

The Network of Islamic Radicalism: Proposing a Mapping Model¹

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Abstract

This paper deals with both a theoretical and practical aspect of mapping of the global radical Muslim groups. It will propose a typology of global Muslim radical groups that will be used to formulate a unified pattern and frame to be integrated into a practical and institutional strategy. While the primary purpose is to create a typology and mapping of actors and its activism, this paper also attempts to answer a more profound question related to the cause of divergence, split, and conflict within the global radical networks. The article will show that the global Islamic radical network is deeply rooted in a local context. Almost all global radical organizations thrived in a failed state where state controls and authorities were absent, and its fabric of society was broken by ongoing ethnic and sectarian conflicts, socio-economic crisis, as well as foreign interventions. Borrowing the social movement theory, this paper elaborates Islamic radicalism movement in a broader picture of Islamic activism where its scope covers both peaceful and violence activism. By taking cases from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, this paper not only proposes the analysis on the dynamics of Islamic radicalism in a broader landscape but also highlights the matter in a comparative perspective.

Keywords: Mapping, Radicalism, Salafi-Wahabism, Violent movement, Al-Qaeda, ISIS

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Introduction

This essay will primarily focus on mapping out global radical Muslim groups (hereinafter, GRMs). It seeks to answer several questions such as: why GRMs have emerged and where they came from, why they split, what are their common platforms and what are their disagreements, including on issues related to Islamic principles. However, this article will also look at the actors and activism of GRMs and seek to understand how they utilise and reinterpret classical doctrines related to the issue of violence. As we will see, different interpretations of doctrines, in addition to other theological matters, have led to the divergence and factionalisation within GRMs.

This article will also discuss how GRMs become a global enterprise by analysing their affiliations and networks in three separate regions: Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. By taking comparative look at these three different regions, this paper will show the global interconnectedness of radical movements, even as they are also tied to their unique contexts. Interestingly, every group dynamic in these cases studies is tied to the state environment: violent extremism thrives only in a weak or failed state.

It is worth noting that instead of providing a comprehensive outline of groups, due to space limitations, my essay will focus only on outlining a strategy and pattern for mapping out these groups. In other words, this paper will attempt to propose a typology of global Muslim radical groups that will be used to formulate a unified pattern and framework to be integrated into a practical and institutional strategy. While many scholars have discussed the issue of Islamic radicalism, a comparative analysis as part of efforts to develop a mapping model are still rare. This article, thus, can contribute to filling this gap.

Causes and origins


The origin of GRMs can be traced back to the 12th century when Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328) formulated theological and jurisprudential theories in response to the dramatic socio-political changes at the time. Ibn Taymiyya wrote at a time when Muslims faced an unprecedented defeat and, ultimately, a crisis of identity. His main intellectual project was reformulating Muslim identity amidst the catastrophic Mongol invasion, which saw almost all Muslim lands fall to the Horde. For example, Ibn Taymiyya questioned whether Mongols who converted to Islam were true believers if they were still bound by their traditional (non-Islamic) customs. He argued that as long as Muslims do not practice the Shari'a (Islamic law), they are infidels. Contemporary Salafists and radical groups gain legitimacy from Ibn Taymiyya's work in their fight against secular regimes, as these regimes are cast as being infidels like the Mongols of Ibn Taymiyya's time (Michot 2011; Riedel 2008, 20-22).

One can also trace the emergence of GRMs to the European colonial period when, like the Mongol era, almost all Muslim lands were colonised and conquered by Western ‘Christian’ powers. The caliphate that represented the symbolic political power of Muslims was dismantled in Turkey in 1924. Muslims faced a crisis and saw themselves as being in decline, lost, and defeated. Just like Ibn Taymiyya, Muslim thinkers and scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghāni (d. 1897), Muḥammad Abduh (d.1905), and Rashid Ridā (d.1935), sought to explain the causes of Muslim defeat and formulate a strategy for revival. This sense of subjugation or defeat, as will be described below, is crucial in analyzing GRMs (Peters 1979; Nasr 2020; Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2020).

Some Muslim thinkers offered a simplistic response to the question of how Muslim lands could be conquered by these outsiders, claiming that it was because Muslims deviated from the right path and abandoned their core religious tenets. For other Muslims, this decline was a result of a lack of understanding and mastering of modern science and adherence to a static intellectual culture. The first stream of thought sparked revivalist movements seeking to restore purist traditions, while the second stream led to the rise of Islamic modernism. The first stream demanded a return to original Muslim traditions, bearing a slogan of ‘return to al-Qur’an and Sunna,’ while the second stream championed independent thought in reinterpreting tradition in the light of modernity with a motto of re-opening the ‘gates of *ijtihad*’ (interpretation) that were ‘closed’ in the 12th century (Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2020).

Interestingly, both the revivalists and the modernists appealed to the earliest traditions in Islam, but in different ways. For revivalists, a return to the purest form of Islam and emulating the ‘pious predecessors’ was the way to cure Muslim civilisation’s ills. Modernists, meanwhile, argue that reform and reinterpreting tradition so that it could adapt to the modern world was key to navigating the crisis of the Muslim world. There are extremes on each end of this spectrum, including those who believe that all tradition should be cast aside as it is no longer relevant.

Referring and appealing to and replicating the earliest traditions formulated and practiced by the first generation of Muslims is the central platform of Salafism (“salaf” here meaning the past or the righteous predecessors), the key ideology behind GRMs. However, modernist Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, interestingly, also claim to be ‘Salafiyya.’ Furthermore, in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a traditionalist Muslim organisation established in 1926, describe themselves as the followers of the salaf tradition — their nationwide school networks are known as ‘*pesantren salaf*’ (‘salaf Islamic boarding schools’). Diagram 1 below outlines the landscape of Muslim actors seeking to reconcile Islam with the modern world.



These groups seek authority and legitimacy for their movement by grounding their views in the earliest generations of Islam. This paper will utilise Wiktorowicz's (2006, 212) terminology, and refer to the modernist stream appealing to the earliest generations of Islam as "Salafiyya" while the term "Salaf", at least with reference to the Indonesian case, represents the traditionalist movement. The focus on this paper, will be on the last category, referred to as "Salafi," which represents the extremist revival of religious tradition (see Diagram 1).

The 1980s as a turning point

Although GRMs' origins can be traced back to the 12th century or the colonial period, these movements only really started to take shape in the 1980s. While Ibn Taymiyya was a product of the Mongol invasions and Salafiyya and Islamism emerged in response to colonisation, GRMs were a product of the specific socio-political environment of the Sunni Arab world in the 1970s and 1980s (Haykel 2016, 71-73). Certainly, both Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine and early Salafiyya teachings contributed to the existence of GRMs, but practically these movements emerged out of the failures and brutality of Middle Eastern politics.

Since decolonisation, Middle Eastern politics has been dominated by corrupt, unaccountable, and repressive authoritarian regimes. The defeat of the Arab coalition in the war against Israel in 1976 and these regimes' failure to deliver economic prosperity and good governance prompted the emergence of Islamic alternatives to secular systems. The Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 boosted calls for change based on Islamic ideals. In response, authoritarian regimes in the Sunni Arab world brutally suppressed political Islam, which they saw as a threat to their position (Haykel 2016, 73).

In order to better understand how GRMs came into being, we must examine three interrelated developments during this period for the Middle East: the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Pan Islamism in the milieu of Saudi-Wahhabi ideology, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. These three historical developments

marked a significant change in the nature of Islamic revivalism and puritanism, with the blending of these developments resulting in the creation of GRMs.

The crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood

Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) established the Muslim Brotherhood (hereinafter MB) in Egypt in 1928. This movement was inspired by Wahhabi puritanism, Al-Afghani pan-Islamism and Muhammad Abduh's reformist modernism. MB's primary purpose was to reform Muslim society based on Islamic doctrines in response to the secularisation of the Arab world at that time, which began with the abolition of the caliphate by Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and the British colonisation of Egypt. MB's combination of organisational skills and charismatic leadership enabled it to grow very quickly, becoming a mass social movement, and attracting new followers not only in Egypt but also in neighboring Arab countries. While focusing on a plan of religious and social reform, MB, from its inception, also had a strong message of political reform (Sattar 1995; Wickham 2013). The organisation published a new political magazine, *Al-Nadhir* (the Warner), which focused on the political struggle in Egypt and abroad. MB enthusiastically sought to seize power through politics and use its position to reform society based on Islamic values (Haykel 2016).

Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), who was MB's most prominent ideologue (and also features prominently in other Islamic puritan and extremist groups), formulated most of his theories and doctrine during his brutal imprisonment and torture under the Nasser regime. Qutbism, as it would later be known, would eventually become the dominant ideology among MB members and among other groups, especially after his execution in 1966 by Nasser. His teachings and doctrines, such as the concept of *jahiliyyah* (lit. 'time of ignorance' but interpreted to mean any environment in which Islamic values are not implemented) and *hakimiyya* ('divine sovereignty') provided the foundation for a legitimate struggle against corrupt Muslim rulers and regimes (Khatab 2002; Qutb 2006; Calvert 2009; Wickham 2013, 27-29).

Divisions over strategy between clandestine violence and electoral politics triggered the emergence of factions in MB in the late 1970s. In 1979 Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farraj (d.1982) founded Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), an extremist offspring of MB, after MB formally disavowed violence (Orr 2003; Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004). EIJ went largely undetected or ignored until Khāled al-Islambuli (d.1982), an EIJ member, assassinated President Anwar Sadat in response to Sadat's peace deal with Israel and the US. After this incident, MB and EIJ members were arrested in one of the biggest crackdowns targeting the organisations in Egypt. Ayman al-Zawahiri, another member of EIJ, was among those who was arrested and spent three years in jail before escaping from Egypt. MB and EIJ members fled Egypt during this period, with many emigrating to Saudi Arabi, Jordan, Afghanistan (such as al-Zawahiri), and other neighboring countries, taking with them their

revolutionary ideology, extensive networks, doctrines as well as organisational skills.

Pan Islamism and Salafi-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

Salafi-Wahhabism (an ideology based on the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) is the official ideology of the Saudi Kingdom and has flourished with the full support of the government. However, the nature of the relationship between this ideology and the government is relatively complex. After the Kingdom received a sudden rush of income, thanks to the oil boom in the 1970s, it expanded numerous development projects, including the establishment of universities like King Abdul Aziz in Jedda and two universities in Mecca and Medina. The lack of academic resources for these universities served as an opportunity for MB members who fled from Egypt (Hegghammer 2010).

The Kingdom was a haven for MB members from neighboring countries, particularly Egypt, because politically, the Kingdom had been competing with Egypt and Iraq for influence in the region and the Muslim world. The Arab Socialism thriving in Egypt and Iraq was a threat to the Saudis, who were backed by the US. As an alternative, King Faisal (d.1975) promoted Pan-Islamism, which he argued was more theologically sound because it was based on the concept of the *umma* (Muslim community). This also mirrored the utopian dream of establishing a global caliphate and Muslim solidarity. As part of this agenda, the Kingdom established numerous organisations to promote cooperation and mutual solidarity of global Muslim *umma*. The two most important organisations established by the Kingdom were the community-based Muslim World League (MWL) in 1962, and the state-based Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1972. During this period, MB also promoted pan-Islamism, which aided relations between the movement and the Saudi regime (Hegghammer 2010, 39-40). MB members had a significant influence within both of these Saudi-founded organisations.

Prominent Palestinian MB member 'Abdullah Azzam (d.1989), an alumnus of Al-Azhar, was among the MB members who emigrated to Saudi Arabia. He just had been banned from Jordan and fired from a teaching position there over political issues. Azzam, assisted by his MB network, transferred to King Abdul Aziz University. At the same time, Kemal al-Sananiri (d.1981), a brother-in-law of Sayyid Qutb, was in Mecca for the Hajj with his family, after having visited Pakistan to escape the increasingly hostile situation in Egyptian following the assassination of President Sadat. Al-Sananiri had visited Pakistan and Afghanistan twice and he encouraged Azzam to move to Pakistan the following year (1981) (Hegghammer 2010, 40).

Azzam would later become known as the father of Arab Afghan jihadists and the mentor of Osama bin Laden (d.2011). He campaigned tirelessly through his articles and speeches for Arabs and other Muslims to assist Afghanistan. His re-formulation

of jihad in his book *The Defence of Muslim Lands* (2002) outlined that because Afghanistan was part of the Muslim world and had been invaded by the Soviets, then jihad became an 'individual obligation' for every Muslim across the world, not only the local population in Afghanistan. This doctrine represented a departure from classical jurisprudence on this issue, which saw jihad as a 'collective obligation' for Muslims (meaning that if some Muslims performed it, the rest would be exempted). It only became an individual obligation for the residents of a country invaded by enemy forces. Azzam's doctrine convinced many to travel to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s to join the burgeoning ranks of the 'mujahidin'.

Expelling enemy from Afghanistan

Azzam's campaign to help Afghanistan expel the Soviets aligned with MWL and OIC's increasing focus on providing assistance to Muslims in need globally. Afghanistan was the top priority, and with the support of oil money, humanitarian aid arrived there quickly. Arab awareness of the suffering of Muslims in Afghanistan was fostered through humanitarian programs under MWL and the Saudi Red Crescent Society (Hegghammer 2010, 18-23). Popular pan-Islamism and the solidarity of *umma* promoted by MWL and OIC, to some degree, laid the groundwork for 'military assistance' to Afghanistan as part of support for pan-Islamism and global Muslim solidarity. Saudi support of jihadists in Afghanistan was unprecedented, exceeding USD 1 billion in three years between 1987 to 1989 (Hegghammer 2010, 25). The United States, importantly, also supported the jihadists in their fight against the Soviets (Coll 2005)

Salafi-jihadism, a sub-group within Salafism, was born in Afghanistan during the war against Soviet occupation. It was also facilitated by increasing global Muslim solidarity as a result of the MWL and OIC's work, which was backed by the abundant resources of the Saudi Kingdom. 'Abdullah Azzam provided the ideological foundation, while economic and political support from Saudi Arabia enabled the mobilisation of Arabs and other Muslims to the region.

The suffering of Muslims in Afghanistan helped trigger the transformation from humanitarian assistance to 'military assistance' through the sending of foreign fighters to wage jihad. Among the volunteers who arrived in Afghanistan was Osama bin Laden, the son of one of Saudi Arabia's most prosperous businessmen, Muhammad Ibn Laden. Radicalised and influenced by MB ideology at the university in Jeddah, bin Laden would soon play a critical role in the story of GRMs and jihadism.

Together with 'Abdullah Azzam, his mentor, bin Laden established the Services Bureau (*maktab al-khidma*) in 1984 that facilitated the mobilisation of jihadists. The influx of untrained volunteer fighters proved to be problematic because they did not have the necessary military skills to fight against the Soviets. To solve this

problem, the Services Bureau established military training camps in several areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, such as in Peshawar. The most prominent military training camp was the Abu Sayyaf Badr camp, under the control of one of the most notable militant leaders, Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf. Bin Laden also founded a military training camp for Arabs, known as the Lion's Den (*al-ma'sada*). During this period, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006) (who later become the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)) also established a camp in Herat. These training camps and the solidarity forged among volunteer fighters on the battlefield would serve as the foundation for global GRMs networks, such as Al-Qaeda (AQ), which was established by bin Laden in Peshawar in 1988 at the end of Soviet occupation (Hegghammer 2010b, 53-94).

The euphoria of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 and the unexpected victory of mujahidin proved to be fragile, as the mujahidin soon disagreed on priorities for the post-Soviet environment. Jihadists had been united in their common goal of expelling the Soviet invaders but they were now unsure of their next priority. Many of them returned home and were never again involved in jihadism, while others sought to incite violent revolutions against their governments. It is worth remembering that MB and EIJ members, like al-Zawahiri, migrated to Afghanistan partly because they were escaping repression at home. Splits between 'Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden emerged during this period. Azzam had long been in favor of waging jihad against Western Christian infidels and Zionist powers, but not against other Muslims. But when EIJ and MB members arrived in Afghanistan they brought with them the ideology of Qutbism, which legitimised the fight against corrupt Muslim apostate regimes. In the early 1990s, bin Laden, who was furious following the Saudi Kingdom's decision to host US soldiers as part of the first Iraq war, sided with al-Zawahiri, who was eager to topple the corrupt apostate regimes – bin Laden likewise wanted to overthrow what he saw as the corrupt Saudi government.

So, in the early 1990s, jihadists in Afghanistan appeared to disagree on which enemy they should prioritise: the far or near enemy (Solahudin 2013, 16). This split served as the seed for further divisions between AQ and the Islamic State (IS/ISIS) decades later. While bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were eager to topple the Saudi and Egyptian regimes, their focus later gradually shifted to targeting the 'great Satan' of the US and the Western interests.

For security reasons, al-Zawahiri and bin Laden briefly moved their base of operations from Afghanistan to Sudan following the Omar al-Bashir-led military coup that was supported by Hasan al-Turabi, an influential radical cleric. During this time, AQ expanded its network in Africa.

Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri would take control of AQ over the next two decades and focus their jihad on fighting against 'the great Satan' (the far enemy). AQ in

Afghanistan served as a melting pot where many jihadists crossed paths before heading off different directions. ‘Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-Suri all crossed paths in Afghanistan and would later become prominent figures in the development of GRMs.

Variants of Salafism

Salafi-Wahhabism is unified by several common elements: a strict interpretation of the concept of unity of God (*tawhīd*) and the rejection of rational reasoning (extreme textualism). According to Salafists, *tawhid* means that God is the sole creator, the sole sovereign, and He alone has the right to be worshipped. As a manifestation of *tawhid*, Muslims are obliged to follow Shari’a in its entirety, reject any human legislation, and prohibit any practices with polytheistic tendencies (*shirk*). These tenets direct Salafists to reject human legislation (secular government) and make them hostile towards the practice of Sufism and other cultural traditions. These doctrines legitimised their fight against secular regimes. Much of the destruction of cultural and historical sites, as took place in Mecca, Bamiyan, and Palmyra, was also based upon their belief that these places and objects lead Muslims to *shirk*. Salafists also reject any innovation and syncretism with local culture, arguing that this pollutes pristine and pure *tawhid*. By this, Salafi doctrine seeks to create a unified global culture of pure Islam, eliminating its impure local elements (Bin Ali 2016).

The path to fulfilling this ideal, according to Salafi-Wahhabism, is through emulating the practice of the earliest pious generations (*salaf al-Shālih*) of Muslims. Importantly, as Salafists see maintaining the purity of Islam as their primary agenda, they formulated the doctrine of *al-walā’ wa al-barā’* (loyalty and disavowal) as a method (*manhaj*) to maintain the purity of Islam (ibid, 41-66). Based on this doctrine, Muslims must have loyalty to God, Islam, and other Muslims while being fully committed to rejecting and disavowing everything that deviates from Islam. Based on this doctrine, Salafists reject any imitation of Western Christian practices and cultures, secular regimes and human-made laws, as well as cooperation with and providing aid to non-Muslims, especially in times of war. Osama bin Laden’s rejection of the presence of US soldiers in the Gulf, for instance, was partly based on this doctrine (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208-214; Wagemakers 2016).

Despite these common tenets, interestingly, Salafi groups have split into several factions for various tactical and pragmatic reasons. As Wiktorowicz has argued, divisions among Salafists “have emerged as a result of the inherently subjective nature of applying religion to new issues and problems.” (Wiktorowicz 2005, 75-76) In other words, these divisions have emerged due to different, subjective responses to the question of how Islam can help the Muslim community overcome the challenges it faces. For example, Salafists may share a similar jurisprudential

view on the permissibility of attacking enemy civilians in retaliation to attacks on Muslim civilians. However, they may diverge on definitions of what constitutes an enemy civilian and whether enemy attacks on Muslim civilians were intended or not (collateral damage, for example).

Furthermore, Salafists agree on the obligation of jihad for everyone in an occupied land but are split on whether it is an obligation for all Muslims (as Azzam believed) or only for the local population of the occupied land. Salafists agree that wars against oppression and infidels are a religious obligation. Still, they disagree on priority targets: the far or near enemy. It is worth noting that these different readings of realities and setting strategic priorities in many cases have prompted denunciations and ex-communication (*takfir*) among jihadists themselves, for example as took place between AQ dan ISIS in recent years (Wiktorowicz 2005, 75-76; Lia 2009).

Wiktorowicz has argued that there are three major factions within the Salafi community, resulting from their different contextual readings and strategies: the purists, politicians, and jihadists (Wiktorowicz 2005). *First*, purists primarily seek to purify Islam from foreign elements through propagation (*da'wa*) and education. They reject violence and political participation as part of achieving this goal because they see political parties as a product of Western thinking. Like other factions, the purists tend towards isolationism because they regard the external world as being filled with threats to the purity of Islam. Purists believe that both politicians and jihadists do not implement the right *manhaj* (method) in their struggle. The opponents of purists have accused them of being subservient to the Saudi regime (*'ulama al-sulta*). Some of the most prominent scholars in the purist camp include 'Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz (d. 1999), Ali al-Halabi (d. 2016), Jamal Furyhan al-Harithi, Muhammad Abu Shaqra (Jordan). Muhammad al-'Uthaymin (d. 2001), Muhammad Rabi' bin Hadi al-Madkhali.

Second, politicians share a similar project to purists, but they seek to initiate reform through the political system and social structure, taking a top-down approach. They argue that the correct way to maintain the purity of Islam and implement Shari'a is through political power. Apart from propagation and education, this group primarily focuses on changing political systems. The experiences and doctrines of the Egyptian MB influenced this stream of Salafism. It is worth remembering that many prominent MB members moved to Saudi Arabia and took up academic positions following the crackdown on MB in Egypt in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Muhammad Qutb (d. 2014) and Muhammad Sorour (d. 2016) were two prominent teachers of many Salafi politician scholars like Safar al-Halawi, Salman al-Awdah, Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq (Kuwait).

It is important to note that despite its influence, MB is still a distinctive group and organisation separate to Salafi-Wahhabism. One of the key differences

between these two groups is that MB since the late 1970s has mostly denounced violence and accepts democracy. Instead of outright rejecting ‘modernity,’ they seek to penetrate and change it from the inside. They tend to be very pragmatic and accommodate Western influence. In addition, theologically, MB shows no compunction about using reason and human intellect – this is a legacy of Muhammad Abduh’s thought (Byman 2015, 77). Still, this does not mean that there is no ties and influence between MB and Salafism. As we have discussed, ‘Abdullah Azzam was a MB member, but is also a legendary Salafi jihadist figure. Sayyid Qutb’s writing has also been also quoted extensively by Salafists. *Third*, jihadists, as has been explained above, emerged during the Afghan war when Arabs flocked there to fight against the Soviets. Jihadists take an extreme position by saying that revolutionary methods and violence are necessary to maintain the purity of Islam and *tawhid*. In this regard, purist and politico views act like kindling, which can easily be set alight to result in jihadism. The Afghan war provided an environment in which many politicos and purists transformed into jihadists. Prominent jihadist scholars include Juhayman Al-Utaybi (d. 1980), ‘Abdullah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Maher 2016).

Below (Diagram 2) is a summary of Salafi typology, adapted from Wiktorowicz’s model. We can expand the map to cover other criteria, like educational institutions and media outlets, that could be relevant for specific purposes.

Salafi	Agenda	Political behaviors	Social change	Org	Key leaders	Incubation	Education
Purist	purification of religious doctrines and practices	da’wa and tarbiya	evolutionary	reject harakat because it has political connotation, imitating the West	Abd Aziz Ibn Baz, Ali al-Halabi, Jamal al-Harithi, Muhammad Abu Shaqra, Muhammad al-Uthaymin, Nasir al-Din al-Albani	Saudi	?
Political	beyond rituals, combating deviancy in society, changing regime through politic	political party	gradualist	MB, PKS	Muhammad Qurb, Muhammad Sorour, Safar al-Halawi, Salman al-Awdah, Abd al-Rahman Abd Khaliq	Egypt	?
Jihadis	liberating Muslim from the enemy/Puppet	armed struggle	revolutionary	ISIL, Al-Qaeda, AQIM, QAP	Juhayman al-Utaybi, Abdullah Azzam, Osama Ibn Laden, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri,	Afghanistan	?

Beyond Salafism

But something is missing from our discussion of these movements: where can we place non-Salafi militant organisations that are still part of the larger Muslims *umma* but are motivated and influenced by different ideologies? Where, for example, should we put the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (National Revolution Front, BRN) of Patani, Southern Thailand. This organisation is made up of Muslim insurgents fighting against the Thai-Buddhist government in Bangkok but – despite their references to classical Islamic jurisprudence on fighting against foreign occupation – jihadism and Salafism have never been a central part of their struggle. They instead focus on their local struggle as Malay Muslims. Furthermore, where does the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fit into our map? Can we consider Hamas, which struggles for independence from Israel, to be part of the Salafi movement?

Wiktorowicz's model is useful in analysing and mapping the Salafi landscape but is not enough to shed light on the broader dynamics of Muslim activism (Maher 2016, 9). Here, we have to move to a higher and broader level for a moment to better position Salafism in relation to other non-Salafi Muslim militants and movements. We have to move from mapping and developing a typology of Salafism to analysing broader Islamic activism. Borrowing from social movement theory, Islamic activism here is defined as the mobilisation of forces in support of Muslim causes or an Islamic agenda (Wiktorowicz 2004, 2). This definition is relatively broad enough such that it can include peaceful mobilisations like demonstrations, propagation (*da'wa*), or education (*tarbiyya*) as well as violent mobilisations such as armed struggles, political assassinations, and acts of terrorism.

Alternative approaches to the theology-based typology, as we discussed above, have been used by academics since the 1980s. Gilles Kepel, for example, when analysing Islamic militancy in Egypt, differentiated the gradualist Muslim Brotherhood from the isolationist Jama'at al-Muslimin and Egyptian revolutionary Islamic Jihad (EIJ) (Keppel 1984; Hegghammer 2009, 257). R. Hrair Dekmejian (1985) proposed a distinction between “gradualist-pragmatic,” “revolutionary,” and “messianic-puritanical” Islamic movements (Dekmejian 1985, 59). In addition, Barry Rubin also proposed a typology of “revolutionary,” “reformist,” and “national liberationist” organisations (Rubin 1998, 17-22). All these typologies are based on political preferences and behaviors rather than on theological/doctrinal outlook.

Thomas Hegghammer has argued that all of the above alternative typologies are either incomplete or inconsistent. He further proposes a more comprehensive and elaborate framework and typology based on the political behaviors and preferences of Islamist actors (Hegghammer 2009, 257). In his typology, he defines five ‘rationales’ or orientations. Under these rationales, he also included “mid-term political aims and strategy” as well as “reason for which Islamists act.” The five

rationales are: “state-oriented,” “nation-oriented,” “*Umma*-oriented,” “morality-oriented,” and “sectarian.” State-oriented movements are characterised by their main agenda of reforming and changing state systems. Nation-oriented groups feature the desire to establish Muslim sovereignty over an occupied land/territory. Umma-oriented Islamic activism is distinguished by its desire to protect Islamic *umma* as a whole from external non-Muslims threats. Morality-oriented groups seek to change the culture and socio-political behaviors of society to be more Islamic. Finally, sectarian-oriented groups aim to protect their sect from intrusion, infiltration, and destruction by other denominations (in this case, Sunni and Shia) that are believed to have deviated from the right path (Ibid).

Hegghammer proposes both violent and non-violent manifestations for each of these five rationales. Below (Diagram 3) I have adapted our table in light of Hegghammer’s model (Ibid):

Orientation/ Rationale	Manifestation			
	Non Violent	Groups	Violent	Groups
State-Oriented	Reformism	Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Sahwa, PKS,	Socio-Revolutionary activism	Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA)
Nation-Oriented	Nationalism	MILF (post agreement),	Violent irredentism	Hammas, Hezbollah, Laskar e-Tayyiba (LeT), Chechnian Mujahidin, BRN Patani
Umma Oriented	Pan Islamism	Muslim World League (MWL), Hizbut Tahrir	Classic Jihadism, Global jihadism	Al-Qaeda, QAP, ISIL, JAT, JI
Morality Oriented	Pietism	Jamaah Tabligh, Madkhalis	Vigilantism	Islamic Defender Front (FPI)
Sectarian	Sectarianism	Anti-Ahmadi groups (Indonesia)	Violent sectarianism	Laskar Janghvi, Iraqi militia

This model helps provide a more comprehensive picture of Islamic activism beyond Salafism. This model, I believe, is the best and most comprehensive tool for the mapping the diverse range of actors within Islamic militant movements and we can also utilise this approach to map GRMs. The red line on the right is the extreme manifestation of different rationales. Here we can see Salafi-Jihadism, for example, within the landscape of broader Muslim activism.

This typology, as Hegghammer outlined (ibid), has three analytical advantages: 1) it provides a more precise understanding of “patterns of behavior displayed by militant Islamist groups.” For example, based on their behavior and ideological discourse, global jihadists more likely to target Western interests, while violent irredentism

will rarely commit sectarian violence. 2) It provides “a basis for nuanced thinking about the causes of Islamists militancy.” Focusing on the causes of other activism is essential to understand, for example, why socio-revolutionary movements flourish where there are socio-economic grievances and state oppression (MB is the best example of this). Torture and state oppression are more likely to lead to socio-revolutionary activism than global jihadism. Meanwhile, the suffering of Muslims experiencing invasion at the hands of the Soviets and Western powers fuels the rise of global jihadism. 3) It facilitates the comparative study of Islamic militancy, as we see in the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and the Syrian conflict. This section will focus on AQ’s affiliates in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East using typology that we have outlined earlier. This will help us understand AQ’s affiliates and their relationship with other Muslim extremist actors and organisations.

Through its affiliates, AQ has maintained a persistent presence thanks to extensive networks that often operate autonomously. This extensive network was established during the Afghan war, where foreign fighters returned to their home countries following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. Global jihadists are a by-product of foreign fighter mobilisations in several conflicts including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq. During the Afghan war, from 1979 to 1992, there were around 20,000 foreign fighters from different countries including the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Europe, the United States, Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippine (Byman 2015, 22-23). These volunteers did not automatically join violent GRMs organisations like AQ. But this massive network was used by AQ as the necessary infrastructure for its global ambitions and to eventually establish its affiliates. The most prominent of these affiliates are Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under al-Zarqawi was previously an affiliate before it broke away and became the Islamic State (IS/ISIS) group.

Apart from its affiliates, AQ also cooperates other organisations that have similar ideological tents and political agendas. The Taliban, as an obvious example, are not an AQ affiliate, despite their very close relationship. Other organisations like the Haqqanis, Laskar e-Taiba (Pakistan), Boko Haram (Nigeria), Ansar Dine (Mali), Ansar al-Shari’a (Tunisia), Jama’ah Islamiyyah (Southeast Asia) and Jama’ah Ansar al-Tawhid (JAT, Indonesia) may have similar ideological traits, share resources and undertake paramilitary activities. However, they remain separate organizations – they also do not take AQ’s name or pledge allegiance to AQ’s leader.

As we will see, AQ affiliates did not come into being overnight but instead had deep roots in local organisations and were connected via foreign fighters. But why would a local militant organisation want to become an AQ affiliate, and what are the incentives and limitations of doing so? Byman argued that affiliation is

triggered by potential mutual benefits like extensive and massive resources under one identity, fundraising, shared training capabilities, experiences, and tactical skills, as well as propaganda opportunities. However, affiliation quite often leads to splits and disagreement internally on setting priorities between following AQ's central agenda (fighting far enemy) and focusing on local specific plans (like targeting the local regime). Because of its nebulous underground networks, local affiliates also, in many contexts, disobeyed the orders of AQ central (Byman 2015, 150-155). Notably, as argued by Boudali (2007), affiliation with AQ was often "an act of desperation" because of their catastrophic failure at home (Ibid, 1-3). Collaboration is a means to maintain a group's operations and existence. For our purpose, the paper will briefly discuss three AQ affiliates.

AQ's Network in Southeast Asia.

The primary purpose of our discussion here is to apply our mapping efforts to a specific case study. I do not intend to go into great detail regarding the origins, networks, organisations, actors, dynamics, and the factions of AQ networks in Southeast Asia. Many excellent studies have been produced on this topic (Ressa 2003, Millard 2004; Noorhaidi 2005; Sidel 2006; Abuza 2007; Singh 2007; Solahudin 2013; IPAC Report No. 36 2017; Hwang 2018). As part of this exercise, we will see how Afghanistan veterans shaped the global Islamic radical network, spanning from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, this section will also highlight our basic assumption that global Islamic radicalism, despite its worldwide networks, has deep roots in local historical contexts.

I would like to begin in Indonesia, with the origin of Jama'ah Islamiyyah (hereinafter, JI), one of the most prominent jihadist networks in Southeast Asia. Following Indonesian independence in 1945, movements and rebellions inspired by Islamic ideology persisted. Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (d.1962), the founder of Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Islamic State of Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Army, hereinafter DI/TII), established a jihadist doctrine similar to that of Salafi Jihadism several decades before it became a global phenomenon. Kartosuwirjo believed that the Indonesian state was illegitimate, and its government was filled with apostates because it was not established on the basis of Shari'a. According to DI/TII, every Muslim must fight against this apostate regime and, as a result, the organisation launched a major revolt against the government in the 1950s in West Java, Sulawesi and Aceh. Although the government managed to suppress the rebellion militarily by 1962, DI/TII's Islamic ideology, its structure, and recruitment activities persisted underground, continuing even until today (Solahudin 2013, 2-5). This stream of radical ideology provided a reliable pre-condition for the arrival of global radicalism and Salafi Jihadism, which arrived in Indonesia and Southeast Asia with the return of jihadists from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

Among those who returned to the archipelago were 'Abdullah Sungkar (d. 1999), Nasir Abbas, Abdurrahman al-Ghozi (d. 2003), Dulmatin (d. 2010) and Umar Patek. Experts like Solahudin (2013) estimated that around 200 Afghan alumni returned to Indonesia. Before departing to Afghanistan, many had some connection with DI/TII. After returning from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, jihadists like 'Abdullah Sungkar hoped that he and his old friends in DI/TII would be able to revitalise these groups. But soon after they returned, disputes over religious practices and theological beliefs with the appointed leader of DI/TII, Ajengan Masduki, forced Sungkar to leave DI/TII and, together with several people, including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, establish a new organisation that would be known as Jama'ah Islamiyyah (JI) (Solahudin 2013, 7).

Sungkar's experience as a veteran of the Afghan jihad provided strong connections for JI with both local and global affiliates. While still holding a position within DI/TII, around 1988, Sungkar met personally with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in Afghanistan, seeking financial help for DI/TII from the global mujahidin network. These connections enabled JI to quickly grow and gain popularity.

Jama'ah Islamiyah, aimed to copy both the methods and ideology of the Egyptian Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya (Ibid, 154). Indonesian jihadists encountered Egyptian JI members in Afghanistan and even organised joint military training in the 1990s. MB also had a significant influence over JI. JI's members not only read MB literature and imitated its organisational methods but members also had direct personal ties. The arrival of MB members at the Institute for Arabic and Islamic Sciences (LIPIA/LPBA) (Solahudin 2013, 92) and the Ngruki boarding school in central Java, on the invitation of JI's leadership, was reminiscent of the way MB took root in Saudi Arabia through universities and education.

From a regional perspective, it is important to remember that many JI members like Sungkar and Ba'asyir, moved to Malaysia soon after they established the organisation, fleeing arrest by the Suharto New Order government (Ibid, 127). In Malaysia, JI expanded by recruiting prominent Malaysian members like Nasir Abbas, Noordin Top (d. 2009), and Dr. Azhari (d. 2005). Top and Azhari were involved in the 2002 Bali bombing, one of the most significant terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.

To manage its fast-growing reach, JI divided its organisational structure into regional coordination units, called *mantiqi*. There were four *mantiqi*, which included *Mantiqi I*, covering Malaysia and Singapore; *Mantiqi II* covering most of the Indonesian archipelago and *Mantiqi III* covering Mindanao, Sabah, East Kalimantan, and Sulawesi islands. The final *mantiqi* covered Australian and Papua, but never really came into operation. Each *mantiqi* had a particular role. For example, while *Mantiqi I* was designated for financial and economic support, Mindanao's *Mantiqi II* was intended as a military training center. JI managed to

secure an alliance with MILF and even used its elite military camp, Al-Hudaybiyya, for training programs (Solahudin 2013, 156-58, 164)

While DI/TII's struggle was always locally-oriented — aiming to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia — their exposure to global jihadism in Afghanistan shifted their focus. As has been discussed, following the Soviet defeat, jihadists disagreed on their next priority between fighting against the far or near enemy. JI and DI/TII activists followed this trend. Sungkar and Ba'asyir met in person with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 where bin Laden urged jihadists in Southeast Asia to join the global fight against the US. The idea of fighting the far enemy, like in Afghanistan, soon created friction among Southeast Asian jihadists.

On the one hand, JI's *Mantiqi I* was eager to join the global jihad against the US. Hambali was among the most prominent jihadists of *Mantiqi I* supporting bin Laden's cause until he was arrested in Thailand and imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay prison. Meanwhile, other *mantiqis* were reluctant and instead focused on their initial agenda of fighting against the infidel Indonesian government. However, both of these factions soon put aside their differences as Indonesia suffered severe disruption at the beginning of the Reformasi (Reform era). The communal violence that broke out from 1999 to 2002 between Muslims and Christians on several islands in eastern Indonesia, especially in Maluku, united jihadists on all fronts.

Islamic movements in Southeast Asia, in general, have always focused on their limited national agendas. The Moro rebellion in Mindanao, Patani-Malay unrest in southern Thailand, the Aceh independence movement, as well as DI/TII shared a striking similarity in their desire to achieve nationalist agendas. They also rarely coordinated with one to another and their cause and struggles were seldom known outside the region. Some organisations like the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) once received significant support from Libya and donors in the Middle East, but this support was primarily aimed to supporting their nationalist causes. However, with the return of Afghan jihad veterans and the establishment of JI in the late 1980s, this trend shifted toward more regional or global jihadism (Singh 2007, 47-48).

With the exception of the Patani-Malay insurgency that remains focused on ethno-religious nationalism (Malvin 2007, 20-25), jihadists in Indonesia, Malaysia and Mindanao coordinated more closely under JI and created what I refer to as a triangle axis of terror in Southeast Asia. After the Bali Bombings, for instance, several fugitives like Umar Patek and Dulmatin fled to Mindanao. For several years, some Malaysian and Indonesian JI trainers like Marwan (d. 2015) and Sanusi (d. 2013), were believed to be present in various military camps in Mindanao. The results of their networking and coordination could be seen, for instance, in the large-scale militant operation to seize Marawi in 2017, during which ISIS-backed militants assaulted the southern Philippines city under the banner of ISIS' East Asia

'province' (*wilayat*), headed by an Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader, Isnilon Hapilon (IPAC No. 33 2016).

From the above discussion, there are two important notes worth remembering about jihadists in Southeast Asia. First, radical Muslim groups in the region, like elsewhere, suffered splits over time for various reasons, including disagreements on their priorities, competition for leadership, as well as deeper theological issues. JI and DI/TII Indonesia, as well as the MNLF and MILF in Mindanao, eventually produced splinter organisations like ASG, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF), the Maute Group, Ansarul Khilafa Philippines (AKP), Laskar Jihad, Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jama'ah Anasru Khilafah (JAK), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), the Khilafah Islamiyyah Movement and so forth. Discussing the details of these splits goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these splinter groups can trace their roots back to both DI/TII and JI in Indonesia and the MILF/MNLF in Mindanao. Global jihadism adds more layers but it was only able to thrive in the fertile soil that has been there for generations. Southern Thailand, however, remains an exception, as global jihadism seems to have had very little impact there (Nilsen & Hara 2017).

Second, it is incorrect to assume that these groups are completely detached from mainstream, more moderate Islamic movements, and organisations. In many ways, through personal contacts or educational institutions, individuals in violent radical movements are also involved in more mainstream activities. One of the most prominent areas where they connect with mainstream Islamic movements is through Islamic humanitarian organisations, Muslim charities, and educational institutions. Sidney Jones estimates that there are around 40 boarding schools that have ties to terrorism in Indonesia (Aiyar 2015). Early DI/TII and JI members were closely associated with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII), which actively engaged with humanitarian organisations such as the Crisis Management Action Committee (KOMPAK). The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) has been accused of being closely connected to AQ networks in the Philippines after bin Laden's brother moved there to head the IIRO's local chapter (Abuza 2003, 173-5; Solahudin 2013, 3).

Below (Diagram 5) is a simplified map of groups in Southeast Asia. Again, this paper does not aim to comprehensively map every group, but instead focuses on proposing a model. For instance, the position of a group like ASG is problematic because it is often involved in piracy and criminal activities as well as violent extremism. Also, the MNLF and MILF have used both peaceful negotiations and violent armed resistance. Nevertheless, this mapping exercise helps us understand global Islamic radicalism within the broader framework of Islamic movements.

Orientation	Manifestation			
	Non-Violent	Groups	Violent	Groups
State-Oriented	Reformism	PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), NU, Muhammadiyah	Socio-revolutionary activism	DI/TIII
Nation-Oriented	Nationalism	MILF/MNLF (post-agreement),	Violent irredentism	MILF, MNLF, BIFF, BRN, GAM, ASG
Umma Oriented	Pan Islamism	Hizbut Tahrir, Gema Pembebasan.	Classic Jihadism, Global jihadism	JAT, JAD, ASG, JI, IS SE Asia.
Morality Oriented	Pietism	Jama'ah Tabligh (Khuruj)	Vigilantism	Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Pamswa-karsa
Sectarian	Sectarianism	Anti-Ahmadi groups (Indonesia), Aliansi Nasional Anti-Syi'ah (ANNAS)	Violent sectarianism	The loose alliance among anti-Syi'ah/Ahmadi in an incidental violent mob.

AQ in Africa

My simple outline of GRMs in Africa will focus on AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb), and its influence in neighboring countries like Mali. I will test the framework borrowed from Hegghammer to analyse the dynamics of Islamist extremism in the Sahara-Sahel region.

The rise of AQIM in Africa should be seen from a gradual historical perspective, particularly in the context of Algeria since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) was established as a splinter group from the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). GIA jihadists in Algeria were also connected to AQ networks in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets (Ouellet et.al, 2014, 656), as Algeria was one of the top countries of origin for foreign fighters in Afghanistan. As discussed, when the Soviets withdrew in 1989, many foreign fighters returned to their countries and joined Islamic militant movements in their homelands. When Algerian fighters returned home, they found an increasingly hostile military regime that had just annulled the Algerian democratic elections, which were won by FIS, in 1991.

As explained in great detail by Hafez (2004), following a bloodless military coup, around 30,000 FIS members were detained in five detention centers in the Saharan desert (ibid, 45-46). Between 1992 to 1993, 166 FIS members were sentenced to death. By 1996, 116 prisons housed 43,737 prisoners, mostly FIS

members or anyone accused of committing terrorism (ibid). Just like EIJ , which was established in response to a brutal crackdown the Nasser regime in Egypt, GIA was also established as a survival mechanism by Islamists in response to military repression (Bencherif 2017). Thus, like EIJ, the GIA was a socio-revolutionary organisation referring to Islamic values. During 1996 and 1997, the GIA undertook a massive campaign of violence, attacking civilian targets indiscriminately, including FIS members.

Because of its brutality, GIA failed to attract broader support from the Algerian population, and it was eventually isolated even among militants. In response to this, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was established by Hassan Hattab, who disagreed with the GIA's brutal methods. Appealing to Salafi-Jihadi theology, GSPC was created to overthrow the Algerian regime but, at the same time, wanted to expand its operations beyond Algeria (Boudali 2007; Chelin 2018, 5-6). They also immediately distanced themselves from the GIA by declaring that they would target only security forces and not civilians, as the targeting of civilians was prohibited by Shari'a (ibid). Soon GSPC attracted dissidents from GIA and FIS, and it became the most important jihadist group operating in Algeria and North Africa.

GSPC members ousted Hassan Hattab in 2003 because they saw him as too moderate. He was replaced by Nabil Sahrawi, a more radical leader who immediately declared war against the Algerian apostate regime at home and US allies abroad. He was killed by Algerian security forces in a military operation in 2004 and replaced by Abdelmalek Droukdel (d. 2020), a former militant GIA member.

GSPC morphed into AQIM (an AQ affiliate) in 2006 under Droukdel's leadership. One possible reason for GSPC's transformation into AQIM was its desperation in the face of an amnesty program for former jihadists launched by President Bouteflika, which decimated GSPC's ranks. However, at the same time, the US invasion in Iraq provided new opportunities for GSPC to recruit young jihadists to be trained and sent to Iraq, in a move reminiscent of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. GSPC was soon flooded by volunteer jihadists from neighboring countries like Mauritania, Mali, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, who were ready to travel to Iraq for jihad. From this moment, Droukdel gradually developed a closer relationship with al-Zarqawi, a leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), as they regularly coordinated on jihadi mobilisation (Chelin 2018, 7-8). Gradually GSPC adopted AQ's methods and declared its formal affiliation after four months of negotiations between Droukdel and al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of AQ Central at that time. AQIM started developing regional ambitions and its influence immediately was apparent in neighboring countries like Mali (Boudali 2007).

GSPC established a stronghold in Northern Mali in 2003, just as Mali started to face political turmoil. Northern Mali, which is home to the Tuareg, has a long story

of rebellion against the South for cultural, economic, and political reasons. Tuareg nationalism has been an issue in northern Mali since the French colonial period in 1893. The Tuareg had rebelled four times (1963-64, 1990-96, 2006-09, 2012) seeking independence for Azawad land since it was incorporated into the state of Mali in 1960 (Solomon 2015, 68-69). Another complicating factor in Mali was narco-trafficking and illicit businesses that involved military and state officials. The vast, wild desert in the northern Sahel served as an ideal location for drug smuggling to Europe and Latin America. AQIM used this to fund their operations alongside the kidnapping of Westerners for ransom. From their illicit business, AQIM secured funds to pay the Tuareg for their support, just as the Tuareg were facing their own dire situation (Boudali 2007).

When Muammar Gaddafi (d. 2011) was deposed in 2011, the Tuareg lost their main source of support. Thousands of Tuareg, who were recruited by Gaddafi as military personnel, returned to their homeland with weapons from Libya. Veterans of Gaddafi's army like Muhammed Ag Najim soon established the Tuareg Azawad Liberation Movement (MNLA) in 2011 to fight against the central government. This movement very quickly suffered from splits, with the emergence of a puritan Salafi faction, Ansar Dine (the Defenders of Faith), established by Iyad Ag Ghali. At the same time in 2011, AQIM also split into the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) as a result of the marginalisation of black African members within the organisation (George 2012). Comprised mostly of Islamist Mauritians and other various non-Tuareg members, MUJAO was established to focus on regional and local operations in contrast to AQIM's global agenda.

The Tuareg began a full-scale military operation in January 2012 and with support from Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO, MNLA quickly expelled Malian security forces from major cities in the North, like Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. A leaked secret agreement between President Toure and the Tuareg in which Toure agreed to permit the Tuareg to operate in the North as long as they did not attack the capital, Bamako, angered the military. President Toure was ousted by a military coup led by Captain Sanogo in March 2012, and Mali's democracy crumbled. Seeing the chaos in the capital as an opportunity, the Tuareg declared Azawad State independence in April 2012 (Solomon 2015, 70-76).

But Tuareg movements were soon fighting one another, and the MNLA was defeated by the coalition of AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine. Splits continued both within the Tuareg as well as the broader Islamist movement. For example, the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) was established by Alghabass Ag Intallah (d. 2013) and separated itself from Ansar Dine, which became increasingly subordinate to AQIM (ibid). Later, when ISIS split from AQ, MUJAO pledged allegiance to ISIS while AQIM remained loyal to AQ.

Below (Diagram 6) is an example of the mapping exercise in Algeria and Mali:

Orientation	Manifestation			
	Non-Violent	Groups	Violent	Groups
State-Oriented	Reformism	PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), NU, Muhammadiyah	Socio-revolutionary activism	DI/THI
Nation-Oriented	Nationalism	MILF/MNLF (post-agreement),	Violent irredentism	MILF, MNLF, BIFF, BRN, GAM, ASG
Umma Oriented	Pan Islamism	Hizbut Tahrir, Gema Pembebasan.	Classic Jihadism, Global jihadism	JAT, JAD, ASG, JI, IS SE Asia.
Morality Oriented	Pietism	Jama'ah Tabligh (Khuruj)	Vigilantism	Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Pamswakarsa
Sectarian	Sectarianism	Anti-Ahmadi groups (Indonesia), Aliansi Nasional Anti-Syi'ah (ANNAS)	Violent sectarianism	The loose alliance among anti-Syi'ah/Ahmadi in an incidental violent mob.

AQAP (Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula)

The story of AQAP is reminiscent of AQIM in Africa in several ways: 1) it thrived in a chaotic failed state; 2) political competition between the North (Zaidi Shi'a) and the South (Sunni) helped AQAP anchor their operations; 3) the mobilisation of Afghanistan veterans served as the backbone for the AQAP's initial operations, connecting AQ in Yemen and AQ Central in Afghanistan. However, there were significant differences with compared to AQIM. In the case of AQAP, the presence of Shi'a (Zaidiyya) added a sectarian element, which was missing in the case of AQIM. While ethnic differences were key in Mali, religious sects/denominations (Shi'a-Sunni) sat on top on the top of traditional-tribal rivalry in Yemen.

Yemen held a special place for AQ leader Osama bin Laden, because it was his ancestral homeland. He tried to establish the first AQ affiliate based outside Afghanistan in Yemen by forming a militant group called Islamic Jihad as early as 1989/1990, during the late Afghan war, and during the final process of Yemeni unification (Lia 2009, 285-6). Although he could provide support and training, bin Laden's efforts largely failed because the key leaders in Yemen, from the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi scholars as well as Afghan veterans favored joining the newly-established government of Ali 'Abdullah Saleh. Bin Laden claimed that the Salih government bribed the Salafists with positions in the government (ibid).

AQAP was formally declared in 2009 by Nasser Al-Wuhayshi (d. 2015), Sa'id Al-Shihri (d. 2013), and Mohammad Al-Awfi when Al-Qaeda in Yemen merged their operations with Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. They announced a shared grouping under the banner of Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating in areas covering Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The merger suggested some desperation on the part of AQ in Saudi Arabia, resulting from the Kingdom's counter-terrorism operations. AQ in Saudi Arabia was active from early 2001, when many Arab foreign fighters returned from Afghanistan after fleeing the US' post- 9/11 invasion. Upon their arrival, they formed four jihadi cells under an umbrella organisation called the Mujāhidīn Military Committee in the Arabian Peninsula (*Mujāhidīn al-Lajna al-Askariya fi Jazirat al-'Arab*), led by Yusuf Saleh Fahd al-Ayiri (d. 2003) (Atwan 2012, 79-87). These cells orchestrated eight major attacks in Saudi Arabia between 2003-2004, targeting Western interests inside the Kingdom, including the attacks on three Riyadh foreign residential compounds that killed 26 people. Attacks continued until 2008, partly because many jihadists who returned from the Iraq war wanted to resume the jihad against their government, which made deals and cooperated with the US.

Realising that AQ was operating inside the Kingdom, Saudi authorities began a systematic war on jihadism, which included counter-propaganda efforts ('re-education and rehabilitation programs') in cooperation with 'Salafi purist' clerics. They also arrested and jailed more than 1,400 jihadists who refused to renounce AQ's ideology and executed key leaders (ibid). In response to the crackdown, AQ hastily moved its operations to Yemen, which was an ideal hideout and haven. Yemen's jihadi infrastructure and cells were supportive, thanks to the connections with Afghan veterans. Yemenis were the second largest foreign fighter cohort in Afghanistan after Saudis, and Yemen had been used as a transit point between Somalia and Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq and a training ground for jihadists.

AQAP took advantage of the chaotic conflict between the Saleh government and the Houthi rebels in the North. The Saleh regime, despite its rhetoric and participation in the global war on terror — including receiving up to USD 60 million a year in US funds for counterterrorism — made few efforts to defeat AQAP. Instead, the regime sought AQAP's help to fight against the Houthis, led by Abdul Malik Houthi, son of Husein al-Houthi, who had been rebelling against the central government since 2004. In addition, anti-American sentiment among Yemenis, fueled by US drone strikes, helped AQAP gain a foothold, particularly in areas like Al-Mukallah, Rawdah, and Hadhramaut (ibid).

The Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011, and deadly street demonstrations forced Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to transfer executive power to his vice president Mansour Hadi, a weak leader with no reliable military and political support. Hadi faced a complicated conflict featuring various actors, including AQAP, which by then had

established a 'local branch' called Ansar al-Shari'a, alongside the Houthi and Saleh loyalists — Saleh would later ally with the Houthis to topple Hadi (Firedson & Holmes 2018). The Houthis, supported by many ordinary Yemenis and Saleh loyalists, took the capital Sanaa in 2015 and forced Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. On Hadi's invitation from exile, a Saudi international coalition intervened by attacking the Houthi, turning the conflict into a regional issue because the Saudis accused Iran of backing the Houthi.

The emergence of a new brand of jihadist group, the Islamic State (IS), further complicated matters (Clausen 2017, 50-62). In contrast to AQAP, that usually refrained from attacking non-military targets, IS' presence sparked sectarian conflict. Zaidi Shi'as and the Sunni majority had been living side by side for ages without any significant problems until Salafi-Wahhabism began to wield influence in the region. ISIS fueled sectarian violence by targeting Shia civilians, including bombing a Sanaa mosque during the Eid prayers in 2015, killing 25 people.

In contrast, when AQAP militants attacked a military hospital in 2013, AQAP leader Qasim al-Raymi (the current leader of AQAP) issued a public apology. In an online video, he explained that the militants disobeyed an order to not attack the hospital and said that AQAP would pay compensation (*diyat*) to the relatives of the deceased (The Associated Press 2018).

This volatile mix of AQAP, ISIS, the Houthi, various militias linked to local tribes, Saleh loyalists, and government forces backed by the Saudi military are unlikely to reach an agreement to end the conflict very soon. By March 26, 2018, the war has killed around 10,000 Yemenis, with more than 40,000 casualties overall (Aljazeera 2018). In a failed state like this, organisations like AQAP and IS will continue to thrive.

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra

Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) is the AQ affiliate in Syria while the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL, Daesh) is the offspring of AQ but also its nemesis, based in Iraq and Syria. The story of their affiliation and eventual rivalry goes back to the Afghan and Iraq wars. JN and IS emerged as a result of the same phenomenon and within the same family, and so we should discuss them together. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was one crucial figure that connected both ISIS and AQ. Al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian jihadist and veteran of the Afghan conflict. He arrived in Afghanistan and as a result never fought against the Soviets, and instead, his first job was as a journalist for a jihadist magazine, *Bunyan al-Marsus* (Gerges 2006, 50-55). While he stayed in Afghanistan, he joined the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction. Upon returning to Jordan in 1993, he joined a Jordanian Salafi-jihadist organisation and became close to Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, his mentor, and one of the most important ideologues of the jihadist movement. Jordanian authorities arrested al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi

in 1995 over a plot to topple the regime and sentenced them to fifteen years in prison. Like Sayyid Qutb, al-Zarqawi's brutal experience of torture while in prison was a turning point: he became even more radical and opposed to what he saw as an apostate regime. In 1999 he was released after King Abdullah granted a general amnesty. Al-Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan the same year, and instead of joining AQ, he set up a jihadist group in Herat known as *Jund al-Sham*. He communicated with Osama bin Laden but maintained autonomy in his operations (ibid, 58).

When al-Zarqawi established a jihadi group in Iraq after the dispersion of jihadists from Afghanistan in 2001 (after 9/11), bin Laden provided assistance to get the organisation up and running. However, from the beginning, al-Zarqawi was reluctant subordinate his organisation to AQ. He established a jihadi organisation, *Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad*, which was focused on fighting against the US in Iraq as well as the Shia. After tough negotiations, finally al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden in 2004 and changed the name of his organisation to Al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers/Iraq (AQI).

Like AQ in Afghanistan, AQIM in Algeria and Mali, and AQAP in Yemen, AQI, JN and ISIS thrived in a failed state where fundamental structures had collapsed and society was fractured. Unlike Egypt, Iraq had never been home to jihadist cells or had any connection with AQ prior to 2003 (when the US invaded) (ibid, 53). The vacuum of state control following the US invasion left former members of the former Baath regime in limbo — these Baathists would later be crucial in supporting the rise of IS and its expansion (ibid, 144). Growing regional sectarian tensions also fueled anti-Shia attitudes among Sunnis in Iraq.

The seeds for IS's rise on the global jihadist stage and its eclipsing of AQ were originally sown in 2006, when al-Zarqawi invited small jihadist cells to join a new jihadist umbrella, the *Majlis al-Shura al-Mujahidin*, to fight against US forces as well the Shi'a. After the unification with these cells was complete, he renamed the organisation as the Islamic State in Iraq, though it was still part of AQ (Byman 2015, 163-4). Ruptures between AQ Central and AQI emerged when AQI adopted an all-out sectarian war against Shi'a, moderate Sunnis, and anyone worked for the government in Iraq. AQ Central was worried that AQI's strategy would divert focus from the fighting against the US and indiscriminate attacks on civilians would jeopardise the jihadist agenda. At that time, AQ Central saw that it had a shared interest with Shi'as: the fight against the US. Furthermore, Iran was used as a safe haven and transit point for many jihadists escaping from Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Attacking Shi'a and Iranian interests was a waste energy and a strategic dead end (Gerges 2006, 73-79).

As the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011 and escalated into armed struggle, al-Zawahiri (AQ Central) asked AQI to send fighters to Syria. By then, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (d. 2019) had taken the leadership of IS/AQI, following the death of

al-Zarqawi and Abū Omar al-Baghdadi at the hands of American forces in 2006. Al-Baghdadi sent his trusted lieutenant, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, to set up a jihadist group in Syria named Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Under al-Joulani, JN became a dominant force in Syria and maintained a degree of autonomy from al-Baghdadi’s control in Iraq. While JN was designated as part of AQI/IS in Iraq, it developed into a native, independent group. Al-Baghdadi wanted to reassert his control over JN by ordering al-Joulani to remain loyal to him. In 2013 al-Baghdadi publicly declared that JN was part of IS, which by then had changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Levant (ISIL) (Byman 2015, 168-170).

JN under al-Joulani rejected this declaration and instead declared that JN had pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi’s superior, al-Zawahiri, the leader of AQ Central. In response to the growing internal tensions among jihadists, al-Zawahiri decided to declare JN as AQ’s affiliate in Syria, while the al-Baghdadi group was its affiliate in Iraq. In response, al-Baghdadi claimed that his organisation was much stronger than AQ Central, and he rejected al-Zawahiri’s decision. This friction among AQ central and IS turned deadly as they fought against one another, resulting in the deaths of around 3,000 jihadists from both sides (Ibid; BBC February 13, 2014).

In February 2014, after lengthy deliberation, al-Zawahiri declared that AQ central had disavowed IS, stating that “is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group... does not have an organisational relationship with it, and [al-Qaeda] is not responsible for their actions” (Byman 2015, 168-170). By then, IS officially became an independent jihadist group rivaling AQ on the global stage. JN would remain part of AQ until 2016 when al-Joulani reformed JN as *Jabhat Fath al-Sham*, cutting ties with any foreign organisation like AQ and focusing on fighting in Syria to overthrow the Assad regime (BBC August 1, 2016).

It is challenging to simplify the differences between IS and AQ in a short paper. However, key differences between the groups are outlined in the table below (Gerges 2006; Lia 2009; Atwan 2012; Haykel 2016; Clausen 2017; Byman 2015):

DIFFERENCES	AL-QAEDA	ISIS/IS
SOCIAL ORIGINS	Afghanistan war against the Soviets, pan-Islamism, oppression of Arab regimes in the 1980s (Egypt MB).	The US invasion of Iraq (2003), the Syrian conflict, Arab Spring, sectarian tensions in the region.
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS	Salafi-Wahhabism, Classical jihadism, Muslim Brotherhood (Qutbism).	Salafi Wahhabism, Jihadism, Qutbism, Sectarianism.

VIEWS ON EXCOMMUNICATION (TAKFIR)	Cautious approach to excommunicating other Muslims. Muslims who do not follow Shari'a may be misguided, but Muslims should not readily excommunicate others.	Other Muslims who are deemed to not follow the Shari'a are infidels or apostates. Those who sympathise with or fail to pass judgment on infidels are also considered infidels. For example, al-Zawahiri is an infidel because he sympathised with MB leader Morsi when he was overthrown. (Morsi was an infidel because he took part in the democratic system).
INTELLECTUAL REFERENCES	Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 'Abdullah Azzam, Al-Zawahiri.	Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Bakr al-Najji, Abu 'Abdullah al-Muhajir.
TOP LEADERS	Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri.	Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
OPINION ON SHIA	Shia may be infidels but seeking to wipe them out is a waste of time and energy; ordinary Shi'as must not be targeted because they are merely ignorant Muslims. It is possible to establish a strategic alliance with Shias to defeat the greater enemy (the US and the West).	Shia are the number one enemy and must be eliminated without compromise or mercy. Shias are more dangerous than Jews and Christians because they are the enemy within Islam.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES	Focus on the far enemy: the US and its Western allies are the root of all problems facing the Muslim world.	Focusing on the near enemy: traitors from within Islam like secular regimes, Shias, and apostates.
MAIN ENEMIES	The US, Jews, Christians, and their local allies (local puppets) (in priority order).	Shia, infidels, apostate regimes, the West (in priority order).

<p>NETWORKS</p>	<p>AQIM, AQAP, Al-Shabaab, Taliban, Jamaah Islamiyah (Indonesia), Jabhat al-Nusra, Ansar al-Shari'a (Yemen, Libya), Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Egypt), Ahrar al-Sham (Syria), Ansar Dine (Mali), Al-Qaeda Caucasus, Tahreke Taliban (Pakistan), Laskare-Taiba (Pakistan) Haqqani Network (Pakistan), Jama'ah Ansarut Tauhid (Indonesia)</p>	<p>Boko Haram (Nigeria), Islamic State Khurasan (AFPAK), Wilayat Sinai (Egypt), Jund al-Khilafa (Algeria), Abu Sayyaf (Philippine), Jama'ah Ansar Al-Daulah (Indonesia)</p>
<p>ISLAMIC STATE/ CALIPHATE</p>	<p>A gradual approach to establishing a caliphate/ Islamic state. Wait until society is ready and the timing is ripe. Premature declaration will lead to the defeat of the caliphate. A caliphate will be established at the final stage after defeating the enemy.</p>	<p>Establishing a pan-Islamic state/caliphate is an immediate priority. Revolutionary approach to establishing a caliphate. A caliphate will only be established by eradicating infidels and apostates from Muslim lands before the far enemy can be defeated.</p>
<p>TACTICAL APPROACH</p>	<p>Hit and run, underground transnational operations, targeting big symbolic targets like 9/11, bombing embassies. Avoid indiscriminate attacks (at least in their rhetoric). Affiliates can ally with other jihadist groups.</p>	<p>Capture territory, establish state-like structures, focus on conquering nearby regions, perpetrate transparent brutality, spreading fear. Indiscriminate attacks are permitted especially against Shia and moderate Sunnis (totalitarian model). Exclusive organisation and does not ally with other jihadist groups (takfiri approach)</p>
<p>FUNDING</p>	<p>Osama bin Laden's private wealth, Saudi private donors, other donations and illegal business.</p>	<p>Taxation, selling oil through black markets, donations.</p>

Conclusion

There is no easy method for mapping out the very diverse set of actors and ideologies within the GRMs milieu, but we can place the organisations within the broader landscape of Islamic movements, outlining their different rationales and ideologies. In this article, I have attempted to analyse the evolution and dynamics behind AQ and its affiliates in Southeast Asia, Africa, Yemen, Iraq/Syria. Through this analysis, this paper has shown that this apparent global network of extremism is deeply embedded in local contexts. Almost all GRMs organisations thrived in failed states, where state control and authorities were absent; ongoing ethnic and sectarian conflicts fractured the fabric of society; socio-economic crises and underdevelopment weakened economies and foreign interventions (mainly the Soviet and the US invasion) rallied militant sentiment. It is not possible to provide a full account of the development of these movements, but this article has outlined a practical proposal for further mapping of these groups. Through this introductory exercise, it is hoped further studies will be able to build on the typology discussed, towards a more comprehensive understanding of how these groups develop, fracture, splinter, and re-emerge over time.

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