof Peerajot Rahimmula stated (interview on 16 May 2004) as follows:

Parliament from the Thai Rak Thai Party, Najmuddin Umar and Areepen Uttarasin. Den Tohmena is the son of Haji Sulong, in 1957 he and his older brother Haji Amin nominated for the General Election but failed. In 1960 Haji Amin was arrested by indictment for being involved in the separatist movement. Den Tohmena was chosen as a Member of Parliament from the Democrat Party in 1976 but went away to Britain after the military coup. In 1980, he was elected a Senator and was appointed Secretary of the Defence Department.

'Half the kingdom employees in the border areas see us as second class citizens, they accuse us of being separatists who support anti-Thai movements. They do not want Malays to sit with people of other religions. Because there is no justice Malays are humiliated. We need justice, we need the protection of human rights as there is no justice or human rights in southern Thailand, on the contrary they accuse us of being separatists or people who want independence'

The substantial problems in the southern border provinces of Thailand basically were not separatism issues but the inequality in socio economic, socio cultural and socio political issues in Malay Moslem life. The socio political inequality was indicated by the strength of central government power and the Malay Moslems' lack of autonomy. Meanwhile, inequality in social and cultural lives was proven by the forced separation culture and discouragement of Bahasa Melayu on the Moslem people as shown by the forced cultural assimilation. The Malay Moslems were obliged to accept the assimilation policy in order to become Thai Moslems rather than Malay Moslems. Although the Constitution of 1997 protected multiculturalism, this was only a limited discourse. Those matters indicate that the root causes of the separatism issues were that there was no autonomy of rule by the Moslems in the southern borders (Paribatra, 1983:3)⁵⁹. This matter was also reiterated by an informant from Chulalongkorn University (SW) who claimed that no country including Thailand wants the *politics of differentiation* but prefer the *politics of homogeneity*.

The politics of homogeneity applying to the minority ethnic groups such as the Lao, the Hmong, and the Chinese did not have as much impact as it did when applied to the Malay-Moslem. The similarity of religion and tradition among the Thai, the Chinese and the Hmong did not make them experience many problems in the forced cultural assimilation. However, in the Malay Moslem case, when the politics of homogeneity are in line with economic and political inequality, there is always room for

⁵⁹ Sukhumbhand Paribatra says: '*essentially separatist movement can be conceived of as attempts by ethnic minorities on the periphery to attain political autonomy from the governing power of the centre*' in 'Factors behind Armed Separatism: A Framework for Analysis,' ISEAS, 1983.

resistance even though at a minimal level. For example, the political, economic, and cultural pressures encourage the Malay Moslems to regard the Thai administration as foreign. The principal leader of the great Mosque of Pattani, Teuku Umarsyah claimed that the Thai administration is a colonial government and the relationship between the Thai administration and the Malay Moslems is like the relationship between the Indonesian people and the Dutch government in colonial times.

The war campaign against terrorism of the Thai administration was greatly influenced by American political and military interests in Southeast Asia. It was often regarded as an endeavour by the US to reestablish its military power in the Southeast Asian regions as in the period of the Cold War. At that time, the US had two military bases at Clark and Subic Bay in the Philippines and was involved in the setting up of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation. If in the period of the Cold War the US military presence in Southeast Asia was necessary to blockade communism; now it is necessary to eradicate terrorism. Other political analysis says that the war against terrorism is actually addressed to blockade the economic expansion of China that has developed as a big economic power.

Except for Singapore and the Philippines, Thailand is the main ally of the US in Southeast Asia. The American Secretary of State, Colin Powell at the meeting of APEC leaders on 18 October 2003 in Bangkok said that APEC should talk about the trading and investment issues in the context of the war against terrorism. On that day, the US and Thailand signed *the Air Cargo Agreement*. Two days later, on 20 October 2003, President George Bush visited Thailand and chose it as a main ally outside of NATO, valued for cooperation in the campaign against terrorism. As a follow up in this issue, the US provided middle range missiles for air to air combat to Thailand as replacement for those offered by Malaysia and China. To help the US in Iraq, Thailand also sent 433 paramedics and technicians there on 3 December 2003. After that, on 15 December 2003, Thailand with Singapore and the US started Cope Thunder Air Exercises, that are undertaken annually, (the 10th), in the Singapore Military Command.

As a show of gratitude, the US helped Thailand to handle 15.000 Hmong refugees who had escaped from Laos after the Communist Party took power in that country in 1975. Thus it is clear that the strong tendency of the policies for war against terrorism in southern Thailand are influenced by US political interests. Separated from this is whether or not Jamaah Islamiyah exists. The Malay Moslems had become the object and military target of Martial Law so this community became very miserable.⁶⁰ For example, through the murder of 85 Malay Moslems on 25 October 2004 when the military arrested 1.300 people demonstrating in Tak Bai, Naratiwat. The incident showed that the military had no proper perspective in facing the rights of civil society in articulating their aspirations. The Martial Law had killed both the Malay Moslem people and the democratic process that is the right of all citizens in the world. The elements gave advantages from Martial Law to the US that sold weapons to Thai Armed Forces and the Thai Armed Forces succeeded in obtaining control over some resources after they occupied the southern border provinces.

IV. 5. Conclusions

Based on the above explanations, it can be said that the political integration policies of Thailand into the southern border provinces were as follows:

1. Every political integration policy of the Thai administration in the southern border provinces always had an external political dimension or was influenced by international interests as well as national interests. Territorial policy was addressed to blockade colonial political expansion, and the ulama political integration was

⁶⁰ Bangkok Post reported that The National Commission of Human Rights would investigate the lost people from January-March 2004 in the southern border provinces of Thailand. The Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CCIT), The Law Society of Thailand, The Senate Committee of Human Rights, and the Moslem Lawyers Association (MLA) said that there were a number of reports of violence such as murder, torture, and mutiny in Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, and Satun. It was suspected that 65 civil servants and military died and 105 Malay Moslems also died during the military operation. Source: Centre of Excellence, in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, Asia Pacific Daily Report, 25 March 2004.

addressed to prevent communist influences. Meanwhile the pondok secularization policy was related to the development program to promote social modernization.

2. Almost all of the Thai administration in Pattani had the main characteristic of intervention in religion and traditional institutions of the Malay Moslems such as the prohibition of the Malay language, pondok secularization, and Thai customs decree of 1939. The unpopular policies were based on the spirit to strengthen Thai nationalism as defined by a loyalty to the Buddha, the Thai nation, and the monarchy. The more repressive the state intervention among the Malay Moslem people, the greater the resistance of the Malay Moslems in responding, such as the rebellions of 1902, 1922, 1948, and 1970.
3. The administration of Thailand has removed the policy to coup separatism. The Prime Ministerial Orders no. 65 and 66/2325 based on social and economic development to eliminate inequality were replaced by the Martial Law that was based on military operations. The Malay Moslems became the victims of the policy which encouraged the development of the separatist movements in the southern border provinces of Thailand.
4. The political integration of Pattani was addressed to building territorial borders, citizenship borders, and cultural community borders. The integration of Islam into the Thai culture was conducted by a forced assimilation policy to strengthen Thai nationalism. The state killed the public spaces to proceed towards establishing a multicultural society. The politics of the state were to support homogeneity of society in the midst of a plural society based on loyalty to the Buddha, the Thai nation, and the monarchy.

So the conclusion, in this paper, can be formulated as that the political integration policies of the Thai administration of the southern border provinces were dominated by the politics of violence, forced cultural assimilation, and economic development that proved failures to get the sympathy of the Malay Moslem people. These policies only

forced the Malay Moslems to accept the Thai authority symbolically. Nevertheless, the political integration still remains unfair and unjust for the Malay Moslem people and could at certain times lead to separatist movements. The political change in 1997 was dominated by the establishment of the democratic and constitutional process which did not automatically produce a conflict resolution policy that eliminated all problems of injustice for the Malay Moslems. As shown when under the democratic government of Thaksin Sinawatra, the administration implemented Martial Law.

The failure to arouse the cooperation of the Malay Moslem people was caused by some factors as follows: The local government officials in the southern border provinces were predominantly non Moslem and their policies never adapted to the Malay Moslem traditions. The local government policies were centralized by the Central government without respect for traditional values in the provinces. That became the reason why the grand schemes proposed by *The National Social Economic Social Development Plan* failed to be realized (Lohasan1996). Although the institution implemented policies to create employment in the southern border provinces, few Malay Moslems took advantage of this program. The GDP grew rapidly at the national level, however, failure to resolve the main problem resulted in the majority of the Thai people, mainly the Malay Moslems living in poverty in the rural areas, not benefiting. Thai development produced three results: to produce social inequality between the poor and rich people; to remove the labour force from the rural to the urban areas, and to increase the number of women working in the industrial sectors.

Besides that, the migration policy that was conducted by the central government since the Sharit Thanarat administration encouraged the horizontal conflicts in 1960. The Malay Moslem people protested to the central government that tried to encourage the migration of Buddhists from the Northern provinces to the southern provinces through *land resettlement schemes* (nikhom). Nevertheless, the southern border provinces were the underbelly areas and underdeveloped provinces, so the migration levels tended to be constant i.e. 3-4% annually since 1960 (Astri Surke 1989: 2).

Peter Gowing also suggests that in the political aspects, the administration of Thailand should conduct some policies as follows (Gowing in Ahmad Ibrahim, et al.1990: 190): First, pay serious attention to the Malay Moslem peoples' aspirations in the local autonomy. That needs endeavour to overcome the threats to the Malay Moslems in order to maintain their values and traditions. Second, give authority to the political institutions as part of their function. It is significant to control the government in respect of the existence and interest of the Malay Moslems. Third, build and maintain effective political communication channels between the Malay Moslems and the central government at the highest level.

CHAPTER V

FORCED CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF PATTANI MUSLIMS' IDENTITY

Erni Budiwanti

V. 1. Abstract

This chapter in general focuses on the change of Pattani's identity after being forcefully incorporated into the nation state of Thailand. There are two main points discussed here: i) the government's cultural policies to convert them into Thai, and ii) the Pattani's adjustment to the new identity as Thai Muslims imposed by the government. The assimilation policies have finally strengthened the spirit of ethno-nationalism movement of Pattani.

V. 2. The Foundation of Pattani's Identity

Prior to its annexation, the Pattani's identity basically was established around: the monarchy (Islamic Sultanate), Islam as a system of belief and practice, Malay language and culture. Pattani Sultanate, like other local Sultanates located in the Malay peninsular, had embraced Islam since 13th century especially when it was under the reign of Sultan Ismail Saleh Shah. According to the local folklore, when he found the place decided to be the center of his royal government he shouted '*Pantai ini*'. '*Pantai ini*', meaning this beach, was then developed as the capital city of the King's domain. Another local folklore explained that Pattani derived from the word *Petani* meaning peasant. This is closely related to the Malay Muslim main occupation of Pattani, most of them working in agriculture as subsistent farmer. The Pattani identity was built around the reminiscent of Islamic kingdom.

The Pattani identity was also a result of the inter-marriages between local customary traits of the Malay (*adat Melayu*) and Islam. Referring to Redfiled's conception, the Patani identity thus was the synthesis between 'Little Tradition' i.e. the

Malay adat as local variance and 'the Great Tradition' i.e. Islam. This combination is expressed in the use of Malay language as a medium of instruction to teach Islam. Most of the Muslim Pattani speaks Malay and they use what so called the *Kitab Arab Jawi* or *Arab Melayu* as one of the main references to teach. Even though they are written in Arabic (using Arabic script), the meanings are in Malay. The teaching of Islam in Pattani generally is conducted in traditional Islamic schools (pondok pesantren), formal religious schools (madrasah), and mosques. Thus the identity of Pattani Muslim is maintained by these institutions, besides by each individual household of Muslim family. In these institutions, the pupils learn to read the Qur'an (Islamic holy book) and memorize it. They also learnt about the *tafsir* (interpretation of the Qur'an), the *fiqih* (Islamic jurisprudence), *syari'at*, (Islamic law), Sunnah and hadist (tradition of the prophet). In Pondok the pupils also absorbed morality and ethical teachings of Islam. This institution provided the young generation with the knowledge of Islam, and how to behave socially according to the standardized value of Islam. When they were grown up they will be ready to socialize themselves with the outer world using Islam as the main value standard.

Local elites in Patani comprised of the nobles (people with royal descent) and the Islamic figures are among those who maintain the Pattani identity. The religious figures (ulama) were called the *ustadz*, and *tok guru*. Tok Guru was the senior ulama, whereas the ustadz was the junior one. Many of them were graduated from Islamic universities in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lybia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Common people believe that the local ulama had charisma and to have closer contacts with God. People also believed that ulama are able to mediate with God. This gave the reason why their prayer and blessing were required. People sought their advice over various problems they faced. Unlike other figures, such as the nobles and traders, the ulama do not have important role in the bureaucracy and economy. Their main role is the maintenance of Islamic values and principles. Dakwah (spreading Islamic

teachings) was their main concern. In short, the ulama were the religious elites who were responsible for the continuity and development of Islam in Pattani. In the time when the Thai government embarked on policy to incorporate the Pattani Muslim into the Thai nation-state through educational program, the Pattani faced great dilemma. If they had to take secular education promoted by the Thai government they had to sacrifice their own Islamic educational system. Before discussing further the characteristics of educational program set up by the Thai government, let's see how the Thai perceived the Pattani and on the other way round.

V. 3. Conflicting Identity

The way the Thai-Buddhist saw the Pattani Muslims, and on the other way round, was highly imbued with stereotyping, prejudices, and stigmatization. The Thai-Buddhist often identified the Pattani as the *Khaek*, generally meant the visitor, or foreigner. *Khaek* referred to people with brown skin, coming from South Asia, such as from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. *Khaek* denoted to a derogatory meaning. Those who were lazy, untrustworthy, poor, stupid, mischievous, thieves were often identified as *Khaek*.

The notion of Pattani as foreigner or visitor was derogatory. Pattani Muslims view themselves as indigenous people. They had been living in their region since 1668 when the Pattani and Kelantan sultanates rein this region. The annexation of their land by the King Chulalongkorn had made them become an integral part of Thailand. The fact that they were different in terms of religion, language, custom from the majority of the Thai Buddhists, made the Thai identified them as *Khaek*. Based on their distinct language, religion, and culture, the majority of the Thai Buddhist treated them as an alien cultural group. After the incorporation, they were also identified as Thai Muslims. Such a call, in Pattani's understanding, was intended to erase the identity as Malay. The identity of Malay was considered no longer relevant after being integrated to Thai. The

newly recognised identity as the Thai Muslims which was now more important and relevant to the present situation of Pattani. Such identity by and large, was established by the government through the annexation of Pattani territory and joined it into the sovereignty of Thailand.

The Pattani Muslim identified the Thai-Buddhists as statue worshipers. It was the image of Buda that they worshipped. Waging war against them was compulsory, not because they were atheist, but mainly since they were colonizers, depriving the Pattani from their ancestral land. The Pattani Muslims were uneasy to obey the infidel rulers. The Muslim Jihad (war on the path of Allah) directed against the Thai ruler was more on the cause of maintaining justice. Through separatism movement, the Pattani Muslims wanted to get back their freedom as well as their land sovereignty from the Thai government. The relationship between Pattani and the Thai state representing the Thai-Buddhist majority was strongly marked by ideological as well as political conflicts. The Pattani Muslim identified their relationship with the Thai government as the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer. The historical fact supported such identification. Since 16th century Pattani was an autonomous body of royal government reigned under Malay Muslim Sultanates. Officially, the Pattani was forced to be integrated in 1902, and in the early of 20th century Pattani was completely separated from other Malays in the Malay peninsular. Based on their kinship, ethnicity, and religion, the Pattani are parts of the Malays in Malay Peninsular. By blood, territory, culture, religion, and affinity they were parts of their Malay brothers in the Peninsular. Incorporating Pattani into the Thai nation state was to impose a new identity that did not belong to them. Their denial over the identification as Thai was mainly because they had their own history, religion, custom, and kinship different from the Thai. Forced integration had led the Siamese government not only to destroy the Pattani's regional autonomy, but also their identity as Malay Muslims. The Thai government set education and other cultural programmes to make the Pattani become Thai. In reality these programs even strengthened their spirit for resistance against the Thai government.

V. 4. Thai Nationalism through Secular Education

The educational policy to infuse Thai nationalism had been started since the reign of King Rama V in 1908. Here education became the main tool to promote symbols of Thai nation state as well as to unify all the Thai citizens and tie them to their own values. The committee conducted the educational program, comprised of: the Buddhist monks, Village heads, and traditional healers. The government embarked on the teaching of Thai language in every school. Though the Thai government was very anxious in conducting the education program especially to the non - Thais and the non-Buddhists. The teaching of Thai language by the Thai-Buddhist monks had aroused strong protest from the Pattani Muslim. Consequently many of the Pattani parents did not send their children in state schools. They were anxious with the subjects taught by the Buddhist monks. In Muslim believe, it was a sinful deed to teach their children with other religion. The Malay Muslims of Pattani accused that the secular education program imposed by the Thai government was aimed at eliminating the Malayas language and religion (Islam), as well as to convert the natural status of the Malay generation into Thai. Briefly, the Pattani perceived that the government educational program was a strategy to control them politically and culturally. In this regard, Uthai (1971) argued that although the Malay Muslims of Pattani disagreed upon the government's educational program, there was no violent protest against it. The only passive resistance that they performed was some of them did not send their children in public schools controlled by the government.

The education program was imposed more vigorous after the political change from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932. During this year, the Thai government started national education to articulate Thai unity. In this program the government stipulated that

1. The state has the right to educate the people and
2. Has full authority to control and monitor education programmes in government and private schools.
3. Any individual who had passed the compulsory education means that he/she is a citizen who is able to gain important living resources through his/her works. S/he has a right and obligation as a citizen, s/he can also proved her/himself functional through out the work s/he does.

With this education program, the government attempted to unite all the ethnic groups within the Thai territory and establish Thai nationalism. In March 1936, the government issued National Education Plan, which allowed the government to control all education institutions available in Thailand. This included the right to manage the examination program to recruit new teachers and certificate given for them, manage all the examination program for students in the elementary, junior, and high schools. The homogenization of education system was appear in the way the government attempted to control the school curriculum focusing on the aspect of national culture, history, and language. All school books published by the government focusing on the teaching of language, religion, and history of the Thai. In brief, the Thai government made education as the main element to develop Thai nationalism, and thus to bind all Thai citizens into a single nation.

Although the Thai government had facilitated free compulsory education, the majority of Pattani showed little interest in sending their children into the government's schools. Averagely every school run by the government in southern provinces recruited not more than 40 % students out of all enrolled in those schools. In 1937 in the Pattani provinces there were around 83 government schools with 177 teachers and 8,326 pupils, without further information explaining how many among them Muslims (see Uthai 1977: 129) were. The headmasters in these provinces describe this situation as follows:

The Malays parents objected a Thai system of education for their children, since Thai was not their language. They were worried if their children were given the opportunity to go to public (government) school, they would not have time to learn about Islam. If they were allowed to learn the Thai as their daily language, they might not only forget their own language, but also would learn Buddhism. They were also anxious if their children studied in public school for there years, they would be able to speak Thai better than Malay.

In line with the increasing government control on education system, many pondok was then turned into private schools supervised by the government. Pondok were obliged to teach Islam in Thai language. They were not allowed to use the local language (Malay). Secular education offered by the government had threatened the traditional Islamic school run by the Ulama in pondok. The government saw that pondok, as an institution strongly promoted Islamic education had prevented the Patani from adopting the Thai rules. For this reason the Thai government tried to infiltrate pondok, bringing up secular subjects with the main orientation to cultivate Thai nationalism. By this way, the traditional role of the pondok as the main upholder of Islam can gradually be reduced. In line with the change of traditional pondok to private school in 1971 there were around 426 out of 487 pondok registered as private schools.

V. 5. Thai Nationalism through Language and Customs

Besides through education, the Thai government set up cultural policy dealing with the use of language and custom to promote further Thai nationalism. The cultural policy, intended to assimilate the Pattani into Thai culture was called the *ratthaniyom*. Ratthaniyom Number 1 issued on 24 June 1930, announced that Siam was replaced by Thailand as the name of the state. It also stipulated that all ethnic groups should change their names into Thai. The Pattani accepted this regulation with suspicion of the government plan to replace Islam and Malay identity with the Thai customary values. Most of the Pattani combined Islamic (Arabic) and Malay names together. By bearing a

Thai name, the cultural and ethnic boundaries were blurred. Those Muslim migrants coming from the Middle East, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, were all included as Thai Muslims despite their varied backgrounds or place of origin.

Ratthaniyom Number 3 issued on 2 August 1939 stipulated that the use of Thai to replace Siam did not mean to divide Thai citizens based on locality (Northern Thai and Southern Thai) or religion (Thai Muslims, Thai Christians, Thai Buddhists). The Muslims Pattani strongly rejected the identification as Thai Muslim for the reason that it was not their natural identity. They had their own history, religion, and culture of origin, separated from the Thai.

Ratthaniyom number 9 issued on 24 June 1940 obliged every Thai citizen to use the Thai script as well to speak in Thai. Thai language was stipulated as the only official language. The use of Malay and Chinese languages in schools, offices, public places, and meetings were banned.

The Cultural Conservation Regulation stipulated in 1940 brought detrimental effect especially for the continuation of the Pattani's cultural identity. Article 4, verse 5 of this constitution stipulated about: the proper way to dress, ethical behavior in public places, efficient and proper behavior in working place

Promotion of Thai nationalism

Article 4, verse 6:

National costume mentioned in verse 5 is employed with respect to the local variances

Article 4, verse 7:

Those who dare to violate against the Royal regulations as mentioned in the verse 6 will have to pay customary fines maximumly 12 baht. All the fines collective become local revenues.

Article 4 referred only to Thai traditional costume, excluding the Malay costume. In this regard the interpretation of this regulation contradicted to article 4, verse 6 that emphasized on local variances. This interpretation brought the image that the promotion of Thai nationalism was narrowed down to raise Thai ethnocentrism.

All the cultural policies mentioned above was a propaganda of Thai culture that include the language, the way to dress up (national costume), literature, and daily etiquette. With the consequence of undermining the culture of minority groups.

The regulation of daily costume was more likely to follow western value standard. Here the Malays were forced to dress up in modern style, wearing trousers, shoes, and hat. They were forbidden to wearing sarong, the Muslim caps. Those who did not abide to these regulations were fined or arrested and undressed by the police to change their clothes.

The cultural policy was conducted more vigorously especially when the Prime Minister, Pibun Shangorn, a military regime was in power. The Malay Pattani launched strong protest against government's cultural policy discriminated them. The discrimination was obvious especially for Malays working in the government offices. They should change their names into Thai unless they did not want to get promoted to a higher rank through their carrier. The holiday for Muslims was changed from Friday to Sunday. Besides the dressing style, the table manner was also regulated. Using fork and spoon was recommended. This was against Malay tradition used to use their bear hands while eating. For the Thai, especially those graduated from the west, adapting to western culture (in dressing and table manner) was not a problem for them. So far, they had admired western world very much. They taught that westerners were modern and highly civilized. Imitating westerners meant that they were trying to be modern and civilized.

The cultural policy which was conducted more vigorously especially during the military regime of Prime Minister Phibul Songkram had created strong sense of public distrust and illegitimacy on Thai rule over the people of Patani. The Malay Muslims of

Pattani constantly contested the legitimacy of Thai government over their people. They saw the Thai government, since the Chulalongkorn dynasty as an alien ruler, forcing them to change their culture and identity to be similar to the Thai people.

Forced assimilation conducted in Phibun time was a strong political tool to build Thai nationalism as well as to modernize the Thai. Phibun attempted to integrate all people in Thailand by homogenizing them. Consequently every citizen was required to respect, to share, and to express one cultural values, one language, and world views. To integrate the Thai people and make them to share a single national identity, Phibun also created national anthems that glorified the history of Thai, the grandeur of old Thai kingdoms, the heroes and heroines of Thai. These national anthems were magnified by means of radio and television broadcasts. In promoting the Thai language, Phibun did not only force non-Thai people to change their names to Thai, but also all the names of public offices, schools, and commercial boards should use Thai characters. Chinese and Malays language were banned to be used publicly.

The most offensive policy was when the Muslims of Pattani were compelled to respect the image of Budha. This was really beyond their limit and heightened their spirit of rebellion. This obligation was confirmed when the Governmour of Pattani held a public meeting on 12 Jnuary 1944, inviting the Malay leaders including the Islamic figures. In his speech he emphasized that since Buddhism was the religion of the majority people, and was officially recognized as the state religion, it deserved to be honoured with high respect by the non-Buddhist as well. In this case the Pattani was required to show their respect to the image of Budha as symbol of the official religion worshiped by the majority of Thai people. In that meeting, the governmor explained in details the ways to respect the image of Budha when the Pattani happened to meet it in scholl, parks, and other public spaces. They had to bow before the image. These rouse Pattani's anger for they conceived that such an order was a violation of Islamic belief. The monotheistic value of Islam was expressed in the worship of only one God. The respect of Budaha image was considered to be the act of the infidelity. They judged that

the government really intended to eliminate Islam in the South, by stipulating the Rattaniyom and the Constitution of Cultural Preservation. These regulations, in Pattani's view were really against the Royal constitutions which for so long had protected and guaranteed religious freedom for Pattani.

The Pattani, through their representative, Nai Adun Na Saiburi, a parliament member of Narathiwat province launched a letter of protest to Prime Minister Phibun Songkram on 14 February 1944. In his letter he wrote:

The governor had forcefully regulated all the people including the Muslims in Pattani province to dress up in western manner, to respect the image of Buda as the state religion. Consequently who did not abide with this regulation would be caught up, even arrested in government offices, and were forced to report for a few days to the government for their disobedience. This caused many of them lost their time while at the same time they had to go to work. People who were arrested had dressed up politely covering their bodies; in religious rituals they had worn trousers. The governor had gone too far, in penetrating individual privacy. He even defined the colour and the fashion of the dress. The females were obligated to cut short their hair. This policy was too strict, there was not such a rule in Bangkok. The governor's policy caused unrest, bitterness, and distress. This was because the above regulations did not only meet with the religious and local customary traits of the Malays, but also since most of the Malays were too poor to buy new clothes with new fashion or model as required by the governor. Since they did not have enough money to buy new dresses and clothes, they preferred to stay at home rather than being caught up when they were outside wearing something that did not meet with the government's standard of requirements. This had caused the numbers of Malays used to go to the markets and other in public places dropped up to 68%. The market activities were also declining, and the prices of all the primary goods were getting more expensive. The Malays were not dare anymore to hang around the city. For the above reason, I requested to the mister Prime Minister to observe the situation on the spot and made fundamental changes to correct the governor's policy to release the Malays' distress.

Ironically the central government in Bangkok did not see the governor policy was a mistake. It even could accepted his policy. With the announcement of Wirathan on 12 May 1944 the Thao government issued the code of national ethics. Article 8 of this

regulation mentioned: “the Thai loved and respected Buddhism more than their own lives”. This strengthened the Muslims belief about the development of Thai chauvinism among the Thai elites during the reign of military regime of Phibun Songkram.

Since there were no expected replies from the central government, Nai Adum Na Saiburi brought complaints and protests to the parliamentary meeting. Since no response came up, Naiudin sent again a letter of protest to Bangkok with no result. The Thai government seem to see the humiliation suffered by the Pattani sas well as their distress as a trivilal problem. The government oppressions did not only make Nai Adun left the parliament, but also had forced him to move to Malaysia to make new moves against the Thai government.

Under the Prime Minister Pidri Panomyong (1945-147), he started with policy to accommodate the Malay Muslims. Unlike Pibhun, Pidri acoomodated Malay Muslims in the decision making process. Some Malay figures were elected to represent their society in the Parliament. He also issued Patronage of Islamic Act on 3 May 1945. In this act the duty of royal kingdom to support the state religion (Buddhism) was extended to include every religion that existed within the Thai sovereignty. This act gave further concession to the Malay Pattani in the forms of:

1. The establishment of Chularajmontri whose role was to connect the government with the Muslims in the South.
2. The government gave religious freedom by giving back the position of Qadi (Islamic judge) and the role of Islamic court.
3. The government promised to built mosques
4. The government would dismiss all the Thai officials who were corrupt and inefficient from the four provinces of the South.
5. The government officials who were appointed working in the South were obliged to learn and understand Malay custom and tradition prior to take their job.
6. The government allowed the teaching of Malay language in elementary schools in each province of the South.

7. The government also planned to recruit more teachers from the Malay Muslim community.
8. The government built Islamic College.
9. Friday was set up as holiday for the Muslims replacing Sunday.
10. The Muslim Malays were recruited in the Thai army and police,

Although the Islamic laws were restored especially in dealing with marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the Muslim Malays were not yet satisfied with religious autonomy. They demanded political autonomy. In their understanding, other forms of autonomy, such as in economy, culture, education, and religion can be achieved through political autonomy. Led by a religious leader, Haji (H.) Sulong, the Pattani issued petition to demand greater political autonomy in the South. The petition, called as *Petisi H. Sulong*, contained the following demands:

- 1) The election of a leader who possessed full authority to govern the four provinces in the South. This leader had full authority to quit, to replace, and to select all of the government officials in the four provinces. The leader should be a native who was born or come from one out of the four provinces and was elected by the whole people in the four provinces.
- 2) 80% of the government officials in each of the four provinces should be Muslims
- 3) Malay and Thai should be the official languages
- 4) Acknowledgement of Islamic law, and its implementation in the autonomous Islamic court, separated from the Civil court, with Qadi as the Muslim judge
- 5) All the regional revenues and the natural resources coming from the four provinces should be utilized for the sake of public interest in Pattani.
- 6) The establishment of an Islamic body having full authority to handle problems faced by the Pattani Muslims under the control of the leader as mentioned in number (1).

Haji Sulong petition raised resentment among the Thai elites. His petition was interpreted to restore the authority of Patani Sultanate, while at the same time to release Pattani from Thai's control by proposing regional autonomy. In reality, H. Sulong wanted to promote Pangeran Mahyidin - the youngest son of Tuanku Abdul Kadir - the last Pattani Sultanate - back to the throne.

The Thai government showed no response toward H. Sulong's petition. This made H. Sulong and his followers boycotted the general election held in 1948. The boycott made the government arrested him, his brother, and three of his followers. Haji Sulong was held in custody and jailed for three years. Not long after his release, he was disappeared mysteriously. His disappearance raised Pattani's resentment. They were motivated to continue H. Sulong's struggle to gain regional autonomy for Pattani in politics, economy, religion, culture and education.

When Pibun Songkram back in power replacing Pridi through military coup, the Malay leaders sent petition to London in order not to recognize his government as well as to reject Thai's territorial claim over the southern region belonging to Pattani. The British refused this petition.

The above petition had made the government aware that forced assimilation had led to the increase of Pattani nationalism against the Thai government. In his effort to pacify the Pattani, Pibun then promoted a Malay representative, Abdullah Wong Puteh from Satun, to be the Vice Minister of Education. This did not work to redeem Pattani's nationalism which was getting stronger especially during the Pibun's military oppression.

V. 6. Conclusion

When Pattani was forcefully incorporated into the nation state of Thai, the problem of identifying The Malay Muslims of Pattani as parts of the Thai people started. The government had undertaken forced assimilation policy by sacrificing the Pattani's identity. The Thai elites did not give an opportunity for natural assimilation

through political and cultural education. The forced integration had taken away the position of Malay leaders' i.e the nobles, religious leaders. They were the groups that lost their power and authorities after subjugated and controlled under the Thai government. Not surprisingly, those making vigorous attempts for the autonomy and independence of Pattani were among these elites. The movements were satrongly supported by commoners who had suffered from assimilation program conducted under the military and police supervision especially during the Pibun government.

CHAPTER VI

SEPARATISM AND MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (STUDY ON THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND)

Sri Nuryanti

*When sugarcane eaten by the elephant,
Then it's difficult for the elephant to vomit it.*¹

VI. 1 Introduction

Thailand four southernmost provinces, known as *Sempadan* region consists of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun (known as *Si Changwad*), has become conflicting region. These have been caused by the extreme differences between social structure of the society particularly in four Southern Thailand provinces and the rest of Thailand. These differences have grown into potential source of conflict that has triggered the emergence of separatist movement.

Society of Thailand reflect the undeniable fact of diversity that supposedly been preserved by Thai constitution. Thai constitution that guarantees an equal treatment to all Thai nationality regardless the existing difference, however, is powerless to prevent discrimination over Muslim group especially in the four Southern provinces of Thailand. Some may point that discriminations are still obviously occur in the four Southern provinces. This discrimination is in various form and sometimes come along with government policy that seen by people in the South very difficult to be implemented. The existence of differences between people in the South and the rest of Thailand namely on language, religion, historical memory and cultural affinity affects

¹ This sentence is a metaphor of the invasion of Thai Kingdom toward Pattani. These words have illustrated the eagerness of the movement people of Pattani to relieve themselves from Thai authority. Sugarcane is a metaphor for Pattani and Elephant is a metaphor for Thailand. It meant while Pattani is still under the authority of Thai Kingdom then there will be uneasy for Thailand to let Pattani free.

the dynamics of society in the four Southern provinces. In turn it's bringing different direction of the discourse of Thailand as a multi-culture country. This study will analyze the root causes of the emergence of separatist movement, the dynamic of separatist movement, and its relations with the dynamic of Thailand as a multi-culture country.

VI.2 Multicultural Society: Concept and Means in Thai Society

Multiculturalism has to be defined as a set of political ideals that aims to ensure that all socio cultural differences are not the source of anger. Multiculturalism is also aimed at advancing the level of equality and equity, such as in the campaign of anti discrimination program, employment equity, education, language training and other program that enhance understanding among every aspect of society. Certain level of awareness to which the degree of tolerance is exercised is ideally followed the above concept. Many policies have been developed in order to gain mutual understanding and optimum awareness of people to shave the disadvantage of any existing differences into something more worthwhile for the continuation of multicultural society.

In any of a multi-culture society, therefore, the ethnic segment of which has its own characteristic should be recognized. These different ethnic segments will not bound by similar political orientation. It is worthy to note that there are at least two division of root that makes up a diverse society: firstly, annexation of and to bigger nation and secondly, immigration.

The first division affected on territorial concentration and to some extent, forced assimilation to the bigger group of culture. Therefore, the 'minority nation' will likely to defend their own character and their independent culture. If not calling for autonomy, there will be extreme act: separatism, to regain their status as independent society.

The second division is signaling the voluntarily assimilation to the bigger group. Therefore, member of society will attempt to be assimilated into the bigger group and accepted as part of the bigger group. In this model of society building, most immigrants will seek recognition from the bigger group in order to make them well accepted

(Kymlicka, 2002:14). From above theoretical concept, it is easily being noted that the emergence of separatist movement may be driven by the will to preserve the special characteristic that well underpinned in the society.

In the context of analyzing the troubled areas in the four Southern Thailand provinces, the following aspects can be used as tools of analysis:⁶¹

- 1.) Factor of identity (Berreman 1991; Nagel 1986; Gaasholt 1989; Douglass 1988; Royce 1982).
- 2.) Historical background (Melville and Melville 1971; Smith 1978; Wolf 1982).
- 3.) Combination of other factors, among them: involvement of military, crisis, unequal economics/politics access, injustice, elite circulation, not ending the process of defining nationalism, etc. (Gurr 1993; Brown 93; Horowitz 1985).

This theoretical overview will illuminate the variety of ethnic conflicts; including religio-minority-based conflicts (Ellsworth, 1999)⁶². The discrimination faced by the Islamic minority group in Southern Thailand is the result of an accumulation of many problems. In Gurr's view, these problems include economic injustice, powerlessness or lack of political access, inequality in the distribution of revenues and the struggle to retain an original identity *vis-a-vis* the creation of a new identity.⁶³

In the case of Thailand, as already stated in earlier chapter, Thailand is consisting of various ethnicities. Approximately 64 to 65 million people inhabit Thailand, as already quoted in the chapter II. Thailand basically inhabited by various ethnic origin. In the Northern part as for example, various hill tribes (Lahu, Lisu, Hmong, Karen, etc) settled in the North border areas. They are minority groups, with

⁶¹ Some parts of this chapter also can be seen in Sri Nuryanti's paper on *Landscape of Intellectual Thought, the thought of Pattani identity and the emergence of resistance movement*, Asian Public Intellectual Workshop, Cebu, Philippines, 2002

⁶² See Kevin M. Ellsworth, 1999 International Studies Association Conference, 19 February 1999

⁶³ Ted Robert Gurr in *Minority at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1993, p. 38-40.

each distinctive character that makes up Thailand more culturally diverse. Minority group also inhabits the Southern part of Thailand. With each complete cultural institution, the Southern part of Thailand that dominated by Malay Muslim descendant settler is markedly different from that of minority groups in the Northern part. The Muslim community in the South used to be independent politically. After Pattani conquest by Siam in 1902, Pattani then to become vassal state of Thailand. As consequences of being vassal state, Sultan of Pattani has to oblige to what Siam has asked. As superb reactions towards the power of Siam, leader in Pattani start to fight against Siam. This struggle for regaining independence state of Pattani, continues up to nowadays.

The Siam government (later on it changed into "Thailand government") for a long period of time has neglected conflicts of identity, ethnicity and nation building in Pattani. The populous Islamic communities in Pattani have experienced massive discrimination, which has affected their sense of identity, their existence and their status of being powerless. To some extent this happened due to the nationalism of the Thais that forcefully applied, especially during Phibul Songkram's period of power.

Being a minority group, the Malay Muslims in the South especially, lack bargaining power in relation to the majority Buddhist Thais, resulting in cases of discrimination. These cases emerge as instances of vertical conflict rather than horizontal base conflict, reflecting a collision between the local identity and the national spirit. As a result, a resistance movement has arisen among the minority Muslims.

VI.3 The Emergence of Separatist Movement

The separatist movement in Southern Thailand had emerged and struggled against the authority of Thailand Kingdom over Sempadan region in Southern Thailand. The Sempadan region in Southern Thailand known as Changwad Chaiden Pak Thai has inhabited by Malay Moslem communities. They have their own behavior and customarily different from the rest of Thai communities. Based on historical overview,

most of the Moslem communities had had strong historical ties to Malay rather than to Thai. Beside most of them are Malay descendants and devoted to Islam, they closed linked to Malay behavior and customary, Malay spoken language with strong Kelantan dialect. Nevertheless, most of these communities have no sense of belonging to the Thainess of the Thai nation that have religion, customary, language, and behavior differ from them. Therefore, as Muslim minority in Thailand, they exhibit distinct characteristics as compared to the homogeneous majority. Given such distinctions, minority groups tend to preserve their original identities in the face of new inventions that endanger their ethnicity. As has been stated earlier, it will be analyzed through various approaches as follow:

VI.3.1. Factor of Identity

As has been briefly stated earlier, factor of identity that may different from others can create problem. In the making of Thailand national identity, Thai government supposedly recognizes the existence of difference in the society. The multi-culture society in Thailand with each of distinctive character somehow should be treated equally. However, the government basically fails to accommodate the different of identity of the people. This has created insurgencies in many Thailand's regions. Due to extreme distinction and the discrimination that occurred, the Southern regions visibly fight against the central authority of Bangkok in a series of insurgencies movement led by underground Muslim activist.

a. Geographical proximity and Nationalism

Based on its geographical proximity, Moslem communities not only inhabit the Sempadan region in the Southern region, but also in another Thai region. In Northern region of Thai, there are Chinese communities from Yunan. They had come to Thai after 1949. In the central region (Bangkok and its vicinity), the Moslem communities came from the foreign immigrants from Middle East and South Asian countries. In the

Northeastern region the Moslem communities came from Pakistan. However, the biggest part of Moslem communities lives in Southern region.⁶⁴ From the table of population below, it shown that Islam is dominant in the four provinces in the South. In the beginning, the different faith has no correlations to the dynamic interaction among people with different religion. Horizontal axis of people interaction is not interfering with the existence of differences. Later on, the religious difference is driven to be the so-called “prominent cause” of movement.

Table 1
Data of Population and Religion 2000*

<i>No</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Others</i>
1.	Patani	608,276	485,718	119,090	1,733	1,735
2.	Jala	358,011	279,705	74,730	2,691	865
3.	Narathiwat	671,649	529,398	89,262	1,380	1,987
4.	Satun	260,265	200,700	59,234	212	119
	Total	1,898,201	1,495,521	342,316	6,016	4,706

* Based on data collected by Islamic Committee of Pattani, 2000

Hence, different religion in general Thailand has become insignificant tool to analyze the root causes of the emergence of Pattani struggle against Thai authority and formed separatist movement. Earlier time, the separatist movement that emerged in the Southern region only is due to their unfulfilled demand especially relating to their effort to preserve their identity. To the Southern region, different religion between Islam and non-Islam only to become one of triggering factors to strengthen the movement. The basic cause of movement is closely related with the implementation of the Thai state policy to form Thai nationalism particularly under the government of Phibul Songkram.

⁶⁴ Interview with Chaiwat Satha-Anand, lecture of the Thammasat University, Bangkok, May 23rd 2004.

Under the authority of Phibul Songkram, Thai government had initiate to construct Thai nationalism by forcefully applying the Rattaniyom Principles, which given emphasize on Rattaniyom No.11 dealing with the “Daily activities of the Thais” as cited in the following quotation proclaimed that:

1. Thais should divide each day into three parts, that is, the time to carry out occupational tasks, the time to handle personal matters, and the time to rest. This should be conducted regularly as a habit.
2. Thais should carry out their daily activities as follow:
 - a. to punctually eat their meals not more than four times
 - b. to sleep for six to eight hours
3. Thais should attend to their respective tasks without becoming discouraged or evasive. And they should stop to rest and have lunch for a period of not over an hour. After the working hours in the evening, they should exercise by playing outdoor games for at least an hour, or engage in other tasks such as growing vegetables, raising animals or plants. After cleansing their bodies, they should have their meal.
4. Thais should use their spare time at night to finish off their work, converse with members of their families or friends, educate themselves by listening to the radio, reading, or go for entertainments or art exhibition.
5. Thais should spend their holidays in manners useful for their bodies or mind such as religious activities, listen to a sermon, make merit, study, travel, play games or rest.

The Rattaniyom No. 11 Principles enunciated the principle of Thainess of the Thai (having Thai culture, legitimize the authority of Thai King, and Thai religion, while in the matter of Thai religion almost always referring to Buddha). By applying the Rattaniyom principles, Phibul Songkram has the policy to indoctrinate ultra chauvinistic concept of the Thai culture, and put it on to a place that higher than other

culture. Many people have criticized the policy of Thai government during the authority of Prime Minister Phibul Songkram. The policy has long-term effect toward the continuity of Thai multicultural society especially which affected Moslem people in the Sempadan area in Southern Thailand. Thai Buddhists used to called Moslem in the Southern region as *Khaek* or visitor. It is simply reflect the rejection of the Thai society towards Muslim community to be part of the society. The stigmatized nickname maybe a fringe result of the least understanding of the differences in culture, customary, and religious obedience of the Muslim minority compared to Thai society in general. (Gowing)

As the consequence of Rattaniyom policy, there were many discriminations acts. This cultural distance has preserved the notion that 'foreigners' govern Malay Muslims in the South of Thailand, whose every effort at cultural assimilation is considered a threat to an ancestral identity. This in turn has nurtured resentment from the majority Thais who subject Muslims to many forms of discrimination, such as restricting their access to education, jobs and positions. Many discriminations cases could be the best example of discriminative behavior toward Moslem people in the Southern region. Many Moslem have problem with the limited job offer and future carrier. Some of them force to resign from their job.⁶⁵

Other example of the insensitivity of the government is the implementation of government policy to build statue in front of local government of Pattani. This project has been highly rejected by Pattani people. As reaction to the discriminative action towards the Muslim community, leader of Muslim community in Pattani called for local autonomy in the Southern provinces especially in Pattani. As to response to the above, Thai government has formulated particular policy toward Southern regions only (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun).

⁶⁵ Interview with one of former state employee that has been forced to resign because of the discriminative acts. As for example, he was prohibited to pray during office hour. Interview with resource person in Pattani, December 2001.

To the eyes of Pattani, the implementation of strict Thai nationalism has contradicted directly with their religion as Moslem. Thai central government through its policy has attempted to unite all aspect of Thai life into one Thai culture. In the implementation, it is affecting to the system of education, language, and to the formation of Pattani identity. Furthermore, it can be said that the emergence of separatist movement in the Southern region has been caused by the failure of central government to accommodate the differences in identity in the Southern region. Finally the central government has made up some of their policies such as the permit to reuse of Jawi language as the *lingua franca*, also the existing Pattani custom as the local daily custom. Therefore, it can be said that the main causes of the separatist movement in Southern region in general was the failure of Thai national identity assimilation program on the Muslim in the Southern region. (S. Yunanto, et.al., 2003)

As the reaction, people in Pattani has initiate such sporadic movement or even terror done by the well organized group or unorganized group. On the other hand, the government continually tried all efforts to implement the assimilation policy with expected result on the formation of the Thai nation building.

b. System of education

Since the beginning, the traditional education system in Pattani, is pondok/ponok system. This education system is proposed to deepen the religious knowledge, but not with studying the general knowledge. The implementation of national education policy has created three division of the education system in Southern provinces: namely *ponok* system, *madrasah* system/private Islamic school (student studying the general knowledge in the morning and studying religious knowledge in the afternoon), and national system (the public school that only taught the general knowledge). While the government currently allows private Islamic schools to teach Malay and Arabic, Islamic doctrine and local history, the long-term policy of secularization of education seeks to supplant the Islamic schooling system in the Muslim

areas. From the data on education below, it can be seen that the education system in the South is supported by establishing schools/madrasah system, and ponok or simply mosque that run education session in traditional way. The Islamic Committee of Pattani, as the formal government administrative institution launches many committee members to oversee the running of education in the populous Islamic area.

Table 4
Composition of Muslims Society organisations in Pattani 2001*

	<i>Name of District</i>	<i>District Comm-itee</i>	<i>Area Committee</i>	<i>Mosque</i>	<i>School</i>	<i>Teacher</i>	<i>Male Student</i>	<i>Female Student</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	Muang	3	18	61	71	408	3,898	4,359	8,257
2	Jaring	3	18	83	76	348	3,697	4,544	8,241
3	Panare	3	18	33	33	145	1,740	1,980	3,720
4	Teluban	3	18	76	80	324	3,239	3,301	6,540
5	Maikin	2	16	19	17	82	615	712	1,237
6	Kokpho	2	16	26	25	103	1,031	1,072	2,103
7	TYDeng	2	16	30	23	152	1,201	1,261	2,462
8	Mayo	3	18	66	73	407	3,618	4,078	7,696
9	Jarang	3	18	97	98	581	5,149	5,550	10,699
10	Melan	2	16	15	18	73	709	894	1,603
11	Nongcik	3	18	71	68	338	3,294	3,756	7,050
12	Kokpur	3	18	59	54	245	2,338	2,539	4,877
	Total	32	208	636	565	3,206	30,529	30,930	61,459

*From Data collected by Pustaka, Islamic Committee of Pattani, 2001

The introduction of private school system has affect to the continuation of ponok system. As the result, many *ponoks* have changed its role into *madrasah*. Some ponoks have even dissolved because there was no funding aid at all from the central government. Due to over On their dynamics, *ponok* has been accused to have link with the separatist movement. Ponok also been accused to become anti multi-culture because they have just studied on the *Kitab kuning* to empower Moslem society. In turn it assumed to create exclusiveness of Moslem people.

As has been stated earlier that the daily language in Pattani is Malay language with strong Kelantan dialect. Meanwhile, the alphabet language is Jawi language (using Arabic alphabet with the Malay pronunciations) (Hooker..). From the above mentioned, it is obvious that Pattani have different language affiliation from the rest of people in Thailand. The language matter here creates closer ties to Malay culture and custom rather than to Thai.

The language problem seems to be one of the important problems because the differences in language have mount the suspicion from the central government, particularly related to the usage of Malay Jawi language as a tool to hide agenda for rebel against Thailand authority. As the result, Thai government has urged to restrict the use of Malay Jawi language in Thailand (Hooker, *ibid*). The prolonged effect, the local newspapers with Malay Jawi language were prohibited and banned.

People of Pattani admit different historical memory from the other Thai. As have been mentioned that Pattani have closer ties to Malay rather than to Thai. A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt wrote in *Hikayat Pattani*⁶⁶ the meaning of Pattani,⁶⁷ exposing its old glory and airing its grievances after its conquest by Siam. From a traditional point of view, this history is the perfect reason to retain the spirit of Pattani. History inspires them to recreate the glory of old Pattani.⁶⁸ The resistance is the struggle against conquest by a foreign power.⁶⁹ The non-traditional view sees the history of Pattani as a precious thing of the past, a memory to reminisce about. Therefore, Pattani highly

⁶⁶ See A. Teeuw and D.K Wyatt, *Hikayat Pattani*, KITLV: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

⁶⁷ See for example the excerpt of Tashilu Nailil Amani, quoted by Hj. Wan Mohd. Saghir Abdullah, *Al 'allamah Syekh Ahmad Al Fathani, Ahli Fikir Islam dan Dunia Melayu*, Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1992, p. 57.

⁶⁸ Interviews with the traditional ordinary Muslim villagers indicate that they will support the movement for Pattani's independence. This analyses is based on some unrecorded interviews with various classified respondents in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat during field research, September-October 2001.

⁶⁹ Respondents mentioned that some people still could not accept the destiny of old Pattani after conquest by Siam. Therefore, there is no doubt that some people still strongly support every mechanism to bring back the glory of Pattani. This is based on interviews with formally educated intellectuals in Pattani and Yala, September-October 2001.

appreciate the monumental building to recalling their memory to the glorious Pattani in the past, such as their appreciation to Krue Sae Mosque and other sites. This Krue Sae mosque plays important role more than just a praying room, but also as a memorial site. Therefore, Pattani want to keep the mosque just in that way. Later on, the plan to refurbish Krue Sae Mosque has always been rejected because to people in Pattani, the renovation of mosque will destroy their historical memory of glorious Pattani in the past as well as the grievance when in hundreds people were burnt inside the mosque.⁷⁰

In current condition, Krue Sae mosque becoming central hot spot when many of Mujahideen were shot dead inside the mosque during April 2004 Krue Sae tragedy. Special explanation on this tragedy will be displayed in other section of this chapter.

VI.3.2 Historical Memory

Historically, Pattani used to be a well-known and prosperous kingdom in the past. The seaport has grown to be the biggest trading port in Southeast Asia (Wyatt, 1970). Pattani region has very wide area covering up to Senggora/Songkhla region. In playing its position as the biggest trading area, Pattani had involved in many relations with different nations and kingdoms, including Ayudhaya. Along with the fall of Malacca, under the power of Rama I (Chakri dynasty), Pattani has been invaded by Siam Kingdom, which centered in Ayudhaya in 1786. Under the authority of Siam Kingdom, Pattani began to struggle for regaining their independent.

Up to the twentieth century, the Thai kingdom introduced new administrative order to organize the local governmental system. It is called *Thesaphiban*. On this system, they had established *Monthon* (province) that led by *Kaluang Thesaphiban* and *Muang* (district) that led by *Phuwa Rachkan Muang*. Along with these dynamics, under the authority of Rama I in 1815, Pattani divided into seven smaller regions known as *Boriwen Ched Hua Muang* consists of Pattani, Nong Chik, Yaring, Saiburi, Legeh,

⁷⁰ Interview with some informans in Pattani, November-December 2001.

Yala, and Raman. On their dynamics, the seventh regions then has united into four regions in 1906 which consist of Pattani, Yala, Saiburi, and Rangek, under the authority of *Monthon* Pattani. In 1933, Thai has changed them into four Southern regions consist of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun/Setul. These have been done in order to control the authority of Thai over Pattani. And as the effect, traditional governmental system in Southern regions has demised. The traditional authority in Southern regions has been illegitimated. Later on, these have caused the emergence of some protests against Thai Kingdom.

In 1909, Pattani has formally become part of Thai region by the establishment of Anglo Siamese Treaty. By the establishment of this treaty then Pattani has become part of Thailand, while Trengganu, Kedah, and Kelantan still part of Malay region.

In turn, after Pattani fall under the rule of Thailand and the establishment of the new reorganization system has caused the emergence of movement. This could be simply understood because the Thai/Siam Kingdom has pushed the implementation of political policy in its regions. This is in fact strengthening the reason to against Thai government.

VI.3.3 Combination of Other Factors

According to many theories (Gurr 1993; Brown 93; Horowitz 1985), conflict that arouse also can be traced by the: involvement of military, crisis, unequal economics/politics access, injustice, elite circulation, not ending the process of defining nationalism, etc. Even though this will not be explained into detail, some parts will be elaborated.

a. Economic Interest

Based on data on its natural resources, Pattani is a rich region. Its economic profile in 2001-2002 has showed the rich of Southern region as the source of oil, fishery industries, and other economical resources. However, in fact that Pattani's standard of

living is still below the poverty line (<http://www.nesb.org>). Only few people such as Thai Buddhist and the Chinese have access to economic resources. There are many economical resources, such as fishery, crops and big trading activities but mainly occupied by the Thai Buddhist and the Chinese. On the other hand, people in Pattani just functioned as the complementary rather than as the stakeholder of the economic activity. People in Pattani mostly are fishermen, small enterprises, labor in the transportation sector, and unskilled labor. In the flux of economy, Muslim in Pattani are powerless and in periphery. Therefore, the emergence of movement partly caused by the big disparity among people's life in the South.

Based on the economic insights, it could be said the pipeline project as the collaboration project with the Malaysian government has create problem to Pattani. People in Pattani just receive the bad effect to its natural environment and ecological deterioration. Therefore, people in Pattani demanding for the compensation of environmental decline. But the call for compensate the worsened environmental above, got in a way. The government was never responded it. It just becomes additional reason to against the government.

On the local language, it has been said "Siamese people have green stomach", it meant the Thais are very greedy. They assumed that they would take all natural resources from the Southern region to keep the Thais wealthy. These have created big economic disparity and add on to reason for anti government feeling.

In another side, while the Thai government has offering more new job opportunities, most of Moslem people in the Southern region are unable to fulfill the requirements. This caused by significantly low level of education attained by most people in the South. Many of Moslem student who pursue the degree outside the country, fail to obtain stamp of certification from the government. Further result, the Moslem students graduated mostly from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Islamic countries in Middle East can easily to get a job in government institution. Therefore, when they went back home to Pattani, they just able to get a job as *ustadz* or religious teacher in

madrasah (Islamic religious school). The Thai language ability is the major parameter to the process of a job acceptance. General assumption believe that student whom graduate from school in Thailand have more abilities to speak and write in Thai language, and understand perfectly of all aspects of Thai's life. Meanwhile, the graduate students from foreign school or university have less ability in Thai language. Even nowadays, Thai language have been applied everywhere, this assumption related to the abilities in Thai language is remain unchanged.

b. Internal Migration

Internal migration, which aimed at distributing population from the heavy crowded areas to the less populous area, is assumed to be the best way to make population balance. However, the implementation of Thai migration policy from the Northern part has worsened economic disparities among Moslem communities and non-Moslem communities in the recipient areas. The government policy to migrate people from the Northern part to the Southern part, particularly during the government of Sarit Thanarat in 1970s, is not a simple matter.

In the beginning, the migration policy is set up to respond to the problem of population density and it is proposed to enhance the living standard of the people (save settlement). By that time, each family has been given farmland covers 25 rais⁷¹ and a house covers 5 rais. They can earn living by farming on the given land and stay on the given house. In the beginning, it is seen that this is good policy to make population balance. It is also aimed at making a balance population on the Southern region in the mean of a balance between Moslem and Buddhist people. But, the result is neither the balance population nor the balance of religious adherent. It resulted at the cultivation of hidden conflict between people. Nowadays, it has been agitated as part of reason to confront the government.

⁷¹ Rais is measurement for land that equal to 1600 square meter. 2,5 rais will equal with 1 acre.

The migration program to the Southern region has part of government program for 75 years. The project has run not less than 40 years. During 75 years, the project is aimed at the balance quantity of population in Southern region between Moslem and Buddhist people, as well as enhancing the quality of life for both people: the migrant and the indigenous.

The other Thai government program related to the distribution of population is migration of the government employee from the Northern region to fulfill the government position in the Southern region. This pattern has supporting the emergence of the movement of Pattani.

VI. 4. Historical Analysis of Separatist Movement

Theoretically the separatist movement could be explained that the movement has aims against the idea of modernization, the strong feeling of nativity, and problem in give meaning of nationalism (Munson, 1984). In this matter, separatist movement in Pattani could be explained as the movement that reject modernization that done through the new nation building policy. The *Thesaphiban* model of governance and the modernization purpose are implemented through the introduction of new system of education.

The *Thesaphiban* system is basically very centralistic, because all of the decision-making policy has to be decided nationally. This has been formulated to strengthen the control of central government toward local autonomy of the regions. As the effect, the decision of local government has been highly influenced by the central government. The local traditional leaders have lost their authority by using the *Thesaphiban* system of governance. This new system of governance has reduced the authority of local traditional leaders and the religious leaders in Pattani automatically. As the effect, the *Thesaphiban* system in the extreme side could be seen as another factor for the emergence of protest by Pattani traditional society to the central government.

Meanwhile, based on Law of National Education, the government has created the national curriculum that have to be applied into all level of national education institutions. To the eyes of Pattani, the new education system is seen as a thread of the existence of the Malay culture, as well as thread to the understanding of Islamic custom and tradition. Hencefort, some people in Pattani have rejected the implementation of national education system.

Some of them whom have accepted the national education system believe that it could be implemented without ignoring the religious knowledge, but could be the fusion of religious and the non-religious knowledge. By the fusion of the two systems, it has created the *madrasah* system, the system in which not only teaching general knowledge in the morning but also teaching religious knowledge in the afternoon.

The separatist movement can also be seen as struggle against ultra nationalist concept that indoctrinates the Rattaniyom principles. As have been widely known that Rattaniyom created by Phibul Songkram in 1939 had the aims to replace the cultural traditions accustomed by the minority people and changed it into national looks of culture. The main aim of the policy based on the effort above was the establishment of Thai nation with one character. By using this law, Malay Muslim in the Southern provinces were prohibited to wear Malay clothing and practice Malay custom. The Malay Muslim in Pattani has been prohibited to speak the Malay language. In line with above restriction, some people in Pattani said that they force to pay respect the Buddhist statues. (Che Man, 1990:65;, Na Saiburi, 1994). Those experiences had worsening the dynamics of relation among people in the South.

Another study conducted, said that the dynamic of Pattani separatist movement is influenced by the dynamic of Pan Islam movement in Middle East. The anti Western, anti imperialist, and later on attached with anti Thai, has driven Pattani separatist movement to become more militant. (Crossroads, Vol. 3, No. 2-3, 1987)

The militancy of separatist movement, internally could be seen from the influence of the Pattani students whom have education background in Middle Eastern countries and their network that have been built with similar movement in Middle East. Meanwhile, the pushing factor that strengthens militancy of the Pattani separatist movement was the government's policy to forcefully apply the Rattaniyom policy and the implementation of new Law on National Education. As the effect, as Chaiwat Satha-Anand said that "the more solid and repressive state, the more violence will be harvested".⁷²

The problem emerged between the central government and Pattani, therefore is easily predicted and it will erupt at any time especially when the government fail to recognize the difference that exist. The more central government restrict the Muslim community without respecting their identity and the differences that exist, the different interest between the two will be mounted.

Furthermore, the worsening problem between the Muslim community and the non Muslim community and the collision of interest sooner or later will influenced the dynamics of the society. In the beginning, the society was able to respect each other or at least learn to understand the differences between them. Later stage, the society starts to get influence. The society started looking at their differences as the sources of conflict of interest with other societies. As the effect, some cases have shown that the societal bond is exercised. In this analysis, many cases were proven example of exercising the societal ties of the society.

Explaining the movement against the Thai government by people in Pattani can be explained as in the following:

⁷² Interview with Chaiwat Satha Anand, lecture of Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, May 2004.

1. The Struggle of Malay Kingdoms (1900-1933)

From the previous explanation, it could be said that movement that tend to form separatist movement has been erupted by Pattani people since long time ago. The struggle of Pattani against the Thai central government started ever since the invasion of Pattani by the Siam Kingdom.

The historical analysis of Pattani separatist movement could be traced back especially when Pattani was under Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin authority. As the King of Pattani, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin had struggled against Thai government since 1901. This struggle is as to respond to the failure of negotiation of the Singapore Governor General, Sir Frank Swettenham to change the Siam policy toward Pattani. (Nik Mahmud, 1954:11)

R.W. Duff, one of British businessman who wants to have economic accesses over Legeh region, mole to the decision of the King of Pattani to against Thai government. He informed British Kingdom about the plan to rebel. Based on other consideration, British Kingdom has informed the plan to rebel to the Siam Kingdom. Therefore, to response to the information, Phraya Sri Shahadhep has met Tengku Abdul Kadir in October 23rd, 1901.

In the next day, Phraya Sri Sahadhep has sent a letter to Tengku Abdul Kadir in Siamese language and asks Tengku Abdul Kadir to sign up the letter. The letter seems to be explained as if it is order to Phraya Damrong Rachanupap (Thai Minister of Internal Affairs) to give follow up to the demand of Tengku Abdul Kadir. In the beginning, Tengku Abdul Kadir has rejected to sign up the letter. However, after he was convinced that the letter as the response to Tengku Abdul Kadir's demand, Tengku Abdul Kadir decide to signed up the letter. Tengku Abdul Kadir believes that the letter is exactly similar to what has been literally mentioned to him. After the letter has been signed up, it is legally approve that Tengku Abdul Kadir agree upon the implementation of the Thesaphiban system. By the very tricky action above, it is obvious that Tengku Abdul Kadir was set up to accept the Thesaphiban governance system.

Knowing that he has been set up when signing up the letter, Tengku Abdul Kadir has protested to Phraya Damrong. The negotiation held in Nongchik in November 31st, 1901. The result of the negotiation, the Thesaphiban system will still be implemented in Pattani whatsoever. As the effect, in 1902 Tengku Abdul Kadir sent another letter to Lord Swettenham again to ask for help from Singapore to mitigate the Pattani problem. Before the help from Singapore shown its positive result, Tengku Abdul Kadir has been arrested by Siam Kingdom in February 21st 1902 and has been put in a jail in Pitsanulok. After the approach done by Sir Frank Swettenham, Tengku Abdul Kadir has been released. Finally, Tengku Abdul Kadir moved to Kelantan until he passed away in 1933.

2. The Struggle of Ulamas (1943-1954)

The struggle of ulamas has started since Haji Sulong or Abdul Kadir Tukmina had established syariat named Haiyah Nafaz Al Ahkam al Syariat or Council of Syariah. During the meeting in October 28th 1943, the council has elected Haji Sulong as the Judge or Kadi for Pattani. This decision has not been legitimatised by the Thai Kingdom even if people in Pattani have recognized the authority of Haji Sulong. Based on the high respect to Haji Sulong, people in Pattani accept the rule and leadership of Haji Sulong. As a consequence, Pattani become more alienated from the power of Thai Kingdom.

Under the power of Pridi Panomyong as the Pusamrech Rachakan Taen Prang (Authority of the King), Thai government created the Law of Islamic Governance (Praracha Banyat Sasnupatham Fai Islam) and it is under Chularachamontri supervision. Chularachamontri or the Islamic religious leader is established in the Thai Kingdom to oversee the implementation of the Law. Having established of Chularachamontri, then the Thai Kingdom has established Central Council of Islamic Religion (Kamakan Islam Pracham), and Council of Mosque (Kamakan Islam Pracham Masjid). Based on this law, in the region with Moslem majority will be supervised by Region Council of Islamic

Religion, as to follow the policy of establishing Chularachamontri. (Chapakia, 2001, ibid.) In July 1945, the ulamas in the fourth regions have met to elect the Region Council of Islamic Religion. The meeting has elect Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir as the chairman of Council of Islamic Religion in Pattani, Haji Mustafa bin Haji Awang in Yala, Haji Nikjid Suda'o in Narathiwat, and Lebai Che Abdullah Langputih in Satun. The roles of Region Council of Islamic Religion not only related to the implementation of Islamic syariah but also to become mediator to solve the problem between the society and the government.

In later development, the Council of Islamic Religion has seen the gap of the government policy toward Moslem people. Then Haji Sulong sent 7 protests in April 3rd, 1947 as stated in the following:

1. The elections of local leaders in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun that have full authority to dissolve and remove all of the local state employee in the fourth regions. The leaders should be the native people in the fourth region and will be elected by the people through general election.
2. Among 80 percents of local state employee in the fourth regions were Malay Moslem people.
3. Malay language has to be accepted as the legal language.
4. The curriculum in the elementary school should have been changed, and Malay language is allowed to become legal language.
5. The Islamic law has to be applied in the fourth regions by functioning the Islamic court that separate and independence from the central government system.
6. All of the taxes collected from the fourth regions have to be used to enhance the welfare people in the fourth regions.
7. The Region Council of Islamic Religion has to be given full authority to establish Islamic law to solve the problems related to the Muslim affairs and Malay culture.

Based on those objections, it could be clearly seen the demand of Haji Sulong were basically the calling for autonomy of the Muslim in Southern provinces. The seventh demands were roughly fulfilled by the central government, except the first point. Unfortunately, before their demand have come to real, there was the replacement regime in the Thai Kingdom with the reign of Phibul Songkram as the Thai Prime Minister.

As Prime Minister, Phibul Songkram has come to power for the second times in April 8th, 1948. Afterward, the Moslem people in Southern regions begun to start. During his second term, Phibul Songkram has tried to reevaluate his assimilations policy in the past that has caused the movement. However, Phibul Songkram's effort was not succeed.

In 1948, Haji Sulong and his three colleagues were arrested under the subversive acts. He was accused to be the responsible person of the movement against the Thai government. After the arrest of Haji Sulong, the movement has grown fast and continued by the Muslim. The arrest of Haji sulong has mounted the anger of Muslim in the fourth Southern regions. As the result, there were many riots and battles between Muslim against polices and military officers. There were many victims of Moslem people. Some of them decided to move to Malaysia.

The biggest struggle of Moslem people happened in Dusun Nyiur of Narathiwat in 1948. Thousands people have struggled against Thai polices and has caused more than one hundred people were killed. Even Haji Sulong has been put in jail for 3 years, this is not decreasing factor of Muslim separatist movement in the Southern provinces. Haji Sulong has been honored as the Father of Pattani Independence Movement. Haji Sulong has been killed secretly in 1954. It even ignites more spirit for creating Pattani independence movement. (Bunnag, 1988:20)

VI. 5 The Dynamic of Separatist Movement

As has been mentioned above, separatist movement in Sempadan of Southern Thailand could be traced back from the struggle done by Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin that had refused to pay golden flower as homage to Siam Kingdom. His act has been judged as the sign of rebel toward authority of Siam Kingdom. The objection of Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin has end up with the arrest of Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin in 1903 by Siam Kingdom and was put in a jail in Phitsanulok for 10 years. The approach that involves Governor General of Singapore, Sir Frank Swettenham, has resulted at the release of Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin. However, in 1915, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin has been arrested again. This time, Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin was charge to commit subversive action against the Siam Kingdom. Having pressure from the Siam Kingdom, then Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin has seek asylum from Kelantan and move there until he passed away in 1933. His son, Tengku Mahmoud Mahyideen, has continued his struggle. (Haemindra, 1976)

Since struggle against Thai authority is started and it kept continue up to nowadays, the dynamic of separatist movement has more colorful. The sporadic movements are done either through well-organized groups or non-organized groups (underground groups, without having clear affiliation).

The movement against authority of Siam Kingdom mostly aims at recreating glorious Pattani and ultimately, to make Pattani independence. From the development point of view, the movement can be divided into the following argumentations:

1. The Un-organized Movement

Since Pattani has fallen into Thai authority, there were many sporadic struggles done by the Pattani against the Thai government. The education policy that excerpt in the Compulsory Primary Education Act 1921 (The Law of National Education) has worsened the problem. This is caused by the existence of the law on education has urged

the implementation of a national curriculum that designed by Thai government. This education system has its task to all of the students to learn Thai language, and then it has been particular problem to education system in the Southern regions.

The traditional system of education in the *ponok*, is considered as most suitable for teaching Muslim values. The new education system (the *kingdom* system of education) supposedly distorts the delivery of Muslim values. Therefore, since the law of National Education has declared, there are problem in education system in the Southern provinces. Some *ponoks* refused to implement new education system. They argue that national education system will destroy their cultural affinity to their Malay ancestor and more important is it will later on destroy the teaching of Islam. Some *ponoks*, which adopt the kingdom education system, has changed from traditional *ponok* into *madrasah* or registered Islamic school (*rongrian aekachon sonsasana Islam*). Meanwhile, by using the new education system, then Thai Kingdom has opportunity to launch many public schools in the Moslem communities. (Che Man, 1990:97)

Based on their view above, some *ponoks* are accused to be the center for sporadic and un-organized movement against Thai authority. Some, who burnt latex or other material that easy to be burned in many corners of the city, were somehow associated with the teachings in the *ponok*. It is believe that teaching in *ponok* will only cites *Kitab kuning* or material that printed in the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, they are more militant in a way to react to any governmental policies. They are assumed to be narrower minded in seeing things. That is why *ponok* is easily accused to breed militant activists and *ponok* also accused as a center for seeding the anti Thai feeling.

Underground activities and un-organized movement, however, basically do not need such affiliation. In some cases of small chaos in Pattani, Yala or Narathiwat recent times, the activities were probably only be done by one person or few person. The effect of the brutality done by few people is sometimes so easily widespread.

2. The Well-Organized Movement

The dynamics of separatist movement among Moslem people in the Southern regions against Thai government could be said already shifted into modern way by establishing the well-organized movement. Some well-organized movements which have significant roles such as:

2.a GAMPAR (Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya)

GAMPAR was established in Kotabahru in March 5th, 1948. This movement has close ties with *Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaka* (PKMM) that has their basis in Malaysia. Members of GAMPAR were Muslim Malay in Pattani. Even the leader was not Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen, many people still believe in Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen as the main player behind GAMPAR. This movement has aims to release Pattani from Thailand influence. The movement was sporadic movement, as similar with the rebellious movement happened in Kampung Belukar Samok in 1947 and in Dusun Nyiur in 1948.

GAMPAR spitted since Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen passed away in 1953. Based on the initiative of one prominent member, GAMPAR has been refunctioned, and Tengku Abdul Jalal (Adul Na Saiburi) has established BNPP in 1959. (Che Man, 1999:98)

2.b BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani)

BNPP has been known as the National Liberation Front of Pattani, established in 1959, has its basis in Kelantan. Their movement aimed at regaining freedom of Pattani. They tend to be not compromise to the idea of autonomy given by the Thai central government. Their model of movement is not only by using tactical acts such as political approaches, but also using guerillas method. Idris bin Mat Diah or known as Pak Yeh also known as the criminal leader, join the BNPP and become the leader of guerrilla movement. Pak Yeh and Seng Lukmaiphai including their followers have consolidated

their movement in four regions in the South in 1960. As for example of their movement, they distributed written text in Jawi language to build public opinion that there will be many Buddhist teachers kidnapped and public schools will be burned down. By using these leaflets, they have said the movement will be done until the independence of Pattani is reached.

In Januari 1975, there was separatist movement named themselves "Black 1902 or Grey 1902". The name of 1902 has been used to remind of the tragedy in 1902 while King Rama V has changed the administration over region, that in turn it is greatly put Pattani in the worst condition until nowadays. Their leaflets have been sent out everywhere by saying there will be many terrorist attacks with the main target of Buddhist Communities in the Southern regions. The following events had happened later as the evident of the written words in the distributed leaflets such as the killing of Thai Buddhist while he is in the forest using M16 guns. No witness of the killing. In the following day, there was Buddhist teacher in Rhaman, Yala region, that has been killed and his dead body has been sent home. This happened also without witness. (Ladd, 1975: 17-18)

The BNPP movement has more activities while many foreign students such as Badri Hamdan, Abdul Fatah Omar, and Hannan Ubaidah, that have finished their study in AL Azhar University, Cairo have joined BNPP. They have established Pattani House as the base camp of BNPP in Cairo.

In Egypt, the association of Pattani students has established Akhon (Brother) as the organization with its aim primary at promoting education for younger Pattani. Later on Akhon has function more on the education basis for younger Pattani and to support the Pattani Liberation Front, when they back home to Pattani. (Che Man, *ibid*, 1999).

Badri Hamdan in turn replaced the position of BNPP leader, Tengku Abdul Jalal who has passed away in 1977. Under the leadership of Badri Hamdan, BNPP has grown into more aggressive in struggling for their political interests. BNPP also has done military exercises with more organized way.

2.c BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional)

Ustadz Abdul Karim Hasan has established BRN in March 1963. The aim of BRN was the establishment of Republic Pattani. The BRN movement has not use the guerilla ways, but by approaching the ponok leaders. From 1963 through 1968, BRN has done much influence on the ponoks in Yala and Narathiwat. In 1968 Ustadz Abdul Karim Hasan and other BRN leaders have decided to keep their underground activities.

2.d PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization)

PULO in the beginning is known as Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Pattani. In the beginning, PULO has been established in India by Tengku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman) after he graduated from Muslim University of Aligarh. Tengku Bira Kotanila then moved to Mecca to build its basis to recruit young Pattani. PULO movement has its own character to be secular nationalism movement.

In order to response to the security threat from the Southern region, central government has built special security force consists of the fusion of military, civilian, and police. This special security force named CPM 43, which is administratively under ACASBP (Administrative Center for the Administration of Southern Border Provinces). These two organizations were established to anticipates the separatist movements that endanger the security of Sempadan Southern Thailand.

Pattani society believed that the fusion of security force above is meant to seek any information relating to underground activities and activists who plan for rebel and endangering security condition. The task force also to cease the underground activists as well as the sympathizers related to the rebel activities executed by the well-organized organization such as PULO, BRN, and other organization.⁷³

⁷³ Based on the interview with the local people of Pattani that the force of CPM have done many patrol over the urban areas in Pattani region, and asking the local people whether they know the basis of the underground activists.

However, the government terminates the activities and dismisses either CPM 43 or ACASBP since May 1st, 2002. The only component that still active up to nowadays is International Security Operation Command Area 4 and its military force (ISOC 4). ISOC 4 has task to host such preventive action and when it is necessary, they seek alternative measures to solve the problem in the Southern region.

Relating to security tension and condition in the Southern border provinces, the New Security law has been formulated to oversee the security condition of the region. If the Law is fully implemented, therefore to some extent it is hoped to reduce the tension of security condition in the South. The special law on security over Sempadan region above also functioned as legal document to take action to preserve peacefull condition in the Southern border provinces.

VI. 6 Towards Multi-culture Society

It is important to be noted that the dynamics of Muslim community in the four Southern border provinces is greatly influenced by many factors as explained earlier. In order to reach the aim of multi culture state, therefore, Thailand has to face problem especially when dealing with the existence of Muslim minority group in the four Southern border provinces. In the following explanation, at least there were two remarkable tragedies where it can be seen that the bond of multi culture society is exercised

1. Krue Sae Tragedy, 28 April 2004

The bloody event in April 28th, 2004 has been related to the previous events, such as the stolen 300 guns from the military post in Narathiwat in January 4th, 2004. This stolen case has been followed by the riot and ended up with 4 people dead, and 21 public schools were burned down. In the previous time, in December 2001 until Januari 2004, it can be said that there were many cases includes riots happened in the Southern region. However, many people have said that the government only sees those (almost 500

cases) as the common criminal case, without trying to see its political connotation.⁷⁴ If the government carefully looking at the political dimension of any significant incident, maybe the security condition in the South can be properly handled.

Prior to the riot in Krue Sae Mosque, there were another significant cases that arguably linked with the tragedy of Krue Sae Mosque in April 28th, 2004, such as the killing of Buddhist monk in Narathiwat in January 22nd, 2004 by slashing the neck by knife from the front. The previous event that similarly happened was the murder of the Buddhist monk in Yala and Pattani regions. The Buddhist monks who got killed were at the oldest age 65 years old to the youngest age 13 years old. This has soared the message that even the respective Buddhist monks can be killed. Therefore, it has caused deep impression that the social bond in the community has been broken.. It also means that the society tolerance to different religious devotee has decreased. By the killing of Buddhist monks above, it is approved that the social relationship condition is worst.

Tragedy Krue Sae Mosque in April 28th 2004 was chronologically can be detected since the incoming of Mujahideen in Krue Sae Mosque, one day before April 28th 2004. The Mujahideen group consists of the people who wore special clothing and wear head cap. The incoming of Mujahideen into Krue Sae Mosque has been related to the attack of some police posts around the mosque. These attacks have killed some polices, and has created anger of the security force. General ISOC that has his post in Pattani has given curfew up to six hours to negotiate with the Mujahideen in the Krue Sae Mosque. The ISOC General (Phallop Pimnae) claimed that the negotiation would fail. Therefore, the upcoming possibilities were another attacks. The night attacks will make security force in difficult situation. They have assumption that during the dark, any combat will probably reaching wrong target. Then, they decided to wait until sunrise.

⁷⁴ Based on interview with political observer from Prine Songkla University, Pattani, May 2004.

Meanwhile, another version said that Chawalit Yongchaiyud as the Thai Minister of Defense has not ordered the attack to the Mujahideen inside the Krue Sae Mosque. However in the morning of April 28th 2004, there were attacks to the police and security force's posts nearby that scattered in the 10 hot spots in the Southern region. As the effect, the security force have gunned the Mujahideen that primarily hidden inside the mosque and to around the 10 hot spots with automatic guns, even RPGs and grenades. Meanwhile, among the Moslem people later on have been founded 26 guns and the rest of the weapons were traditional weapons such as knife, machetes, etc.

As the victims, there were 113 people got killed with 32 Mujahideen shot dead inside the Krue Sae mosque other victims were dead in the 10 different places. Based on the government version of information, among the dead victims were 17 youth that committed as drug addicted. This been objected by the Muslim side because there were evidence that those 17 youth were the best soccer players from one tamboon. They were the youth from Ban Suulok. Based on another fact, it has been identified that the 4 victims have the same family name.

In the same month, there was an effort from the Prime Minister Deputy to search for non-radical alternative policy to solve the problem in the Southern regions. This is as has obviously formulated in the blue print proposed by Chaturong Chaiseng toward the Thai government in April 17th 2004. Unfortunately this proposal has been rejected, even though many people believed that the blue print would become the appropriate alternative solution toward the problem in the Southern provinces.

2. Tak Bai Tragedy

Many people were killed during Tak Bai tragedy, which happened at outside Tak Bai district police station, Narathiwat area, on October 25th, 2004. Many protesters, about 80 people were died from suffocation in crowded army trucks while being taken to detention. Most of the victims were Muslims. This tragedy was then heightening tension between Buddhist and Muslims who previously coexisted harmoniously in the

South. This tragedy is another big tragedy that approves the broken ties of society between two different groups of religious adherents, namely Muslim and Buddhist.

As yet already been well understood that since the government is likely ignoring the latent conflict between the Muslim and Buddhist group, the riot easily erupted. The government seems to act unjustly to deal with the above tragedy. The treatment given to the protesters were widely criticized because the police officers treat badly to them. The protesters, with half naked body, were asked to put their face down to the earth with their tightened hand over their head. They later on have been transported to detention by few trucks. Some reports said that there were only 4 trucks available to transports all of protesters with more than thousand people in quantity. Therefore, many of the protesters were injured and got killed.

The above two tragedy are clear example of the deteriorating relation between Muslim and Buddhist in the South.

VI.7 Multi-Culture Society: Closing Note

Almost every society is in the condition of multi culture. In the case of Thailand, the concept of Multi culture state has been wrongly implemented. Multi culture state is just as jargon that had been used to manipulate the ultra nationalist concept. The application of many policies especially in term of national building toward the unity of Thailand, is merely not recognized the difference that exist in the Thai society in general.

Therefore, the series tragedy is clear evident of the clash of interests in building the national identity. The emergence of separatist movement simply can be understood as a way to react upon the government ultra nationalist idea. The emergence of separatist movement, therefore, simply could be understood as reactions toward the government policy that seems to be endangered the Muslim identity.

The state leader has tried to establish the national value that should be respected by all member of society. However, the Thai government fails to recognize the difference in the society that has not been accommodated when the government implementing the constitution. Muslim community, especially in the four Southern border provinces whom been neglected by the government, have acts against the authority. In earlier, there is not really correlated with the different religious value, rather on the ideal formation of national identity. But, later on, it is turn to be more complicated by asserting religious differences. Therefore, in one hand, the government attempt to form national identity, while on the other hand, the government fails to recognize the difference of the society. Therefore, it can be conclude that the discourse of Thai as multi culture state has been challenged by the existence of differences of the society. When the governments can not response to the need of the people, therefore separatism is thought as the correct way to solve the problem.

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Erni Budiwanti and Cahyo Pamungkas

When the Malay Muslim sultanates' areas of were conquered, the earlier step conducted by King Chulalongkorn was the territorial consolidation to extend his control and authority over these territories. To gain full control over the southern border provinces, the Thai government divided the Malay Sultanate' territories to weaken their power, so that they would not be united, and easily to be controlled. These territories were divided into 7 provinces and then united into 4 provinces (Narathiwat, Satun, Pattani, and Yala).

All the bureaucratic network linking up the Southern region with other parts of Thailand were centralized in Bangkok. The centralization was meant to strengthen the legitimacy as well as the grip of the Thai King over the Southern area. Centralisation was a means to exercise control to gain full authority upon the former Malay Sultanate's domain. However, King Chulalongkorn was only successful in making territorial integration. He failed to breed the sense of belonging a Thai nation among the Muslims of Pattani. The government was unsuccessful in producing the sense of loyalty toward the Thai royal kingdom. This was because the royal government concentrated more on the maintenance of Thai state boundaries, and the establishment of socio-political infrastructure connecting the Center and provinces of southern region. It did not look over the mental development of the Pattani especially after being united socially, culturally, and politically with the Thai royal government represented the Thai-Buddhists majority.

Political incorporation of the Pattani into the Thai sovereignty had made the Malay sultanates loose nearly all of their power and authorities to rule in the South. Bureaucratic system centralized in Bangkok had deprived them from managing and

controlling local human resources as well natural resources available in the South. Political integration conducted through centralized bureaucracy had enabled the Bangkok government to take over the control upon the tax and other local revenues available in the South. The power of taxation and collection of local revenues, previously belonged to the Malay Sultanates, was transferred to central government in Bangkok. In this case the Pattani were deprived from political, economic, cultural and religious autonomy.

After being incorporated into Thai sovereignty, the religious autonomy of the Malay Muslim Pattani was abolished. The central government removed the role of Islamic religious court as well as Muslim judge (Qadi) in settling matters especially on marriage, inheritance, and divorce. The removal of religious autonomy showed the extension of government's control over Muslim jurisdiction. State authorities changed the Muslims' judicial system with the secular Thai civil laws. The state expanded Thai's judicial authority and the centralized law bureaucracy over the Muslims' domain. After the political incorporation, the Islamic laws (especially in matters dealing with the above cases) were subordinated under the Thai legal system. The government conceived that strong adherence of Islamic laws had discouraged the Pattani to accept Thai values as fundamental base of nationalism. The government proposed to loosen Pattani's attachment toward their customary and religious values by imposing compulsory education program for three years. The compulsory education program was followed by the use of Thai as official language, modernization and secularization of school curriculum. Secular curriculum was forcefully integrated in the pondok and madrasah schools focusing on Thai language, culture, history, and Buddhism. Compulsory education and the inclusion of secular subjects in pondok school were expected to reduce the role of pondok as an autonomous local institution, as well as to decrease the involvement of young pupils. Thai government undermined the Patton's pondok school system as hindering nationalization (Thai-ification) and modernization. In government's view, the Pondok School built loyalty toward Malay ethnocentrism, and a place to stir

up feeling of anti government. In short assimilation was intended to inculcate sense of Thai nationalism at the expense of Patton's religion and cultural identities. Thai's repressive cultural policy was also conducted through dressing style and table manner, eradicating further the symbols of Islam. However, when the government aware of the increasing protests and resistance among the Pattani due to repressive cultural and educational policies, it started to swing to accommodate Muslims' interest in restoring Islamic laws.

The constitutional monarchy marked the swing from repressive assimilation policy toward the more accommodative one. Both of the forced assimilation (during the Pibun time) and accommodation (during the Pidri time) failed to develop sense of Thainess among the Pattani.

The accommodative policy was conducted, among other things, by reviving Islamic laws. This was apparent from the opening of Islamic court and the reposition of Muslim judge, and many other concessions given by the government. In fact the Pattani felt an urgent need for political autonomy that guaranteed their freedom to have their own administrative government and ruler. In their view, economic, educational, religious, and cultural autonomy can only be achieved through political autonomy. In this respect, though the Pidri government had restored Muslims' religious rights, Malay Muslims of Pattani remained dissatisfied and kept their spirit of resistance. This was mainly because religious autonomy was insufficient for them. What they really wanted was political autonomy.

The early separatist movement was built around Malay solidarity extended to other Malays living in the Malay peninsular. The aristocrats supported by the ulama took a leading role in this movement. They previously were the ruling elites who, after the forced integration, lost authority and control over people living in Southern territory.

The Pattani, fled to Malaysia, felt they better to live with their Malay brothers in the peninsular, rather than to be controlled under the oppressive infidel rulers and were forced to live in distress and bitterness. Malay solidarity was extended to convey Pan Malay Muslims across the peninsular. Ethno-nationalism movement among the Pattani was not only to achieve an independent Pattani - free from the Thai oppression - but also to be united with Malays majority in the Federation of Malaysia.

Some separatist groups were formed to achieve greater pan Malay movement and to incorporate Pattani into the federal states of Malaysia. Other organizations wanted to establish an independent Islamic state of Pattani, separated from Malaysia. This struggle marked the expectation of reviving an autonomous Pattani Sultanates prior to the Siamese' subjugation.

Each of the Pattani Liberation Fronts generally had its own militia, gained support from the Pattani people, as well as from other Malays in the Peninsular and Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Lybia. International supports provided them with military equipments, financial aid, and military trainings. Mass support was likely based on kinship and affinity, ethnicity, Islam, and brotherhood of common religion (*ikhwanul Muslimin*).

The aristocrats no longer dominated leadership of the liberation fronts. Recent development, especially since 1970s, religious figures also took leading position in the movements, supported by the aristocrats. Religious leaders became the backbones of separatist struggles against Thai government. Though many of them suffered internal friction due to different ideological struggle, in several occasions they had gun fights with Thai's arm forces and polices.

Muslim Malays of Pattani were forced to live under the state jurisdiction of Thai Buddhists who had marginalized them culturally, politically, and economically. The Thai government failed to educate them as belonging to the Thai citizenship, and form their allegiance or adherence to the kingdom as well as to Thai values centralized on Buddhism. The Pattani felt a great distant from the Thai government and people

geographically, historically, culturally, economically, and politically. The Thai officials who in many ways did not command the Malay language and understand their culture controlled the government bureaucracy in the South. Socio-economic gap between the Thai officials controlling Southern region with the Pattani was obvious. The regional disparity worsened the relation of the four provinces in the South with other provinces in the North of Thailand.

The government did not pay so much attention to the process of natural assimilation, such as through political education, in integrating the Pattani. Forced assimilation marked by the penetration of values and regulations had created hatred, suspicion, protest and resistance. In the long run it is difficult to maintain the unification as well as the harmonious relation between the Pattani and the Thai, unless the government is willing to respect the rights of the Muslims in this region in all aspects of lives.

Nation state Thai was built under the hegemony of the Thai majority over the Pattani minority. Multiculturalism established on the basis of fulfilling minority rights remained to be ideal discourse developed among the academic and the rhetorics of the elites. In real practices it never works out.

In relation to that, to continue the political integration of the southern border provinces in order to be more civilized and just, the administration of Thailand was suggested to take these steps (The Nation 1996)⁷⁵:

⁷⁵ *Past government policies failed to pay heed to unique identity*, 1 September 1996.

1. The administration has to continue to adapt its policies to the Malay-Moslem aspirations in the southern border provinces of Thailand. Many development programs in these provinces showed good will and government faith towards the minority, nevertheless the government should accept the Malay culture as a part of the *country's national heritage*. The government should not prohibit the continuity of the Malay-Moslem traditions and culture.
2. The government should conduct political liberalization, protect civil rights and raise the political participation of the Malay Moslems in the decision making process based on the Constitution of 1997. Although the number of Malay Moslem people that has entered parliament has increased, this has not insured that Malay Moslems are treated fairly. There is a doubt among the Malay Moslems about the continuity of democratisation and political liberalization in relation to the Martial Law of 2004.
3. The government should establish Moslem education in line with economic development. The development of education is not only limited by infrastructural development but also by the education to increase tolerance for ethnic and religion differences. The government should emphasize that the Thai and Malay Moslem people live in peace and promote understanding for each group.
4. The government should change the military approach into one for peace through dialogue in coping with the violence in the southern border provinces. Dialogue with the opposition should not be conducted by military power but by intellectual power. The government has to realise the basic problems in the southern border provinces i.e. no protection of human rights and no justice for the Malay Moslem people. So the concrete policies to establish law enforcement, mainly in illegal businesses, should involve Thai civil and military officials.

5. The government should conduct a fair resource distribution proportionally to the Malay Moslems. The economic development programs addressed to open up employment and promote the dignity of the Moslems that was undertaken by accepting the existence of the Malay Moslem people in the midst of Buddhist society should continue as the Malay Moslems feel themselves to be second class citizens in their own country.

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Executive Summary

**MULTICULTURALISM, SEPARATISM, AND
NATION STATE BUILDING IN THAILAND**

**(MULTIKULTURALISME, SEPARATISME DAN
PEMBANGUNAN NEGARA BANGSA DI THAILAND)**

MULTIKULTURALISME, SEPARATISME DAN PEMBANGUNAN NEGARA BANGSA DI THAILAND

PENDAHULUAN

Buku ini membahas hasil penelitian mengenai multikulturalisme, separatisme dan pembangunan negara bangsa di Thailand. Studi ini berangkat dari upaya pemahaman mengenai faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi tumbuhnya gerakan separatisme di Pattani. Penelitian kali akan menjelaskan sejauhmana kebijakan-kebijakan multikulturalisme diterapkan di negara Thailand. Realitas apa yang dihadapi berkaitan dengan persoalan etnik minoritas ketika berhadapan dengan etnik mayoritas. Studi yang mengambil kasus Bangsa Melayu Muslim Pattani dipandang memiliki kaitan sejarah dimana Pattani dahulunya merupakan salah satu pusat kebudayaan dan kerajaan Islam di wilayah semenanjung Malaya, namun dalam perkembangannya terjadi inkorporasi pihak kerajaan Thailand. Akibat yang di timbulkan kemudian adalah munculnya gerakan perlawanan bangsa Melayu Pattani terhadap dominasi pihak pemerintah. Selain perkembangan internasionalisasi separatisme Pattani menjadi kasus yang menarik untuk di kaji.

Bentuk pengelolaan konflik yang dilakukan pemerintah Thailand dalam menangani separatisme Pattani dilatarbelakangi oleh kebijakan integrasi Kerajaan Siam terhadap Kerajaan Pattani pada tahun 1902. Dalam perkembangannya masih terjadi unsur-unsur kekerasan struktural dalam proses integrasi politik, budaya, dan ekonomi yang terlihat jelas hingga sekarang ini. Hubungan antara dampak kebijakan integrasi dengan tumbuhnya gerakan separatisme masyarakat Pattani memiliki keterkaitan satu sama lain. Keterkaitannya berdasarkan pendekatan dan kebijakan Pemerintah Thailand dalam manajemen resolusi konflik mendapat respon negatif masyarakat Pattani atas kebijakan yang sentralistik sepihak. Kebijakan integrasi selama ini diarahkan untuk meredam gejala konflik yang terjadi namun kurang memberikan akses 'anak negeri' di

sektor pemerintahan, pendidikan, politik dan kegiatan ekonomis lainnya. Munculnya gerakan separatisme yang dilakukan kelompok pembebasan Pattani ditengarai merupakan bentuk kekecewaan terhadap sikap pemerintah yang tidak mengakomodasi kepentingan dan kebutuhan Melayu Muslim Pattani.

Berdasarkan uraian di atas, buku ini berupaya menangkap pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan dalam penelitian yang dilangsungkan di negara Thailand: (1). Faktor-faktor apa yang menyebabkan tumbuhnya gerakan separatis Bangsa Melayu Muslim Pattani, (2). Sejauhmana kebijakan-kebijakan multikulturalisme diterapkan di Thailand terutama terhadap Bangsa Melayu Muslim Pattani dan (3). Bagaimanakah hubungan antara pengelolaan konflik separatisme Pattani pemerintah Thailand dengan proses pembangunan negara bangsa?

Beberapa variable yang dijadikan kerangka ruang lingkup studi mencakup di antaranya persoalan: (1) Multikulturalisme, yaitu hubungan antar etnik terutama Bangsa Melayu Pattani dengan Thai yang ditandai dengan pembagian kekuasaan yang adil baik dalam politik maupun ekonomi dan diakuinya semua etnik dan agama sebagai unsur-unsur negara yang fundamental. (2) Separatisme, yaitu perlawanan bangsa Melayu di Pattani terhadap Pemerintah Thailand yang dianggapnya sebagai imperialis. Organisasi-organisasi yang akan dikaji lebih mendalam adalah Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP), Council of the Moslem People of Pattani (CMPP), dan Pattani Union Liberation Organization (PULO). (3) Pembangunan negara bangsa yaitu proses pembangunan semangat kebangsaan (nasionalisme) dan keutuhan integrasi teritorial Thailand. Manajemen pengelolaan konflik yang dilakukan pemerintah akan dilihat kontribusinya pada proses pembangunan negara bangsa.

Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan metode analisis deskriptif dan analisis komparatif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui studi pustaka dan penelitian lapangan. Penelitian lapangan dilakukan melalui wawancara mendalam terhadap sejumlah informan di Bangkok dan Pattani, diantaranya berasal dari akademisi yang memiliki perhatian terhadap masalah yang dibahas. Kemudian wawancara

dilakukan terhadap beberapa aktivis NGO yang memiliki perhatian terhadap masalah minoritas Muslim di Thailand. Sedangkan studi pustaka dilakukan melalui penelusuran informasi di perpustakaan Nasional dan daerah seperti di Universitas Chulalongkorn dan Universitas Songkhla. Pemilihan Pattani sebagai lokasi studi dilakukan melalui pertimbangan bahwa daerah ini sejak tahun 1922 menjadi pusat perkembangan gerakan separatisme di Thailand dalam skala yang relatif luas. Selain itu, mayoritas masyarakat di daerah ini adalah masyarakat bangsa Melayu yang beragama Islam dan merupakan etnik minoritas di Thailand.

SEKILAS DEMOGRAFI THAILAND

Thailand berpenduduk sekitar 62.799.872 jiwa (2002). Thailand termasuk negara dengan laju pertumbuhan penduduk yang cukup tinggi karena rendahnya angka kematian bayi. Jumlah penduduk Propinsi Pattani sendiri sekitar 627.955 jiwa pada tahun 2002 dari 8.415.908 jiwa seluruh penduduk di Selatan dan menempati urutan ke 39 dalam jumlah penduduk dari 76 propinsi yang ada.

Sekitar 80% penduduk Thailand adalah orang Thai, yang terdiri dari 53% orang Siam dan 27% orang Lao. Kelompok minoritas lainnya adalah, Cina yang terbesar (12%), kemudian Melayu (4%) dan beberapa kelompok minoritas lainnya, yang dibedakan atas kelompok "orang gunung - Hill Tribe" (Lisu, Luwa, Shan, Khan, Meo, Karen, dan Yao) dan pengungsi Vietnam. Minoritas Hill Tribe terdapat di daerah Chiang May, Talaung, dan etnik Laotian di Utara, Hmong di Selatan, dan Haw di Golden Triangle. Secara umum, minoritas terbesar terdiri dari China (11%), diikuti oleh Melayu (3-4%), dan khmer (1%). Kelompok minoritas lainnya termasuk sejumlah besar suku perbukitan yang tidak lebih 2% dari jumlah penduduk. Masih ada prejudise dan diskriminasi terhadap etnik-etnik yang ada. Konflik yang potensial terjadi antar tetangga di Thailand adalah dengan etnik China, karena mereka lebih mendominasi dalam bidang perekonomian. Sedangkan konflik etnik yang signifikan terjadi di Thailand, adalah konflik antara Muslim di Selatan dengan pemerintahan Thailand.

Sebagian besar Islam Thai atau Islam Melayu memiliki kondisi ekonomi yang miskin dan pada awalnya propinsi Pattani beserta dengan empat propinsi lainnya merupakan bagian dari wilayah negara Malaysia, yang 90%-nya adalah Muslim. Setelah menjadi bagian dari negara Thailand, mereka menjadi korban dari diskriminasi dan prejudise. Keempat propinsi Islam dalam perjalannya, tidak mendapat persamaan dalam pembangunan ekonomi dan perhatian pemerintahan sebagai bagian dari wilayah negara Thailand dan kini mereka dalam kondisi yang miskin (Slagter dan Kerbo, 2000:77).

Agama merupakan pusat kehidupan masyarakat Thailand. Agama adalah hal utama yang dipelajari untuk mengetahui siapa mereka, apa kebiasaan mereka, dan bagaimana mereka merencanakan kehidupannya. Sekitar 94% masyarakat Thai beragama Budha. Agama ini di bawa oleh para biarawan India pada abad 3 sebelum masehi. Masyarakat Thai mayoritas menganut aliran Budha Theravada. Sisanya adalah beragama Islam (4%) dan 1% terdiri dari agama Kristen, Brahma, Hindu, Sikh, Tao, dan animisme. Agama Islam sebagian besar hadir diantara masyarakat Melayu, sedangkan Kristen dapat ditemukan pada masyarakat perbukitan dan orang Vietnam.

Kebebasan beragama dilindungi oleh hukum dan pemerintah menghargai semua hak kegiatan beragama, akan tetapi pemerintah kadang membatasi kegiatan beragama beberapa kelompok yang lain. Buddha Theravada adalah agama mayoritas penduduk Thailand dan kebebasan beragama telah diabadikan di setiap Konstitusi Kerajaan sejak tahun 1932. Agama Islam adalah agama minoritas di Thailand, tetapi menjadi mayoritas dan terkonsentrasi di propinsi-propinsi wilayah Selatan, seperti Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, dan Satun. Agama Islam sendiri sampai ke Pattani melalui para pedagang arab dan India yang melakukan perdagangan disertai penyebaran Islam di Thailand selama abad 13. Kontak dagang yang dilakukan penduduk Malaysia dengan penduduk Thai di daerah selatan juga membantu penyebaran agama Islam.

Pendidikan formal bagi anak-anak dimulai sejak usia tujuh tahun. Dalam hukum yang dikeluarkan pada pertengahan tahun 1990-an, dinyatakan bahwa semua anak-anak di Thailand diharuskan menyelesaikan sekolah/pendidikan paling sedikit 9 tahun ajaran. Pada abad ke-21 ini, Thailand akan mewajibkan belajar 12 tahun ajaran untuk semua anak-anak, sebagaimana halnya negara-negara berkembang lainnya di Asia. Jumlah penduduk terdidik di Thailand tahun 2000 sebesar 11.767.555 orang. Jumlah pelajar di propinsi Pattani pada sendiri adalah sebesar 118.673 dengan jumlah sekolah sebanyak 372 buah dan jumlah guru sebanyak 5.268 orang. Pendidikan agama telah ditanamkan di sekolah-sekolah umum, sejak sekolah dasar hingga tingkat kedua (kelas 7-12).

Untuk wilayah selatan, Pattani khususnya, banyak terdapat institusi pendidikan Islam. Ada tiga jenis sekolah yang berlangsung, pertama sekolah agama (*religious school*) atau umumnya dikenal dengan nama *pondok*, sekolah agama swasta (*private religious school*) dengan tambahan kurikulum pendidikan umum yang telah disetujui oleh Menteri Pendidikan, biasanya dikenal dengan sebutan *madrasah*, dan sekolah umum (atau sekolah kerajaan) dengan kurikulum umum lebih dominan. Secara historis sekolah-sekolah agama tradisional atau *pondok* telah memainkan satu peranan penting di dalam pendidikan Islam di Pattani sebelum digabungkan ke dalam negara Thailand (1909). Selain itu, *pondok* merupakan salah satu bangunan yang sangat penting bagi masyarakat Muslim. Pada masa lalu, Pattani sempat dikenal sebagai pusat intelektual dimana banyak siswa yang berdatangan berasal dari luar wilayah Pattani. Jumlah *pondok* yang terdapat di Pattani sejumlah 249 buah. 122 *pondok* yang terdaftar di pemerintahan Thailand sedangkan 127 tidak.

Penduduk Pattani umumnya mengenyam pendidikan di sekolah agama, *pondok*. Beberapa hal yang menyebabkan penduduk Pattani lebih memilih untuk mensekolahkan putra-putrinya di sekolah *pondok*, pertama, *pondok* merupakan institusi pendidikan pertama yang tumbuh di Pattani, sebagai pusat pendidikan dan sosialisasi

nilai-nilai hidup dan hukum (*syariha*) yang berlandaskan pada agama Islam. Kedua, ketersediaan sekolah-sekolah umum sangat terbatas terutama di daerah pelosok. Ketiga, biaya pendidikan di sekolah umum dirasa cukup mahal. Keempat, bahasa yang digunakan dalam proses belajar mengajar di sekolah umum adalah bahasa Thai, yang umumnya tidak dimengerti oleh siswa-siswi Melayu. Kelima, sekolah umum dengan mata pelajaran sekulernya, kadang kala diwarnai dengan nilai-nilai Buddhism. Kondisi-kondisi inilah yang melatarbelakangi sekolah umum dan sekuler kurang diterima.

Pendidikan menjadi salah satu masalah di Pattani. Tidak banyak sekolah tersedia di daerah terpencil di Pattani dan kebanyakan sekolah menengah tersedia di kota besar. Jika anak dapat masuk ke sekolah umum Thailand, bahasa menjadi salah satu masalah yang serius, sebab penggunaan bahasa Thailand dalam proses belajar mengajar menjadi satu kesulitan bagi anak-anak Pattani yang cenderung lebih fasih berbahasa Melayu. Disamping itu, penduduk Pattani kebanyakan kurang mampu menyekolahkan anaknya ke sekolah umum Thailand, sebagai alternatif, mereka hanya mampu mengirim anaknya untuk belajar di *pondok*, yang mengajarkan murni agama Islam. Hal ini menyebabkan kebanyakan pelajar dari Pattani dianggap kurang berkualitas dan tidak mampu bersaing dalam pekerjaan militer, pemerintahan sipil, dan kepolisian (Stephen I : 249).

Lebih dari 85% penduduk Thailand berbahasa Thai. Bahasa Inggris merupakan bahasa kedua yang diajarkan di sekolah. Namun bahasa Inggris sulit diterapkan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, karena hanya 28% sekolah tingkat dua yang menerapkan pendidikan bahasa Inggris. Pada akhirnya bahasa Cina menjadi salah satu bahasa yang sering digunakan oleh penduduk. Masyarakat Pattani, sebagian besar penduduknya menggunakan bahasa Melayu khususnya dalam kehidupan di keluarga, sedangkan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari bahasa Thai sudah mulai digunakan karena adanya proses asimilasi. Disamping itu, dalam konteks formal, mampu berbahasa Thai merupakan salah satu syarat penting. Kadang kala bahasa menjadi kendala bagi komunikasi antara penduduk Pattani dengan para pegawai pemerintahan, sehingga dapat terjadi salah

pengertian yang menjadi penyebab munculnya gap antara penduduk dan pegawai pemerintahan. Menurut Chaiwat Satha Anand, bahasa juga menjadi kendala dalam usaha mencapai kesepakatan di Pattani.

Jumlah lapangan kerja yang tersedia di Thailand pada tahun 2002 sebanyak 358.548 dengan jumlah tenaga kerja sebesar 7.908.981 orang. Untuk propinsi Pattani, lapangan kerja tersedia sebesar 2.734 (urutan ke-4 di wilayah Selatan, setelah Songkhla (6.906), Surat Thani (5.676), dan Nakhon Si Thammarat (3.296)) dengan jumlah tenaga kerja sebesar 29.397 orang. Sebagian besar lapangan pekerjaan ini bergerak dalam bidang pertanian, perkebunan, dan perikanan, dimana sebagian besar pemegang modal adalah dari etnis Cina dan Thai, sedangkan penduduk Pattani sendiri kebanyakan sebagai buruh di lapangan pekerjaan tersebut.

Pendapatan yang diperoleh Provinsi Pattani adalah sebesar 29.645 juta Baht (Desember 2000). Untuk pendapatan perkapita tahun 2000 sebesar 47.737 baht menurun dari tahun 1997 sebesar 49.816 baht. Pendapatan perkapita penduduk Pattani selama 7 tahun (1993-2000) meningkat sebesar 4,5%/tahun. Sedangkan ekonomi propinsi meningkat sebesar 4,67% . Secara regional, wilayah Selatan telah menyumbangkan 9,1% untuk pendapatan nasional atau sebesar 448.794 juta baht (2000) dari 4.904.731 juta baht secara keseluruhan. Propinsi Pattani sendiri sebagian besar pendapatan diperoleh dari sektor pertanian (52,7%) dimana sebagian besar daerah Selatan memang subur untuk pertanian. Dalam kegiatan ekonomi, kegiatan pertambangan sendiri banyak yang tidak berproduksi, karena kurangnya investasi dan isue terorisme juga membawa penurunan pada pendapatan domestik daerah dari hasil perkebunan karet dan pertambangan timah, serta menurunnya hasil perikanan, karena persaingan dengan usaha dan industri perikanan yang lebih besar dan berkembang, sedangkan nelayan dari masyarakat Pattani sendiri peralatan nelayan tidak berkembang.

INTEGRASI MELAYU PATTANI: SEJARAH PERUBAHAN GEOPOLITIK

Keberadaan Pattani dahulunya merupakan kerajaan bernama Langkasuka. Sebuah kerajaan yang diyakini menjadi cikal bakal dari kerajaan Pattani. Bukti kehadiran dari Langkasuka ini bisa dilihat dalam catatan cerita lama teks India maupun Jawa. Saat itu Langkasuka dipandang sebagai salah satu sasaran ekspedisi angkatan laut India yang perlu ditaklukan dan dikuasai bidang perdagangan mereka. Kemudian cerita kepahlawanan Majapahit tahun 1365 dalam surat *Nagarakartagama*, melukiskan Langkasuka sebagai wilayah pesisir timur yang menjadi bagian wilayah kekuasaan Majapahit. Langkasuka juga merupakan salah satu daerah kekuasaan kerajaan *Sri Vijayan*. Hal ini ditunjukkan melihat asal usul orang Pattani berasal dari suku *Javanese-Malay*. Sebagian besar menganggap bahwa salah satu leluhur orang-orang Melayu di daerah Malaka setelah terjadi penaklukan pada sekitar abad ke-8 dan 9 kemudian berkembang menjadi masyarakat Melayu sekarang. Seiring dengan memudarnya kekuasaan kerajaan Sriwijaya pada abad 11 wilayah ini kemudian mendapatkan kemerdekaannya dan menjadi sebuah wilayah tersendiri. Langkasuka sendiri merupakan suatu daerah yang cukup banyak diminati oleh beberapa kerajaan yang ada di sekitar Asia Tenggara pada sekitar abad 13 dan 14; kerajaan Angkor di Kamboja, kerajaan Burmese di Pagan, Raja Cholas India, Raja Ceylon, kerajaan di Jawa dan Sriwijaya. Hampir kesemua kerajaan tersebut sempat mengintervensi dan berusaha membuat patokan wilayah *independent* di daerah tersebut.

Catatan mengenai perkembangan daerah Pattani dalam banyak literatur, banyak sekali di kaitkan dengan proses Islamisasi dan perdagangan yang terjadi di wilayah ini. Dilihat kedudukannya secara geografi, daerah Pattani cukup strategis karena berada di pertengahan jalur lalu lintas perdagangan antara negeri Melayu dan negeri Asia Timur dan di antara perairan selat Malaka serta Laut Sulu dengan perairan laut Cina Selatan. Pattani dipandang sebagai pusat komersial yang penting untuk melayani pedagang-pedagang Islam Arab, India, Eropa maupun Cina. Pattani kemudian menjadi

entrepot dalam perniagaan, diantaranya dengan menjual hasil bumi berupa rempah-rempah yang ditukar dengan tekstil dan tembikar dari Cina. Selain sebagai wilayah perdagangan yang cukup maju, Pattani merupakan salah satu pusat kebudayaan dan penyebaran Islam di alam Melayu. Melalui jalur perdagangan dengan orang-orang Arab dan India serta saudagar-saudagar Muslim Cina, Islam diperkenalkan di Pattani dan menjadi agama yang dianut oleh penduduk setempat. Adanya kontak-kontak perdagangan maupun penyebaran Islam tersebut mendorong Pattani menjadi kerajaan makmur dan mencapai puncak keemasan perkembangan wilayah terutama pada kurun waktu abad 15. Melalui tradisi lokal masyarakat yaitu kegiatan berdagang yang sudah terjadi cukup lama membentuk posisi Pattani berkembang menjadi satu kekuatan politis dan ekonomi.

Kesultanan Pattani mencapai zaman keemasannya ketika diperintah oleh empat orang Raja perempuan yaitu Ratu Hijau (1584-1616), Ratu Biru (1616-1624), Ratu Ungu (1624-1635) dan Ratu Kuning (1635-1651) yang mampu mempersatukan beberapa wilayah Melayu utara seperti Kelantan, Trengganu dan Perlis. Namun jaman keemasan ini tidak berlangsung lama. Bermula dari gejolak politik internal kerajaan dalam hal perebutan kekuasaan, mengakibatkan kekuatan kerajaan menjadi rapuh. Pengaruh lain kemunduran Pattani disebabkan oleh perseteruan politik dengan kerajaan Siam yang telah lama mengincar Pattani dalam upaya memperluas wilayah kerajaan. Kekalahan Pattani oleh Siam berlangsung pada kurun waktu 1786 setelah mendapat serangan Phya Taksin Raja Thonburi pemimpin kerajaan Ayudhya. Akibat mengerikan dari kekalahan itu, sebanyak 4.000 orang Melayu Pattani menjadi tawanan dan dibawa ke Bangkok sebagai hamba tebusan. Setelah kejatuhan Pattani itu muncul gejolak politik dan kekuasaan yang berdampak langsung pada kekacauan dalam negeri Pattani. Bidang perdagangan terkena imbas dengan mengalami penurunan daya tarik mereka. Bagi para saudagar asing situasi yang tidak menentu mengakibatkan mereka memindahkan perniagaan ke wilayah baru yang mulai mengalami kemajuan seperti; Johor, Malaka, Aceh, Banten dan Batavia (Jakarta).

Negeri Pattani mulai dihadapkan pada persaingan perdagangan dengan pelabuhan lain yang sedang mulai tumbuh berkembang, di sisi lain Pattani dihadapkan pula pada hubungan perseteruan dengan Siam yang fluktuatif. Pada akhirnya wilayah Pattani dapat ditaklukkan oleh kerajaan Siam. Sentimen anti Siam berkembang pada periode setelah kekalahan ini, kecenderungannya kemudian menimbulkan sikap pemberontakan terhadap pihak kerajaan yang dilakukan oleh para elite Pattani. Pihak Siam lantas memberlakukan beberapa kebijakan yang bertujuan meredam konflik yang terjadi, diantaranya; mengeluarkan kebijakan memecah Kerajaan Melayu Pattani menjadi 7 wilayah yang dikenal dengan *hua muang*. Desain kebijakan yang cukup radikal ini berusaha menggunakan cara langsung dalam mengatur kerajaan melalui kota-kota provinsi atau melalui agen pemerintahannya (sistem perwakilan). Kebijakan transformasi tradisi birokrasi kerajaan kemudian disebut dengan istilah "*sistem Thesaphiban*" yang diterapkan pada tahun 1899.

Terdapat beberapa alasan mengapa muncul kebijakan tersebut. Hal ini berkaitan erat dengan situasi eksternal yang terjadi kurun waktu abad 18, *Pertama*, Perubahan dasar kebijakan pemerintah kerajaan Siam mempunyai hubungan erat dengan situasi pengolakan politik dan keamanan yang terjadi di wilayah Asia Tenggara pada tahun-tahun 1890-an. *Kedua*, pada tahun 1890-an, munculnya imperialis besar-besaran ke wilayah Asia Tenggara dimana penguasa kolonial Perancis dan Inggris telah mulai menjejakkan jajahannya di wilayah Asia Tenggara. Apa yang terjadi dari perlombaan mereka untuk menguasai wilayah mencapai puncaknya pada tahun 1893. Kerajaan Siam semakin sulit posisinya di wilayah semenanjung dan dibuat bingung dengan terbentuknya perjanjian Inggris-Perancis pada 15 Januari 1896. Isi perjanjian tersebut diantaranya menyatakan bahwa kedua belah pihak hanya mengakui kedaulatan wilayah Siam atas Lembah Chao Phraya dan tidak menyebutkan tentang kekuasaan mereka di negeri Melayu utara. Walaupun perjanjian tersebut mengakui keberadaan kekuasaan Siam di Lembah Chao Phraya, pihak kerajaan merasa tetap terancam karena

karena dalam isi perjanjian tersebut tidak menghalangi pihak Perancis atau Inggris bila sewaktu-waktu berusaha menguasai Siam. Dalam perjanjian tersebut tidak menjamin mengenai kemerdekaan dan keutuhan wilayah Siam.

Berdasarkan pertimbangan tersebut maka pihak kerajaan Siam berusaha merombak sistem pembagian wilayah mereka. Di bawah Sistem *Thesaphiban*, pembagian wilayah disusun dan di kumpulkan ke dalam satu unit yang dikenali sebagai *Monthon*. Tiap-tiap *Monthon* dipimpin oleh seorang Gubernur (*Khaluang Thesaphiban*) yang bertanggungjawab kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri. Dibawah peraturan ini mengakibatkan keistimewaan yang dimiliki oleh Raja Pattani menjadi berkurang. Raja-raja tidak lagi mempunyai kuasa untuk melantik pegawai-pegawai kerajaan. Selain itu dalam hal menetapkan beberapa kebijakan daerah setiap raja maupun Gubernur diwajibkan untuk mendapatkan persetujuan administratur Tinggi Wilayah bersangkutan. Sebaliknya, para wakil raja di daerah hanya memiliki kewenangan untuk melantik atau mengangkat pegawai rendah di wilayah mereka.

Jika dilihat pada peraturan tahun 1899, jelas menunjukkan bahwa tujuan peraturan ini memang untuk melumpuhkan kekuasaan Raja negeri dan menguatkan lagi cengkaman kerajaan pusat terhadap wilayah-wilayah yang dibagi. Dengan peraturan ini pihak kerajaan di Bangkok berharap dapat mengawasi wilayah-wilayah jangkauan mereka terutama dari gangguan pihak asing. Usaha yang dilakukan Putera Damrong nantinya diharapkan akan mendapat dukungan dari pihak Inggris karena kerajaan Siam memerlukan dukungan juga dari pihak Inggris dalam upaya membendung ancaman Perancis di wilayah utara mereka.

Kenyataan ini membuat raja-raja Pattani seperti Tengku Sulaiman dan Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, merasa resah dan melakukan upaya perlawanan agar pihak kerajaan Siam tidak terus menerus melakukan campur tangan urusan dalam negeri-negeri Melayu. Kenyataan ini ditambah pula dengan tindak-tanduk pejabat perwakilan Siam yang merugikan kedaulatan dan kewibawaannya sebagai Raja Pattani tetapi juga telah menimbulkan pelbagai masalah pada penduduk-penduduk negeri itu. Diantaranya

pegawai-pegawai Siam seringkali campur tangan dalam urusan keagamaan penduduk setempat. Hal ini membuat pihak Pattani tidak memiliki pilihan lain kecuali perlawanan dengan mengajak pihak Inggris yang berkuasa di Singapura supaya ikut membantu dalam mempertahankan serta memulihkan kewibawaanya sebagai Raja Pattani yang berdaulat.

Usaha untuk mendapatkan dukungan dari pihak Inggris menemui kegagalan. Pertimbangan mengapa Inggris tidak mau mencampuri urusan di Pattani karena melihat strategisnya wilayah Semenanjung. Saat itu orang-orang Jerman sedang mendesak Bangkok agar memberikan konsesi kepada mereka di pulau langkawi lepas pantai Andaman untuk dijadikan tempat pengisian bahan bakar bagi kapal-kapal mereka, sementara itu Rusia juga sedang bersaing dengan perancis untuk memperoleh konsesi pembuatan sebuah terusan lintasan Segenting Kra. Inggris saat itu sebenarnya memiliki rencana khusus dengan empat daerah taklukan penting di sebelah selatan Pattani. Daerah-daerah tersebut dianggap ebih penting. Konsolidasi Inggris di sana akan lebih menguntungkan daripada bermusuhan dengan Siam dalam persoalan Pattani. Sikap hati-hati ini dan sikap diplomatis Inggris membuahkan hasil dengan ditandatanganinya suatu perjanjian antar Inggris-Siam yang memutuskan hasil menyerahkan wilayah Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu dan Perlis kepada kekuasaan Inggris. Sebagai imbalannya Inggris kemudian mengakui kedaulatan Siam terhadap provinsi Pattani dan mengembalikan semua persoalan yang menyangkut hak ekstra teritorial wlayah dan kenegaraan kepada pengadilan Siam. Perjanjian ini dikenal dengan perjanjian Inggris Siam 1909.

Situasi pada abad 16 ketika kekuasaan kolonial sampai ke Asia Tenggara, Siam dihadapkan pada suatu kesadaran akan keharusan yang mendesak mengkonsolidasikan kekuasaan dan menyatukan satuan-satuan politik yang terpecah untuk menghadapi bahaya kolonialisme.

Oleh karenanya Siam berusaha untuk melakukan pembaharuan administratif dengan pertimbangan keamanan nasional dan efisiensi urusan kenegaraan. Pembaharuan yang dilakukan Raja Chulalongkorn pada tahun 1909 dimaksudkan sebagai upaya mempersatukan wilayah Thailand ke dalam satu mekanisme pengaturan wilayah tersebut.

KEBIJAKAN POLITIK INTEGRASI THAILAND TERHADAP PROVINSI SELATAN PERBATASAN

Kebijakan-kebijakan politik integrasi Thailand terhadap provinsi-provinsi Pattani dapat diringkas ke dalam tabel seperti di bawah ini:

Tabel 1. Daftar Kebijakan Politik Thailand di Provinsi-Provinsi Pattani

No.	Latar Belakang	Kebijakan	Pemerintahan	Dampak
1.	Membendung ekspansi Inggris-Malaya dan Perancis-Indocina	Integrasi teritorial 1902, integrasi bangsawan, reformasi birokrasi.	Raja Chulalongkorn (1868-1910)	Pemberontakan 1902 dan 1922
2.	Nasionalisme Thai Raja Vajiravudh	Integrasi pendidikan berdasarkan UU 1921	Raja Vajiravudh (1910-1925)	Diperkenalkannya bahasa Thai ke pondok-pondok
3.	Kudeta dan perubahan konstitusi 1932	Liberalisasi politik	Pridi Banomyong	Partisipasi terbatas
4.	Berkembangnya fasisme di Eropah dan Asia menjelang perang dunia kedua	Thai-rathaniyom 1938	PM. Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 dan 1948-1957)	keberpihakan Pattani kepada sekutu, nasionalisme Malaya.
6.	Kekalahan Thailand dalam perang dunia kedua	Patronage Islam Act 1946: Integrasi ulama	Pridi Banomyong (1946)	Chularajamontry, petisi Haji Sulong, pembontakan 47
7.	Perang Vietnam	Integrasi pondok 1960-an	PM. Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963) dan pemerintahan sesudahnya	Kontrol pemerintah terhadap pondok, separatisme di bawah PULO,dll.
8.	Pembangunan dan perang dingin Amerika Serikat vs Uni Soviet	Prime Minister Order No. 65/66, <i>Tai Rum Yen</i>	PM Prem Tin Sulanonda	Menurunnya aksi-aksi separatis, simpati ke pemerintah
9.	Kampanye internasional "perang melawan terorisme"	Martial Law 2004	PM Thaksin Sinawatra	Meningkatnya aksi-aksi kekerasan di Pattani, Narathiwat, dan Yala

Sumber: data diolah

Dari tabel tersebut dapat disimpulkan beberapa hal yang berkaitan dengan kebijakan terhadap Pattani sebagai berikut:

1. Setiap kebijakan politik integrasi Thailand terhadap Pattani selalu memiliki dimensi eksternal atau dipengaruhi oleh kepentingan internasional di samping kepentingan nasional. Kebijakan integrasi teritorial ditujukan untuk membendung politik ekspansi kolonial, sedangkan integrasi kaum ulama dimaksudkan untuk mencegah berkembangnya pan- Malaya. Adapun kebijakan integrasi pondok terkait dengan berkembangnya ideologi pembangunan pada akhir tahun 1960-an.
2. Hampir semua kebijakan politik yang dibuat pemerintah Pattani dimaksudkan untuk mencampuri urusan-urusan keagamaan dan tradisi bangsa Melayu Pattani seperti; melarang penggunaan bahasa Melayu, sekularisasi pondok, dan *Thai Custom decree* 1939. Kebijakan yang tidak populer tersebut selalu dilandasi untuk memperkuat nasionalisme Thailand yang didefinisikan sebagai kesetiaan terhadap agama Budha, bangsa Thai, dan monarki. Hal tersebut mendorong perlawanan Bangsa Melayu Pattani dalam bentuk pembontakan 1902, 1922, 1948, dan 1970-an.
3. Negara telah menggeser permasalahan separatisme menjadi terorisme. Kebijakan untuk mengatasi separatisme berdasarkan Prime Minister Order No. 65 dan 66/2325 yang menekankan pada pembangunan sosial ekonomi dan menghilangkan ketidakadilan digantikan dengan kebijakan darurat militer (martial law 2004). Bangsa Melayu Pattani telah menjadi pihak yang paling menderita akibat dari kebijakan ini.
4. Politik integrasi terhadap Pattani ditujukan untuk membangun batas-batas teritorial, batas-batas politik kewarganegaraan, dan batas-batas komunitas budaya. Penyatuan komunitas budaya minoritas Islam ke dalam budaya Thai dilakukan melalui kebijakan asimilasi kebudayaan yang dipaksakan dan ditujukan untuk memperkuat nasionalisme Thai. Negara telah mematikan ruang-ruang bagi sebuah proses sosial menuju terbentuknya masyarakat multikultur.

Dengan demikian, politik integrasi Thailand terhadap provinsi-provinsi di perbatasan selatan yang disertai dengan politik kekerasan, asimilasi kebudayaan, dan pembangunan ekonomi tidak sepenuhnya berhasil dalam merebut hati orang-orang Melayu untuk menjadi Thai-muslim. Politik integrasi hanya berhasil dalam memaksa orang-orang Melayu mengakui kekuasaan pemerintahan Thai secara simbolik. Namun demikian integrasi masih menyisakan ruang-ruang ketidakadilan bagi minoritas melayu yang suatu saat dapat muncul ke permukaan. Perubahan politik demokratis di Bangkok pada tahun 1997 tidak dapat menjamin terciptanya resolusi konflik yang berkeadilan bagi minoritas ketika demokrasi dipahami hanya sebagai sebuah prosedur politik. Sebagai buktinya di bawah pemerintahan demokratis, Pemerintahan Perdana Menteri Thaksin Sinawatra menetapkan keadaan darurat militer di daerah-daerah Pattani.

Kegagalan dalam merebut simpati orang-orang Melayu diduga disebabkan oleh beberapa hal sebagai berikut. Pejabat-pejabat pemerintah di Pattani yang mayoritas non-muslim beserta kebijakan-kebijakannya tidak mampu menyesuaikan dengan kebutuhan-kebutuhan rakyat di daerah ini. Kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintah yang dilaksanakan di daerah-daerah seluruh Thailand direncanakan secara terpusat tanpa mempertimbangkan karakteristik-karakteristik khusus dari setiap daerah. Hal inilah yang menjadi sumber masalah mengapa grand shemes yang diajukan oleh Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Ekonomi dan Sosial Nasional (*National Social Economic Social Development Plans*) gagal untuk diwujudkan (Lohasan, 1996). Sebagai contoh meskipun Badan ini telah menerapkan program segitiga ekonomi yang ditujukan untuk menciptakan lapangan kerja di lima provinsi perbatasan, namun sedikit orang-orang Melayu yang diuntungkan dari program ini. GDP secara nasional tumbuh dengan cepat, namun demikian tidak mampu memecahkan masalah utama yaitu sebagian besar penduduk hidup dalam kemiskinan dan tinggal di daerah pedesaan (Ibid.).

Selain itu, politik migrasi yang dilakukan pemerintah pusat sejak masa pemerintahan Perdana Menteri Sharit Thanarat telah memunculkan bibit-bibit konflik horisontal pada masa tahun 1970-an. Kalangan muslim seringkali melancarkan protes

kepada pemerintah pusat yang telah mencoba memindahkan orang-orang Budha dari provinsi-provinsi utara ke provinsi-provinsi di perbatasan selatan. Pemerintah memiliki kebijakan untuk memberikan mereka tempat tinggal melalui program *land resettlement schemes* (nikhom)(Astri Surke, 1989: 2). Berkaitan dengan hal tersebut, untuk melanjutkan proses integrasi terhadap wilayah-wilayah perbatasan selatan secara lebih berkeadilan dan berperadaban, maka Pemerintah Thailand sebaiknya dapat melakukan langkah-langkah yang antara lain sebagai berikut:

1. Pemerintah harus terus menerus menyesuaikan kebijakan-kebijakannya dengan aspirasi orang-orang Melayu Muslim di daerah perbatasan. Banyaknya proyek-proyek pembangunan di wilayah ini menunjukkan niat baik dan ketulusan pemerintah terhadap minoritas Melayu, namun demikian pemerintah harus menerima kebudayaan Melayu sebagai bagian dari kebudayaan nasional (*country's national heritage*). Kelangsungan tradisi dan adat-istiadat orang-orang Melayu harusnya tidak dilarang oleh pemerintah.
2. Pemerintah harus terus menerus memberikan liberalisasi politik, melindungi hak-hak sipil politik, dan meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam proses pengambilan keputusan kepada orang-orang Melayu muslim sebagaimana dijamin dalam UUD 1997. Meskipun jumlah orang-orang Melayu yang menjadi anggota-anggota Parlemen dan pejabat pemerintah semakin banyak, namun tidak menjamin minoritas muslim diperlakukan dengan lebih adil dan beradab. Ada keraguan dari masyarakat berkaitan dengan keberlanjutan demokratisasi dan liberalisasi politik dengan adanya kebijakan daerah militer.
3. Pemerintah seharusnya membangun pendidikan orang-orang muslim seiring dengan pembangunan ekonomi yang tengah dijalankan. Pendidikan yang dibangun tidak hanya sebatas pembangunan infra-struktur tetapi juga pendidikan untuk saling menghormati dan bertoleransi terhadap perbedaan etnik dan agama. Pemerintah harus menekankan kepada orang-orang Muslim dan Budha untuk

dapat hidup berdampingan secara damai. Hal tersebut diperlukan untuk meningkatkan saling pengertian antara mayoritas-minoritas.

4. Pemerintah harus mengubah pendekatan militer menjadi dialogis dalam penanganan gejala kekerasan sosial di selatan. Dialog dengan kelompok-kelompok yang tidak puas dengan pemerintah hendaknya dilakukan tidak dengan menggunakan kekuatan militer. Pemerintah seharusnya dapat menangkap substansi permasalahan di daerah-daerah perbatasan selatan yaitu tidak adanya keadilan dan perlindungan hak-hak asasi manusia. Oleh karena langkah kongkrit yang harus dilakukan adalah menegakkan keadilan bagi orang-orang Melayu-muslim dan menghukum pihak-pihak terlibat dalam ilegal bisnis termasuk oknum-oknum polisi dan pejabat pemerintah.
5. Pemerintah seharusnya dapat memberikan pembagian sumberdaya ekonomi secara lebih proporsional kepada orang-orang Melayu. Program-program pembangunan ekonomi harus diarahkan untuk membuka lapangan pekerjaan dan meningkatkan harkat dan martabat minoritas Muslim melayu. Hal tersebut dilaksanakan sebagai bentuk pengakuan atas eksistensi orang-orang Muslim di Thailand. Selama ini mereka diperlakukan sebagai orang asing meskipun hidup di negerinya sendiri.

ASIMILASI BUDAYA DAN IMPLIKASINYA BAGI KELANGSUNGAN IDENTITAS PATTANI

Fondasi identitas Pattani dibangun di atas simbol-simbol atau atribut seperti: pengalaman sejarah atau *collective memory* tentang Kerajaan Melayu Pattani, bahasa Melayu, agama Islam, dan kebiasaan-kebiasaan atau adat-istiadat lokal. Salah satu identitas yang dipelihara oleh sejumlah pranata seperti pranata pendidikan tercermin dari sekolah-sekolah agama yang disebut pondok. Selain itu identitas juga tetap terjaga di dalam institusi keluarga, masjid, maupun dalam pondok itu sendiri. Tokok-tokoh

setempat, seperti ulama dan bangsawan, merupakan elit lokal yang menjadi pilar-pilar penyangga identitas (agama dan budaya) Melayu.

1. Antara Thai dan Pattani: Perselisihan Identitas (*Conflicting Identities*)

Cara Thai mengidentifikasi Pattani dan sebaliknya kerap diwarnai dengan stereotip dan stigma negatif. Thai Buddhist menyebut Pattani dengan *Khaek* yang secara harafiah berarti 'tamu' atau 'pendatang' di Thailand. Secara umum istilah *Khaek* juga dipakai untuk mengidentifikasi orang-orang dengan warna kulit sawo matang khususnya yang berasal dari Asia Selatan seperti: India, Pakistan, dan Timur Tengah, termasuk mereka yang beragama Islam, yang diantaranya adalah Melayu Muslim. Dalam pandangan Thai-Budhist, *Khaek* merujuk pada istilah yang berbau etnosentrik, dan stereotipik. *Khaek* juga berkonotasi sebagai orang yang malas, jorok, egois, miskin, tak bisa dipercaya, berpikiran picik, kejam, tidak bisa diajak kerjasama, bodoh, tidak ramah, dan fanatik (lihat Busakorn Suriyasarn:1993). Intinya istilah ini mengandung pelecehan makna/konotasi (*derogatory meaning*). Berdasarkan simbol-simbol agama dan budaya (bahasa, adat berpakaian) inilah mereka dikelompokkan sebagai *alien cultural group*.

Sebaliknya Melayu Muslim mengidentifikasi orang Thai-Budhist sebagai orang kafir (atheist), penyembah patung (image Buda). Mereka diibaratkan sebagai jahiliah moderen, yang menjadikan Budak bak "Lata dan Uza", yang menurut hukum Islam wajib diperangi lantaran sifatnya yang zalim terhadap (sewang-wenang, menindas, dan memerangi) Melayu. Tidak seperti hubungan antara Thai dengan Cina, hubungan Thai dengan Melayu Pattani, yang melibatkan pula hubungan antara Pemerintah Thai dan rakyat Melayu Pattani, penuh diwarnai dengan konflik ideologis, budaya, bahkan bentrok fisik. Di pihak Melayu Muslim Pattani sendiri mengidentifikasi hubungan pemerintah Thai dengan Pattani sebagai hubungan antara mereka yang menindas (penjajah) dan yang ditindas (dijajah). Statement ini

didukung kuat oleh realitas sejarah. Pattani sebelum diintegrasikan ke dalam Thailand adalah kerajaan Melayu Islam yang otonom dan berdaulat penuh. Disini pada akhirnya Melayu Pattani menganggap dirinya (menyadari identitasnya) sebagai *outgroup* di dalam wilayah kelahirannya sendiri.

2. Hubungan Negara dengan Minoritas Muslim Pattani: Pengikisan Identitas Pattani

Keberagaman dari segi etnik, bahasa, agama, dan budaya, status sosial-ekonomi yang ditandai dengan fenomena ketimpangan (*gap*) sosial-ekonomi-politik merupakan kondisi potensial yang mengundang konflik dan kekerasan antar kelompok masyarakat. Dengan demikian kondisi pluralitas mengandung potensi dan ancaman bagi terurainya ikatan kesatuan dan keutuhan dalam suatu negara bangsa. Terlebih-lebih bila negara bangsa tersebut dibangun bukan hanya atas dasar pluralitas di atas, tetapi juga atas penaklukan dan integrasi paksa, sebagaimana dialami Patani yang dipaksa masuk dalam lingkup nation-state Thailand. Apa yang dialami Patani yang dipaksa untuk diintegrasikan ke dalam Thailand jelas mencerminkan kekuatan dan otoritas negara yang bersifat memaksa. Ini membawa konsekuensi bagi Melayu Muslim untuk tunduk terhadap simbol-simbol negara yang diantaranya berpusat pada (*lak Thai*): Raja, agama (Budisme), dan aturan-aturan pemerintah. Program-program nasionalisasi Thai, seperti pendidikan, bahasa, budaya, agama, yang justru memperkuat keinginan untuk melepaskan diri dari ikatan negara bangsa

3. Akomodasi Untuk Meredam Resistensi

Di bawah Perdana Menteri Pidri Banomyong (1945-1947) yang menggantikan Pibun, dia memulai kebijakan-kebijakan yang mengakomodir Melayu Pattani. Pidri membangun politik akomodasi untuk mengintegrasikan Melayu ke dalam Thai melalui partisipasi politik Melayu Muslim di Parlemen. Diantaranya dengan mengeluarkan Royal Decree yang pada intinya bertujuan untuk mengayomi Islam (*Patronage of*

Islamic Act) pada 3 Mei 1945. Undang-undang ini menjamin Konsesi-konsesi pada Melayu Pattani yang diberikan sebagai bagian dari politik akomodasi Pidri, yang meliputi:

1. Pembentukan Chularajmontri yang berperan sebagai penghubung antara pemerintah dengan umat Islam.
2. Pemerintah menjanjikan kebebasan beragama dengan memulihkan jabatan Qadi (jaksa penuntut) dan peran pengadilan agama Islam.
3. Pemerintah menjanjikan proyek-proyek pembangunan masjid.
4. Pemerintah berjanji memindahkan pejabat-pejabat Thai yang korup dan tidak efisien yang bertugas di keempat propinsi.
5. Pegawai pemerintah yang hendak ditempatkan di Selatan diwajibkan untuk mengenal dan memahami dahulu adat istiadat dan tradisi Melayu Muslim sebelum menjalankan tugasnya di salah satu dari keempat propinsi .
6. Mengijinkan pengajaran bahasa Melayu di sekolah-sekolah dasar di masing-masing propinsi.
7. Pemerintah berencana untuk merekrut lebih banyak guru-guru dari Muslim Melayu untuk tahun ajaran berikutnya.
8. Hari Jum'at ditetapkan sebagai hari libur khusus di keempat propinsi menggantikan hari Minggu.
9. Pemerintah mendirikan Universitas Islam (Islamic College)
10. Melayu Muslim diberikan akses dan kesempatan yang sama di Angkatan Bersenjata dan kepolisian Thai.

Meski hukum Islam diberlakukan kembali di keempat propinsi, namun kaum Muslim Pattani belum cukup puas hanya mendapatkan otonomi keagamaan. Mereka menuntut otonomi politik dan ekonomi. Bagi Melayu tuntutan yang lebih penting adalah otonomi politik. Sejalan dengan tuntutan otonomi politik, H. Sulong, Ketua

Majelis Ugama Islam (MUI), mengajukan petisi pada 3 April 1947 kepada pemerintah Pusat di Bangkok. Petisi ini berisi tuntutan sbb:

1. Pemilihan seorang pemimpin yang memiliki kekuasaan penuh untuk memerintah di keempat propinsi Selatan Thailand. Pemimpin ini memiliki pula kewenangan penuh untuk memberhentikan, mengganti semua pegawai pemerintah di keempat propinsi tersebut. Dia harus seorang putra daerah atau orang asli (berasal atau dilahirkan) dari salah satu dari keempat propinsi tersebut dan dipilih rakyat di keempat propinsi.
2. 80% dari pegawai pemerintah di masing-masing propinsi beragama Islam.
3. Melayu dan Thai menjadi bahasa resmi
4. Pengakuan terhadap hukum Islam, dan pelaksanaannya dalam pengadilan Islam yang otonom (berdiri sendiri), terpisah dari pengadilan sipil, dengan Qadi sebagai hakim.
5. Semua pendapatan dan hasil bumi yang berasal dari keempat propinsi harus dapat dimanfaatkan bagi kepentingan penduduk setempat.
6. Pembentukan sebuah badan Islam yang memiliki kekuasaan penuh menangani masalah-masalah yang dihadapi kaum Mulim Pattani di bawah kewenangan penuh dari penguasa negeri.

Petisi H. Sulong tidak mendapatkan tanggapan serius dari Bangkok. Reaksi pemerintah tetap dingin terhadap tuntutan tersebut. Tak adanya reaksi pemerintah atas tuntutan otonomi regional. Aksi protes H. Sulong beserta pengikut-pengikutnya berakhir dengan penangkapan para pemberontak atas tuduhan melakukan penghinaan pada Negara, dan melanggar aturan kerajaan Thai. H. Sulong kemudian diadili dan ditahan di Bangkok.

4. Perubahan Administrasi Pemerintahan dan Struktur Ekonomi

Dengan dijadikannya Pattani sebagai bagian integrative dari wilayah Thailand yang berdaulat, bukan hanya menuntut perubahan administrative maupun ekonomi. Perubahan administratif ini dimulai ketika Raja Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) melakukan sentralisasi pemerintahan yang dikenal dengan sistem *thesapiban*, yang bertujuan untuk melakukan kontrol memusat (dari Bangkok) atas wilayah Selatan. Di tahun 1901 Siam dikelompokkan ke dalam 7 provinsi (*bortween chet huamuang*) yang ditempatkan di bawah kontrol Komisi Wilayah (*kaluang boritween*) yang bertanggung-jawab langsung kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri. Dengan kontrol memusat ini, tidak perlu lagi Raja-Raja di wilayah Selatan membayar upeti (bunga mas), namun seluruh hasil dan sumber-sumber pendapatan disini diserahkan dan dikelola oleh Departemen Pendapatan di masing-masing provinsi. Menjelang tahun 1909 ketujuh propinsi digabungkan menjadi 4 propinsi yang disebut dengan monthon Pattani.

Sementara struktur ekonomi sebelum dan sesudah pengorganisasian sistem administrasi pemerintahan di Pattani memunculkan perbedaan dalam banyak hal. Yang jelas perubahan ini telah mendesak Melayu Pattani ke posisi sosial-ekonomi yang jauh lebih rendah. Di akhir abad ke-19 sampai dengan awal abad ke-20 mayoritas Melayu pattani bekerja di sektor pertanian subsisten. Mayoritas penduduk Melayu Pattani tinggal di sepanjang garis pantai, dan pedalaman dimana mereka mengandalkan sektor pertanian dan perkebunan, terutama karet. Sebagian lainnya bekerja sebagai produsen garam, sektor perikanan skala kecil, dan pekerja tambang. Perdagangan skala besar, seperti ekspor-impor didominasi oleh kelompok Cina. Sedang kekuasaan politik dipegang oleh elit Melayu yang berada di strata atas.

Tak lama setelah Melayu Pattani berada di bawah kontrol pemerintah Thai yang berpusat di Bangkok, pengaturan birokrasi pemerintahan diserahkan pada pejabat-pejabat Thai. Tidaklah mengherankan bila Melayu Pattani sebagai penduduk asli di Selatan hanya menjadi penonton pasif dari banyaknya lowongan kerja yang tersedia seiring dengan pembentukan sistem administrasi dan infrastruktur baru di Selatan.

Secara sosial, politik, dan ekonomis mereka berada dalam posisi yang tak menguntungkan. Di tanah kelahirannya sendiri mereka harus mengalami diskriminasi, tekanan, dan kesewenang-wenangan yang bertubi-tubi dari pemerintah Thai. Sayangnya usaha-usaha pemerintah untuk memperbaiki kondisi ekonomi kurang menampakkan hasil yang memuaskan. Diantara penyebabnya adalah karena pegawai-pegawai pemerintah Thai yang bertugas melaksanakan projek-projek di atas kurang bertanggung-jawabnya dan kurang efisien, kurang tersedianya cukup dana, dan permasalahan ekonomi sudah terlalu kompleks.

Pengidentifikasi Pattani terhadap Thai dan Thailand sebagai suatu nation-state sesudah pengintegrasian tidaklah mudah. Yang dilakukan Pemerintah Thai adalah pengasimiliasian paksa, tidak memberikan pendidikan politik secara wajar (tanpa paksaan). Terlebih-lebih di kalangan elit yang kehilangan kekuasaannya. Tidaklah mengherankan bila gerakan perlawanan Pattani yang mula-mula tumbuh dipelopori oleh elit Pattani baik elit bangsawan (sultan dan keturunannya) dan elit agama maupun yang kehilangan power dan otoritasnya di dalam lingkungan masyarakat Melayu Pattani. Merekalah yang sebenarnya berperan sebagai penjaga/pemelihara identitas agama, bahasa, dan budaya Pattani. Perlawanan ini mendapatkan justifikasi sejarah”, bahwa sebelum ditaklukan Siam, Pattani Raya adalah kesultanan yang otonom. Tujuan memobilisasi massa Melayu dalam berbagai gerakan adalah mengembalikan kejayaan Pattani sebagai suatu wilayah politik yang otonom.

GERAKAN SEPARATISME DI THAILAND SELATAN

1. Sebab-sebab Munculnya Gerakan Separatis

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand yang dikenal dengan nama *Changwad Chaiden Pak Thai* rata-rata adalah dihuni oleh komunitas muslim keturunan Melayu. Mereka memiliki ikatan sejarah Melayu yang kuat dibandingkan dengan Thai. Hal ini membuat mereka merasa bukan menjadi bagian dari negara Thailand yang memiliki

kepercayaan, adat, bahasa dan tatacara yang berbeda dengan mereka. Hal yang ditengarai sebagai penyebab munculnya gerakan separatis adalah: pertama, sejarah dan penaklukan oleh Siam, dimana Pattani dulu adalah sebuah kerajaan yang termasyur dan pelabuhannya berkembang sebagai pusat perdagangan (trading port) terbesar di Asia Tenggara (Wyatt, 1970). Pattani meliputi wilayah yang cukup luas, sebagai pusat perdagangan besar, dan menjalin hubungan dengan banyak negara atau kerajaan lain, termasuk Ayudhaya yang kemudian berkeinginan untuk menaklukan Pattani. Pada akhirnya berhasil ditaklukan oleh kerajaan Siam yang berpusat di Ayudhaya pada tahun 1786.

Pada tahun 1815 atas perintah Raja Rama II, Pattani terbagi menjadi tujuh kawasan negeri yang disebut Boriwen Ched Hua Muang, yang terdiri dari Pattani, Nong Chik, Yaring, Saiburi, Legeh, Yala dan Raman. Pada tahun 1906, dikelompokkan menjadi empat wilayah yaitu Pattani, Yala, Saiburi dan Rengek, dibawah pemerintahan Monthon Pattani (setara dengan propinsi) dan pada tahun 1933, diubah lagi menjadi empat wilayah selatan yaitu Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat dan Satun/Setul.

Penaklukan Pattani oleh kerajaan Siam yang kemudian diikuti dengan penerapan tata pemerintahan baru ini menjadi titik awal munculnya gerakan perlawanan. Masyarakat Pattani yang menyimpan kenangan sebagai kerajaan masyhur dan menjadi pusat perdagangan yang paling ramai, menginginkan kondisi seperti dulu dan benturan kepentingan yang saling bertolak belakang inilah yang menyebabkan munculnya gerakan separatis pula.

Penyebab kedua adalah, kepentingan ekonomi. Wilayah Selatan cukup kaya karena sebagai sumber penghasil minyak, pengembangan industri perikanan dan pengalangan ikan, dan sumber ekonomi lain. Namun demikian, dalam catatan kemiskinan diketahui bahwa Pattani adalah wilayah yang berada dibawah garis kemiskinan. Hal ini dikarenakan sebagian besar akses ekonomi yang ada dinikmati oleh anggota komunitas lain di Pattani, seperti orang Thailand yang beragama Budha dan keturunan China, sedangkan posisi ekonomi para penduduk Pattani hanyalah sebagai

pelengkap (complementer) daripada sebagai stake holder. Penduduk Pattani kebanyakan adalah nelayan, pedagang kecil, pekerja pada sektor transportasi, dan buruh kasar. Dengan demikian, penduduk Pattani merasa tersingkir secara ekonomik. Masyarakat Pattani merasa hanya menerima imbas kerusakan ekologi dan kehilangan kesempatan untuk menikmati hasil bumi yang diambil dari wilayahnya. Hal ini telah melahirkan perasaan tersingkir dari akses memperoleh kesejahteraan secara ekonomis, yang akhirnya juga memunculkan perasaan anti pemerintah. Ditambah lagi dengan kesempatan bersaing dalam lapangan kerja yang terbatas, terutama bagi mereka yang belajar di luar negeri, dengan alasan bahwa mereka tidak mengerti bahasa Thai dan sendi-sendi kehidupan masyarakat Thai.

Penyebab ketiga adalah, migrasi internal. Adanya program migrasi penduduk dari wilayah Utara telah menciptakan kesenjangan ekonomi antara komunitas muslim dengan komunitas non muslim. Para penduduk ini dipindahkan dari wilayah utara ke Selatan. Mereka dipindahkan ke Selatan dengan alasan meratakan densitas penduduk, sekaligus meningkatkan taraf hidup penduduk (Save Settlement), dimana setiap keluarga diberi oleh pemerintah sebidang tanah garapan seluas 25 rai dan rumah seluas 5 rai). Tujuan lainnya adalah untuk membuat jumlah penduduk di Selatan menjadi “imbang”, antara penduduk muslim dan Budha. Penduduk yang dipindahkannya sebagian pegawai pemerintah di wilayah utara dan pusat untuk mengisi jabatan-jabatan di wilayah Selatan. Pola ini juga memicu munculnya perlawanan masyarakat Pattani. Program tersebut baru berjalan ± 40 tahun dan dalam kurun waktu 75 tahun, proyek itu akan menghasilkan jumlah penduduk yang seimbang di wilayah Selatan antara penduduk muslim dan penduduk Budha.

Penyebab keempat adalah, kegagalan mengakomodasi perbedaan identitas. Pada dasarnya persoalan perbedaan agama secara umum menjadi tidak begitu signifikan untuk menjelaskan munculnya perlawanan Pattani. Hal ini dikarenakan gerakan separatis yang dilakukan oleh kalangan muslim di Thailand, hanya muncul di wilayah selatan. Namun demikian, bagi wilayah selatan, persoalan perbedaan agama menjadi

salah satu faktor pemicu muncul dan menguatnya perlawanan. Hal ini tidak lepas dari penerapan kebijakan negara Thailand yang menyangkut penerapan kebijakan nasionalisme Thailand khususnya pada masa pemerintahan Phibul Songkram, dimana berusaha menerapkan konsep *ultra chauvinistic* yang menempatkan budaya Thai lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan budaya lain yang memberikan efek jangka panjang bagi kelangsungan masyarakat Thailand yang multikultur, seperti banyak kasus yang menjadi contoh perlakuan diskriminatif yang diterima oleh kalangan muslim khususnya di Selatan, baik dalam bahasa, pekerjaan, pendidikan, dan sebagainya.

2. Telaah Historis Gerakan Separatis

Secara teoritis, gerakan separatis dapat dijelaskan bahwa gerakan ini ditujukan untuk melawan proses modernisasi, nativistik dan persoalan dalam kerangka nasionalistis (Munson, 1984). Dalam hal ini, gerakan separatis di Pattani dapat dijelaskan sebagai gerakan yang menolak modernisasi yang dibawa oleh pembaruan system dan tata pemerintahan Thesaphiban, dan modernisasi yang dibawa oleh implementasi atas undang-undang pendidikan nasional.

Dari sisi gerakan perlawanan yang dilakukan oleh masyarakat Pattani, ada beberapa babak, pertama, Perlawanan pada Masa Raja-Raja Melayu (1900-1933), diketahui dengan masa Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamarudin, raja negeri Pattani memutuskan untuk melakukan perlawanan kepada pemerintah Thailand pada tahun 1901. Keputusan ini dilakukan setelah upaya perundingan yang melibatkan Gubernur Jenderal Singapura, Sir Frank Swettenham gagal merubah kebijakan Siam atas Pattani. (Nik Mahmud, 1954:11). Kedua, Perlawanan kaum Ulama (1943-1954), dimulai ketika Haji Sulong atau Abdul Kadir Tukmina membentuk syariat yang dinamakan Haiyah Nafaz Al Ahkam al Syariat atau Badan Pelaksana Hukum-hukum Syariat. Pada pertemuan tanggal 28 Oktober 1943, badan itu telah melantik Haji Sulong sebagai Hakim atau Kadi bagi masyarakat Pattani.

3. Perkembangan Gerakan Separatis

Sejak pembangkangan terhadap Siam dan perlawanan yang terus menerus dilancarkan oleh penduduk Pattani, perkembangan gerakan separatis semakin marak. Perlawanan sporadis banyak dilakukan oleh para penduduk Pattani, baik yang terorganisir maupun yang berupa gerakan bawah tanah, tanpa mempunyai afiliasi organisasi. Gerakan perlawanan terhadap kekuasaan kerajaan Siam, yang rata-rata bertujuan untuk mengembalikan Pattani seperti pada jaman keemasan dengan upaya memerdekakan Pattani dari pengaruh Thailand, dapat dilihat dalam beberapa sisi. Pertama, Gerakan yang tidak terorganisir, dimana sejak Pattani jatuh ke tangan kekuasaan Thailand, banyak perlawanan yang dilakukan secara sporadis oleh masyarakat Pattani untuk menentang kebijakan pemerintah Thailand. Kedua, gerakan yang terorganisir, dimana perkembangan gerakan perlawanan masyarakat muslim di Selatan terhadap kekuasaan Thailand, dapat dikatakan mulai memasuki tahap modern dengan mewujudkan diri sebagai sebuah gerakan yang terorganisir.

Beberapa gerakan yang terorganisir yang cukup signifikan adalah GAMPAR (Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya), didirikan di Kotabahru, Kelantan tanggal 5 Maret 1948, gerakan ini dapat dikatakan mempunyai ikatan kuat dengan Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) yang berbasis di Malaysia. Anggota GAMPAR adalah orang-orang muslim melayu di Pattani, diyakini bahwa Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen berdiri dibalik GAMPAR. Gerakan ini bertujuan membebaskan Pattani dari pengaruh SIAM dan gerakannya lebih bersifat sporadis. Kemudian BNPP ((Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani), BNPP yang juga dikenal dengan National Liberation Front of Pattani, didirikan pada tahun 1959 dan berpusat di negeri Kelantan. Gerakannya lebih kearah pembebasan Pattani, tidak lagi mau berkompromi dengan model pemberian otonomi. Model gerakannya tidak saja dilakukan dengan cara taktis dengan melakukan gerakan-gerakan politis, tapi juga dilakukan dengan model gerilya. Idris bin Mat Diah atau yang dikenal dengan Pak Yeh dikenal dengan pimpinan kriminal, bergabung dengan BNPP dan menjadi pimpinan perang gerilya. Ada lagi yang dikenal dengan PULO (Pattani United

Liberation Organisation), gerakan ini lebih kearah gerakan sekular nasionalistis, dan terakhir BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), didirikan pada bulan Maret 1963 oleh Ustadz Abdul Karim Hasan, dengan upaya mempengaruhi kalangan pondok.

Untuk menyikapi perkembangan kondisi keamanan di wilayah Selatan, pemerintah telah membuat kekuatan keamanan khusus yang terdiri dari gabungan antara militer, sipil dan Polisi. Kekuatan khusus itu dinamakan CPM 43, yang secara administratif berada di bawah ACASBP (Administrative Center for the Administration of Southern Border Provinces). Kedua organisasi tersebut adalah untuk mengantisipasi perkembangan gerakan separatis yang mengganggu kondisi keamanan di wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand.

Dari persoalan benturan kepentingan dalam pembentukan identitas itu, muncullah gerakan separatis, yang sederhana dapat dipahami bersumber dari masalah-masalah sebagai berikut:

1. Penguasa Thai berusaha mewujudkan homogenisasi nilai - yang dihormati bersama di dalam sistem pemerintahan maupun kemasyarakatan - di dalam wilayah kekuasaannya. Mereka kurang membuka ruang untuk berkembangnya budaya dan kepentingan-kepentingan minoritas. Islam dan Melayu tidak dihargai sebagai elemen-elemen yang memperkaya khasanah (mosaik) dalam proses pembentukan negara bangsa Thai. Islam bahkan dianggap sebagai suatu sistem nilai yang menghambat nasionalisasi dan modernisasi. Membangun nasionalisme Thai yang menutup eksistensi dan aspirasi dari etnik minoritas justru menghancurkan pilar-pilar nation state Thailand. Pemimpin Thai perlu disadarkan lagi konteks kesejarahannya sendiri (learn their own history). Semenjak wilayah Pattani disatukan ke dalam nation-state Thai, Thai bukanlah bangsa yang homogen lagi. Kebijakan homogenisasi (nasionalisasi Thai) justru merusak konsolidasi kedaulatan dan integritas wilayah Thailand sendiri.
2. Pimpinan negara perlu memahami reasoning dan justifikasi, motivasi utama mengapa tokoh agama melakukan tindakan politis yang membawa potensi

disintegrasi . Oleh karena itu, pemimpin negara Thai perlu berupaya untuk mengakomodasikan kepentingan para pemimpin agama yang merupakan simbol representasi masyarakat umum dengan memberikan akses kepada mereka dalam ruang publik yang legitimate, seperti dalam sistem perwakilan politik yang membawakan aspirasi Pattani.

3. Di sisi lain, pemimpin agama perlu menegakkan prinsip agama Islam yang menjadi pondasi bagi masyarakat khususnya masyarakat Muslim Pattani. Keterisolasian dan keterasingan secara geografis, politik, ditambah lagi dengan jurang sosial-ekonomi dan perbedaan ideologi agama merupakan bibit subur bagi tumbuh dan berkembangnya separatisme.
4. Pemimpin agama Islam sering muncul sebagai juru bicara atas persoalan muslim di wilayah itu, bahkan sering mengatas namakan kepentingan untuk komunitas muslim. Rata-rata pada kenyataannya para pemimpin agama ini muncul dari pemimpin tradisional, yang menguasai kelompok pemilik tanah, atau pemimpin local. Sangat jarang pemimpin agama yang berusaha mencari peran politik. Oleh karena itu, ketika ada pemimpin agama yang berubah orientasi perjuangan dengan mencari peran politik, banyak yang menganggapnya sebagai “Tuk Nai/orang yang ikut-ikutan”. Namun ketika keadaan (realitas politik, ekonomi, sosial dan budaya) berubah drastik, dan menempatkan Pattani pada posisi tertindas dan mengalami kesewenang-wenangan penguasa “asing”, keterlibatan pemuka-pemuka agama Pattani sebagai tulang punggung atau motor penggerak dalam berbagai front pembebasan menjadi sangat krusial dan fundamental. Islam tidak mengenal pemisahan antara peran agama dan peran politik, melawan kezaliman dan menegakan keadilan adalah perjuangan spiritual yang justru membutuhkan tanggapan ulama sebagai mobilisator dan katalisator antara pemerintah dan masyarakat. Idealnya, mereka harus berada di garda terdepan dalam membumikan ilmu agama ke dalam aksi/amal yang faktual.

Masyarakat yang pluralistik senantiasa mengidamkan kondisi multikultur yang mengakui, melindungi, menghormati, dan menjamin hak-hak minoritas. Jaminan perlindungan terhadap hak-hak minoritas idealnya diwujudkan dalam bentuk terciptanya situasi yang kondusif bagi pemberian kesempatan yang sama (*equal opportunity and access*) dalam mendapatkan (memperebutkan) semua sumber-sumber penting dalam segala aspek kehidupan. Jaminan pengakuan (perlindungan) bagi hak-hak minoritas idealnya tercermin dari sikap publik dan pemerintah untuk menyediakan ruang publik (*public sphere*) yang merepresentasikan kepentingan-kepentingan minoritas dalam setiap aspek kehidupan (*political, cultural, social and economic representativeness of the minorities in public sphere*). Kebijakan ultra nasionalis yang merekonstruksi identitas Thai yang monolitik (*creation of Thainess as a single/sole identity*) telah menghancurkan sendi-sendi multikulturalisme itu sendiri dan menyalakan semangat resistensi. Dalam perkembangannya, kebijakan ultranasionalis bila tetap diteruskan akan menjadi kendala bagi proses pembentukan negara bangsa di kemudian hari.

KESIMPULAN

Dengan mempelajari politik integrasi yang dijalankan sejak jaman dinasti Chulalongkorn terhadap kaum Mulsim Melayu Pattani di Selatan dapat disimpulkan bahwa fase yang paling awal dilakukan pemerintah adalah integrasi politik, yakni penggabungan wilayah Thai dan Pattani dalam satu sistem pemerintahan. Dalam proses awal pengintegrasian, perintah rupanya lebih mementingkan aspek konsolidasi teritorial dan memperluas kekuasaan (otoritas) Raja Thai untuk memerintah atas provinsi-provinsi Melayu Muslim di Selatan. Pemerintah Kerajaan Thai (pada waktu itu) juga menerapkan kebijakan *divide and rule* dengan memrcrah teritori raja-raja Melayu di Selatan menjadi beberapa proinsi dengan tujuan untuk melemahkan kekuasaan masing-masing raja, sehingga mereka kurang punya sinergi kekuatan-kekuatan politik untuk berontak.

Usaha-usaha untuk menyatukan wilayah raja-raja Melayu di Selatan dengan memasukkan mereka ke dalam sistem administrasi pemerintahan yang tersentralisir sudah dimulai sejak jaman Chulalongkorn di awal 1900 an. Tujuan utama dari sentralisasi ini adalah untuk memperkuat legitimasi kekuasaan Raja Chulalongkorn dan menancapkan cengkeraman politiknya (*political grip*) pada masing-masing teritori (raja-raja Melayu) yang ditaklukkannya. Singkat kata sentralisasi merupakan mekanisme menjalankan kewenangan dan kontrol penuh (*exercising full authority and control*) atas wilayah-wilayah (bekas) raja-raja Melayu yang secara absah dan legal menjadi bagian integral dari kedaulatan Siam. Namun di bawah Raja Chulalongkorn integrasi politik dalam arti untuk membangun *sense of belonging* sebagai bangsa Thai dan *sense of loyalty* pada Kerajaan Thai di kalangan Melayu Pattani tidaklah berujud seperti yang diharapkan. Ini dikarenakan pemerintah kerajaan lebih terkonsentrasi pada pembangunan dan pemeliharaan batas-batas wilayah negara, penyediaan infrastruktur (pranata-pranata) politik di Selatan yang menghubungkan Pusat Kerajaan, daripada membangun mental (*spirit*) Melayu Pattani untuk menyatu dengan rakyat dan Raja Thai.

Inkorporasi politik ke dalam kedaulatan Thailand, bukan hanya beresiko hilangnya kekuasaan dan otoritas dari para raja-raja Melayu setempat atas wilayah yang pernah dikuasainya, sentralisasi juga menyebabkan kehilangan wewenang untuk menikmati segala sumber daya alam dan hasil-hasilnya (termasuk pungutan pajak) di dalamnya. Integrasi politik yang dijalankan melalui sentralisasi ini memberikan kewenangan penuh bagi Pusat untuk mengambil alih hasil-hasil pajak dan hasil-hasil bumi di Selatan. *Power of taxation and collection of local revenues* beralih kendali dari tangan mantan Raja-Raja Melayu ke pemerintah Pusat (Bangkok). Dengan begini, mereka bukan hanya otonomi politik mereka dipenggal, tetapi juga otonomi ekonomi dalam mengelola, menerima pajak, dan hasil-hasil bumi lainnya.

Hal lain yang dilakukan untuk memperluas otoritas negara adalah merubah sistem pengadilan dengan memindahkan kewenangan hukum dan pengorganisasian hukum yang tersentralisasi. Semenjak pengintegrasian, supremasi hukum sipil Thai yang sekuler berlaku atas hukum-hukum agama (Islam) berlaku. Pengadilan Islam (yang mengatur perkara terbatas pada perkawinan, perceraian, warisan) harus tunduk pada hukum sipil Thai. Di masa Pibun pengadilan Islam bahkan ditutup seiring dengan dipecatnya jabatan Qadi (hakim agama Islam). Ini dimaksudkan untuk mengangkat nasionalisme Thai. Kesetiaan pada Islam dianggap sebagai penghambat dari nasionalisme Thai. Namun, setelah melihat fakta bahwa kebijakan Pibun justru meningkatkan spirit resistensi, di masa Pidri hukum Islam dipulihkan

Selama periode monarkhi konstitusional yang menggantikan monarkhi absolut, kebijakan integrasi politik bergerak di antara asimilasi (paksa) dan akomodasi. Program asimilasi ditandai dengan menerakan program pendidikan (wajib belajar selama 3 tahun dari kelas 1-sampai dengan kelas 4). Program ini memaksa Melayu untuk mengurangi intensitas ketrelibatan mereka pada pendidikan pondok, yang dilecehkan pemerintah Thai sebagai menghambat nasionalisasi (Thai-ifikasi) dan modernisme lantaran mutu pendidikannya yang rendah. Pondok hanya membangun kesetiaan etnik (Melayu) dan menjadi tempat menggalang semangat resistensi (anti) pemerintah. Program wajib pendidikan ini kemudian diikuti dengan penetapan bahasa Thai sebagai bahasa nasional, program modernisasi dan sekularisasi pendidikan yang mengurangi pengaruh dan otoritas pondok yang mengajarkan bahasa Melayu dan Islam.

Baik asimilasi paksa (di masa Pibun) maupun akomodasi (di masa Pidri) gagal mengasimilasikan Melayu Pattani untuk memiliki sense of nationalism yang lebih tinggi. Pada intinya asimilasi hendak mengangkat nasionalisme Thai dengan mengorbankan identitas (budaya dan agama) Pattani. Sedang akomodasi (di masa Pidri) justru memulihkan (sebagian) identitas Pattani dengan memberikan otonomi beragama, seperti mengembalikan peran hukum Islam, jabatan Kadi, dan pengadilan agama Islam. Padahal yang lebih diinginkan Pattani adalah otonomi politik (regional), yang

menjamin kebebasan mengelola administrasi pemerintahan dan kepemimpinan sendiri. Dalam pandangan Pattani, otonomi bidang ekonomi, pendidikan, agama, dan budaya, dsb hanya bisa dijalankan sepenuhnya melalui otonomi politik. Jadi meskipun di masa Pridi banyak hak-hak istimewa (khususnya beragama) Muslim dikembalikan, namun Pattani tetap merasa tidak puas dan tetap bergolak (menjalin semangat resistensi) karena penolakan pemerintah atas tuntutan otonomi politik.

Awal dari gerakan separatisme Pattani melibatkan solidaritas Melayu dari luar Thailand, yakni etnik Melayu lainnya di Semenanjung Malaya (sekarang Malaysia). Pada mulanya gerakan perlawanan Pattani dipimpin oleh bangsawan yang didukung ulama. Kedua kelompok elit inilah yang banyak kehilangan kekuasaan otoritas di bawah kebijakan integrasi politik (sentralisasi), dan pendomestifikasian hukum Islam di bawah hukum sipil Thai yang sekuler. Namun pada akhirnya juga melibatkan massa Melayu Muslim secara umum.

Massa melayu pattani yang melarikan diri ke Malaysia karena tekanan budaya, politik, maupun fisik dari pemerintah Thai merasa lebih baik bergabung dengan sesama saudaranya di semenanjung. Afinitas kekerabatan dan kesamaan etnik membentuk ikatan solidaritas politik antar sesama Melayu, dan mengkristal dalam cita-cita mengembangkan Melayu Raya.. Nasionalisme etnik Patani yang pertama muncul berbentuk harapan untuk lepas dari Thai dan terlebur dalam entitas Melayu yang lebih besar, yakni Federasi Malaysia.

Munculnya berbagai organisasi perlawanan merupakan akumulasi dari sikap anti-pati terhadap pengintegrasian Pattani ke dalam nation state Thailand. Di samping ada organisasi perlawanan yang berkeinginan meleburkan diri dalam semangat Melayu Raya dan menjadikan Pattani bagian dari Federasi Malaysia, sebagaimana diungkap di atas, ada pula fron-fron perlawanan yang menginginkan Negara Islam Pattani merdeka yang berdiri sendiri. Perjuangan ini mencerminkan keinginan untuk mewujudkan kembali collective memory tentang kedaulatan Kesultanan Pattani di masa lalu. Organisasi pembebasan Pattani memiliki fron-fron bersenjata yang menuai dukungan

luas dari kalangan penduduk Pattani dan sesama Melayu dari Semenanjung, maupun negara-negara Islam lainnya. Dalam perkembangan berikutnya terjadi transformasi kepemimpinan, yang tidak lagi didominasi oleh para bangsawan tetapi juga sudah beralih pada elit keagamaan. Perubahan ini seiring dengan makin memudarnya prestise dari kalangan bangsawan. Meski dalam kenyataannya perjuangan pembebasan Pattani lebih banyak dipelopori tokoh-tokoh Islam, mereka tetap didukung oleh kalangan bangsawan. Keterlibatan dari para tokoh agama dalam fron pembebasan ini sangat krusial. Para tokoh atau elit keagamaan merupakan tulang punggung atau penggerak utama dari beberapa gerakan separatisme di Pattani di tahun 1970an. Meskipun berbagai fron ini pada akhirnya juga mengalami firksi dan perpecahan internal, mereka telah sering mengadakan aksi-aksi perlawanan bersenjata melawan polisi dan angkatan bersenjata Thai di keempat provinsi. Untuk mengingatkan Pemerintah maupun masyarakat umum mengenai keberadaan dan perjuangan panjang mereka.

Dalam perjuangannya berbagai fron pembebasan ini juga berupaya untuk memperoleh dukungan maupun pengakuan internasional (khususnya negara-negara islam), demi memperoleh perlengkapan militer, bantuan keuangan, maupun pelatihan militer yang sangat fundamental bagi kelangsungan aktivitas fron tersebut. Pada intinya popular support (dukungan massal) yang diperoleh oleh organisasi perlawanan didasarkan pada ikatan: afinitas etnik dan kekerabatan lokal (sesama Pattani dan sesama Melayu), solidaritas (emosi) keagamaan (Islam) global/universal - yang melintasi batasan etnik, teritori, dan negara (*ethnic, territorial, state boundaries*) dalam bentuk ikhwanul Muslimin (persaudaraan sesama Muslim).

Melayu Muslim Pattani dipaksa hidup dalam wilayah yurisdiksi hukum dan pemerintahan negeri Thailand yang mereka pandang sebagai sesuatu yang asing (alien ruler/government) dan membuat mereka terkucil (alienated/isolated). Mereka dipaksakan untuk hidup dalam wadah nation-state Thailand, namun pemerintah Thai gagal untuk menarik loyalitas dan dukungan mereka untuk menjadi bagian dari warga negara Thai (Muslim Thai). Melayu Pattani merasa memiliki jarak geografis -

kedudukan pemerintah Thai yang relatif jauh dengan daerah yang ditinggali oleh Melayu Pattani, jarak politik dan agama (budaya) -pemerintahan di Selatan dipegang mayoritas Thai-Buda yang berasal dari daerah lain, jarak status sosial-ekonomi - ketimpangan struktural antara pejabat Thai dan mayoritas Thai di provinsi lain dengan Melayu di provinsi-provinsi Selatan. Program-program pemerintah untuk mengintegrasikan Pattani dalam banyak hal dinilai gagal, sebaliknya justru mengakibatkan timbulnya kecurigaan, meningkatkan anti-pati, dan resistensi terhadap pemerintah. Timbulnya aksi-aksi perlawanan yang sporadis sedikit banyak juga didorong oleh akumulasi dari keterasingan dan anti pati, yang kian mengkristal sebagai akibat berbagai program integrasi politik (asimilasi budaya) yang dinilai gagal.

Dalam menjalankan programnya pemerintah kurang mengandalkan proses asimilasi yang alami (*natural assimilation*) melalui proses pendidikan politik yang wajar dan sabar. Proses asimilasi yang tidak wajar ini ditandai dengan penetrasi nilai-nilai, pemaksaan aturan-aturan yang menekan (*oppressive rules*). Kebijakan pendidikan bukanlah proses naturalisasi yang wajar. Di satu sisi, pemerintah lebih banyak memaksakan identitas (budaya) mayoritas yang menjunjung tinggi etnosentrisme lokal Thai dalam menerapkan asimilasi, dengan konsekuensi menghancurkan identitas (budaya dan agama) Pattani di lain sisi. Pada fase selanjutnya akumulasi kecurigaan, kebencian, ketrasingan terhadap program-program pemerintah mengkristal dalam semangat resistensi, yang diorganisir dan dilembagakan dalam berbagai gerakan pembebasan (Malay Liberation movement) dengan menggunakan cara-cara legal maupun ilegal (semacam teror).

